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Abstract 
 
 
 
Most of the literature on management control systems (MCSs) shows that state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) lack autonomy, do not have clearly defined objectives, and therefore 
have inadequate accounting systems, accountability, and control systems. Whilst some 
researchers claim that privatisation per se should improve this aspect of enterprise 
performance and accountability, others argue that change cannot be brought about 
without accompanying structural, cultural and external environment changes. As a 
result of its economic reform policy, governmental development plans, the need to join 
the WTO, and the need to overcome the poor performance and ineffectiveness of certain 
industries, the Saudi Arabian Government privatised some of its SOEs.    
 
This study is an exploratory investigation into the effect of such policy on two selected 
organisations and their MCSs in Saudi Arabia. Its main objective is to describe the 
nature of control systems before privatisation and determine the impact it has 
subsequently had on the companies in question. In addition, it investigates whether 
privatisation was the only reason for change or whether there were other influencing 
factors. The case study was conducted within two Saudi companies that have been 
privatised recently, viz., the Saudi Telecom Company and the Saudi Electricity 
Company. For triangulation purposes, the case study employed three modes of data 
collection: semi-structured interviews, examination of classified official corporate 
documents, and semi-structured interviews with an external related party (the Saudi 
Investment Authority).  
 
The main finding of the study is that privatisation alone cannot change MCSs: without 
changes in organisational structure, culture and the external environment, the 
privatisation process cannot effectively achieve its objectives. The study found out that 
although both companies were privatised, changes in their respective control systems 
were different for three main reasons. (1) The degree of competition: the 
telecommunication sector becomes more competitive and therefore the Telecom 
Company had to develop very efficient control systems so it could compete in the 
market. However the Saudi Electricity Company continued to dominate the market and 
as result there was no strong motive to apply stringent MCS. (2) Managerial power 
within the two organisations: Whereas in Saudi Electricity engineering managers were 
dominant and therefore highly influential on the kind of changes the company was 
seeking, in the Saudi Telecom Company accounting managers dominated and were very 
different in their attitude towards changing control systems. (3) Government 
involvement: Saudi Electricity had very limited autonomy since the Government was 
still the main decision maker on factors such as pricing and policy, whereas Saudi 
Telecom had a considerable level of autonomy in its policy making.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
State-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) reform is a worldwide phenomenon. Since the 1970s, 
governments throughout the world have undertaken reforms that improve the market-
orientation of their policies, e.g. trade liberalisation, deregulation of domestic markets, 
and privatisation of SOEs, in order to improve economic efficiency and maintain long-
term growth (Campos and Esfahani, 2000). 
 
State-owned enterprises, mainly in developing countries, are often inefficient and 
insufficiently accountable due to many factors, for example, lack of clearly defined 
objectives; overstaffing; lack of resources; time and cost overruns; inefficiency of huge 
inventories; poor quality products; lack of autonomy, control, qualifications, 
competition and incentives linked to performance; inadequate measures for judging 
performance; insufficient compensation and training; lack of necessary information due 
to inadequate accounting systems; weak management; wrong or controlled pricing 
policy; recruitment, promotion and training policy; lack of auditor general power; 
ineffective internal or external control; inadequate financial targets, and failure to 
expand services to meet rapidly growing demand (Harris, 2003; Ayub and Hegstad, 
1986; Shirley and Nellis, 1991; Shirley 1983’ Aharoni, 1986; Singh, 2000; Ramamurti, 
1991; Pallot, 1998; McCrae and Aiken, 1988). Privatisation has made accounting 
research more significant. The policy of privatisation has become an important element 
in the development programme of developing countries. Accounting is considered as 
the driving force in these new policies (Sobhan, 1991; Wickramasinghe, 1996; World 
Bank, 1995). 
 
During the past two decades the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been the subject of rapid 
economic development in all areas, including the business sector. Therefore, in Saudi 
Arabia, a privatisation programme has been initiated to overcome the inefficiency of the 
public sector and to achieve economic development. It is assumed that under the 
privatisation programme management control systems will became effective, of the 
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change to private ownership (Uddin, 2004).  The main objectives of this research are to 
study the changes that privatisation has made in management accounting control 
systems (MACS) in privatised Saudi Arabian companies, and find out whether 
privatisation alone has an effect on MACS or there are other factors has be taken into 
consideration. 
 
This chapter aims to describe the research problem, starting with describing the 
background of the study, then declaring its aim and objectives, specifying the research 
methodology and outlining the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Background of the Research Problem 
Saudi Arabia is a comparatively young country, established on 18 September 1932. The 
Saudi government took advantage of the oil boom years in the 1970s, and established a 
modern state and world-class infrastructure as an instrument to speed up development in 
the country, including railways, airlines, ports, water, electricity, postal and 
telecommunications activity. At that time, the government was the only body able to 
establish these huge projects to fulfil basic requirements and provide public services to 
the society. However, during the last three decades, the Saudi economy has witnessed 
growing budget deficits coupled with high population growth, low investment in 
infrastructure, and poor performance and ineffectiveness. As a consequence there has 
been increasing pressure to restructure and diversify the Saudi economy in order to 
engage in the global trend towards enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
public sector and developing the private sector. Therefore, privatisation has become a 
necessity for state-owned enterprises, which are considered major players in economic 
performance and social activities in the country. 
 
Advocates of privatisation presume that ownership changes will induce superior 
management accounting controls, and hence greater productive and allocative efficiency 
(Adam et al., 1992; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). It is assumed that under the 
privatisation programme, management accounting control systems will be effective as a 
result of private ownership. According to most accounting studies, the market 
mechanism indicates how business functions should be performed. Having received a 
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signal from the market mechanisms, a management accounting control system can 
formulate appropriate strategies and control mechanisms for the enterprise (Uddin, 
1997). However, there are some studies which question the belief that privatisation can 
be the only cause of the change in the management accounting control systems in 
privatised organisations especially in developing countries (Uddin and Hopper, 2003; 
Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). Flamholz, Das and Tsui (1985) state that the three 
elements of the context of management control (external environment, organisational 
structure, and organisational culture) can be effective as well as the change on the 
ownership status.  
 
The interest in changes in management accounting control systems due to the changes 
on ownership signify a need for research on accounting in the context of recent changes 
in developing countries. Unfortunately, no attempt has been directed towards 
understanding the management accounting control systems and privatisation in Saudi 
Arabia. As far as the research shows, almost all authors have been concerned with 
financial accounting. This study is motivated by this deficiency. Therefore, this study 
aims to investigate the changes that occur in management accounting control systems 
after privatisation and explore whether privatisation was the only reason for the changes 
or whether there were other factors. 
   
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Study 
It appears that there is lack of empirical literature and clear understanding of 
management accounting control systems in privatised Saudi Arabian companies. In 
principle, this study will attempt to investigate the changes that appear in management 
accounting control systems due to the privatisation in Saudi Arabia. It is hoped that 
such a study will make a highly significant contribution to knowledge in general and to 
the organisations and the government of Saudi Arabia, as the government is in the 
process of privatising other state-owned enterprises. Its importance to the organisation 
and the Saudi economy in general can be gauged from the fact that a large number of 
participants in the research enthusiastically asked to be shown the final report of its 
findings and recommendations. This may also be because of the general dearth of this 
kind of research work in the Saudi public and private sectors.  
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This research has the following objectives: 
 
1. To investigate the nature of change in management accounting control systems 
in the two post-privatisation Saudi companies; 
2. To determine the factors other than privatisation that led changes in the 
management accounting control systems in the selected companies; 
3. To examine whether privatisation improve management accounting control 
systems or not; 
4. To examine the impact of cultural, political and structural factors on the changes 
in the management control systems of Saudi privatised companies; 
5. Propose recommendations drawn from findings relating to Saudi privatised 
companies that might assist the government of Saudi Arabia when it privatise 
other organisation. 
 
To address these objectives, the following research questions were developed: 
 
I. What were the changes that appear in the aspects of management accounting 
control systems in privatised Saudi companies? 
II. What were the factors that affected the changes on the management accounting 
control systems other than privatisation? 
III. Does privatisation improve management accounting control systems? 
 
 
This research is not intended to be a comparative study of the impact of privatisation on 
management accounting control systems in different countries, but a comprehensive 
analysis of changes on management accounting control systems due to privatisation in 
the Saudi Arabian context. It is not intended to generalise the findings to other 
companies on other countries, as it is well known that cultural, legal and political 
differences exist between countries and that findings from one context cannot be 
extrapolated to another.  
 
 
5 
 
1.3 Research Methodology  
The design of research in management accounting can take several forms: it can be 
either normative or positive and it can be based on either theory or practice. The major 
methods used will be descriptive case study and semi-structured interview surveys.  
 
In order to accomplish the research objectives, the researcher needs first to have a 
general understanding of the organisational practices and values that influence 
management control systems. Thus the first stage of this research is devoted to 
reviewing the literature on management accounting control systems in general and its 
relation to privatisation in particular. This investigation aims to provide a better 
understanding of the meaning, aspects and the boundaries of these phenomena.  
This empirical study is based secondly on extensive in-depth interviews with 
respondents at various levels in two Saudi privatised companies and 3 governmental 
officials. The purpose of these interviews is to explore the investigated organisations’ 
previous and current MACS and the role of privatisation in changing it. The 
examination of highly confidential organisations’ documentations is used on the study. 
As a result, this case study employs a methodological triangulation approach, 
combining qualitative methods and documentation, through the complementary use of 
primary data (interviews) and the examination of highly confidential documents 
(secondary data) pertaining to the MACS of the organisations.  
 
In terms of validity, as noted earlier, it is not intended to generalise the findings of this 
research to other companies or SOEs. Hence, external validity is not a concern here; 
instead, the focus is on internal validity. In other words, could the research be repeated 
to produce the same results? The research was designed to meet this criterion. More 
details concerning the utilisation of these methods and data analysis techniques are to be 
found in Chapter Four.  
 
1.4 The Significance of the Study 
As stated earlier, this study seeks to explore and understand the changes that occur on 
MACS as a result of privatization in Saudi Arabia. A number of arguments justify the 
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importance of this study. First of all, the importance’s of the issue of management 
accounting control systems and changes in them to all companies in any country. 
Second, privatisation in Saudi Arabia is a new issue that needs more in-depth 
investigation, especially due to the lack of empirical literature and clear understanding 
of MACS in Saudi SOEs and private companies. Third, as far as the researcher is aware, 
this study is the first empirical exploration of management accounting control systems 
and the changes that appear in it as a result of privatization in any country that is a 
member of Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)1 including Saudi Arabia. Fourth, this 
study will provide policy makers in any developing country especially Saudi Arabia 
with information on the steps and the aspects that the country should take in any 
privatized sector in order to enable the privatization policy to be affected in regard to 
MACS. Fifth, because the study is conducted through interaction with the subjects, this 
will enable the individual organizational actors to come to a better understanding of 
themselves and the MACS in their respective organizations. Sixth, it is anticipated that 
the results of this study will be useful not only to Saudi Arabia but also internationally, 
to private investors because it will clarify many current and future obstacles regarding 
MACS, and it is hoped that other developing countries, especially the members of GCC 
which have a similar environment to that of Saudi Arabia, will benefit from the 
knowledge gained. This knowledge should allow future useful comparisons and 
extrapolations. At the national level, the study is hoped to be of particular interest to 
state-owned enterprises’ managements, controllers, boards of directors and decision 
makers, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning and Economy, the 
Consultative Council, General Investment Authority, Universities, Educational and 
Training Institutes, Accounting and Consulting firms, Banks, and Potential Investors. 
Internationally, this study will attempt to fill the wide gap in the international literature 
on management accounting reform that stressed by Enthoven (1998) and Lapsley 
(1993).  
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters including this introductory chapter (see Figure 1.1 
The Structure of the Study).  
 
                                                 
1
 This is including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. 
7 
 
Chapter One provides a general overview of the research problem under investigation. 
It discusses various issues, including the background to the research problem, research 
objectives, research methodology, the significance and importance of the study, and the 
study structure. 
 
Chapter Two gives an overview of the Saudi economy, a brief history of its political 
systems, a review of major economic developments, directions of development planning 
in Saudi Arabia, reasons for applying privatisation policy in Saudi Arabia and sectors 
that candidates for privatisation, other countries experiences with privatisation including 
developed and developing countries, and overview of the two organisations under study. 
 
Chapter Three contains the literature review; it examines the subject of management 
accounting control systems and provides a broad overview of the relation between 
privatisation and changes on MACS. It provides a better understanding of the main 
themes and aspects of MACS in general and the changes on them due to the 
privatisation. Finally, it provides us with a clear expectation of the changes on MACS 
because of the changes on the ownership status (privatisation). 
 
Chapter Four presents the research design and methodology chosen to address the 
aims and objectives of the study. It explains the reasons for selecting certain data 
collection methods and describes the design of the data collection instruments. It also 
describes the research hypotheses and questions that are investigated in the study.  
 
Chapter Five presents and analyses the results of the qualitative aspects of the case 
study. It presents the changes that occur on MACS on the organisations under study.  
 
Chapter Six provide a discussion of the changes that occur on MACS based on the 
analyses on chapter five and reveal the other factors that have implications on MACS 
beside privatisation. 
 
Finally, Chapter Seven offers a summary and conclusion of the study. In addition, its 
major findings and limitations are discussed and suggestions are made concerning 
possible further research. 
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Chapter 2.   An Overview of Saudi Arabia and Its Economy 
 
Introduction 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not only the homeland of the Arab peoples but also the 
birthplace of Islam, the world's second-largest religion. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
was founded in 1932 by Abd Al Aziz bin Abd Al Rahman Al Saud. The central 
institution of the Saudi Arabian government is the monarchy and Islamic law (Sharia) is 
the primary source of legitimacy. The Sharia has the same status as the constitution and 
the power of the Monarch is not unlimited, as it is constrained by the Sharia (McCurry, 
1994). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains a leading producer of oil and natural gas 
and holds approximately 25 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves (Ministry of 
Economy and Planning, 2006).   
The Saudi government is committed to pursuing economic reforms and diversification 
and promoting foreign investment in the country in the context of Saudi Arabia’s 
accession to the WTO in December 2005. A rapidly growing population, aquifer 
reduction and an economy largely dependent on petroleum output and prices are all 
ongoing government concerns. 
 
This chapter discusses the geography, demography and governance of Saudi Arabia and 
reviews its business environment by looking at the major economic developments 
affecting it.  In the context of this project it specifically examines the reasons behind the 
recent privatisation programme and its implementation.   
 
The chapter is divided into seven main sections, viz., 
(1) Brief description of the location and population of Saudi Arabia;  
(2) Governmental system in the Kingdom and the process of decision-making in 
the country  
(3) Government policy towards business; 
(4)  Major developments in the Saudi economy; 
(5) Development planning in Saudi Arabia’; 
(6) Review of the Saudi public and private sectors; 
10 
 
(7)  Reasons for privatisation in Saudi Arabia and privatisation experiences of 
other countries. 
2.1  Geography and Population 
 
Saudi Arabia has a total area of 2.2 million square kilometres—about 10 times the size 
of the United Kingdom and a third the size of the continental United States (Saudi 
Ministry of Information 1997). The Kingdom covers roughly 80 percent of the Arabian 
Peninsula and is bordered by Iraq and Jordan to the North, Kuwait to the Northeast, the 
Arabian Gulf, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to the East, the Sultanate of 
Oman and the Yemen Republic to the South and by the Red Sea to the West (Figure 2.1 
Map of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia).  
 
Figure 2.1 Map of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
Source from Infoplease, 2005) 
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According to the latest estimates of the Central Department of Statistics, the total 
population was 24 million in 2006, comprising 17.3 million Saudis (73% of the total 
population) and 6.7 million non-Saudis. Saudi Arabia is one of the fastest growing 
nations in the world in terms of population growth, which is expected in the next few 
years to remain exceptionally high, at 3.2 percent per year, in comparison with the 
global growth rate of 1.5 percent (SAMA, 2006).   
 
2.2      Government Systems 
 
Saudi Arabia is an Arab and Muslim state, whose constitution is based on the Qur’an 
(the Book of Allah) and the Sunnah (Words and Practices of the Prophet Mohammed: 
peace be upon him). It is a monarchy, with a King whose official titles include President 
of the Council of Ministers and Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and who occupies 
multiple positions as Head of State, Prime Minister and Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces, formulating and executing national policies. The Deputy Prime Minister, 
who is also the Crown Prince and the Minister of Defence and Inspector General, 
directly assists the King. Other ministers, who are well-known people of intellect and 
wide experience, appointed to the Council of Ministers, provide policy and legislative 
support to the King.  The King also receives advisory support from the Consultative 
Council, the majority of whose members have received their higher education or earned 
postgraduate degrees from among the best universities in the world. 
 
It should be pointed out that the political development of Saudi Arabia differs from that 
of most developing countries. Saudi Arabia has no history of exploitation and 
subjection by any Western colonial power. Al-amri (1982: 54) states: 
 
Most of the developing nations, in their formative stages, were heavily 
influenced by one or the other of the European nations.  Accordingly they 
patterned their independent system of government after those nations… 
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, was never a colony.  Its relations with 
other nations were always on a more remote, more equal basis. And when 
the political system of Saudi Arabia was being formed, it relied on the values 
of the nation, predominantly those of Islam, rather than on a foreign model. 
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In addition to being the most influential Arab country and leader of the Islamic world, 
the Kingdom has maintained a respected and influential position in the international 
community. Saudi Arabia is a founder member of the Congress of the Islamic World, 
the Arab League, and the United Nations, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the 
International Monetary Fund and the G20, and many other international organisations 
(SAMA, 2008).   
 
2.2.1 The Council of Ministers  
In the 1930s, the central administration was established for the first time in Saudi 
Arabia as a result of two independent developments. The first was the discovery in 1938 
of oil, which gave the Kingdom a source of income through which all its needs could be 
met. This required a centralised government to manage its affairs. The second 
development was the increasing complexity of government2. 
 
Prior to the 1992 reforms, the Council of Ministers exercised three main functions of 
government: legislative, executive, and administrative. However, due to the 
establishment of the state Consultative Council in 1992, a new constitution for the 
Council of Ministers was issued in August 1993, which limited the Council of 
Ministers’ responsibilities to mainly exercising executive authority, which it gets 
directly from the King who acts as Chairman of the Council and Prime Minister. 
The council’s executive jurisdiction includes the following functions: 
1.  Monitoring the implementation of statutes, rules, and decrees; 
2. The creation and organization of public services; 
3. Following up implementation of the overall development plan; 
4. Establishing committees that will investigate the progress of the work of 
Ministries and other Governmental bodies or a specific issue3. 
 
Although the establishment of the Consultative Council as part of the 1992 reforms 
reduced the Council of Ministers’ monopoly over the creation of legislation, the Council 
                                                 
2
 Three ministries were established in 1950: Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence. Other ministries, 
including Interior, Communications, Education, Agriculture, Commerce and Health were established in 
1954. The Directorate General of Petroleum and Minerals with other agencies and departments followed 
in 1958. 
3
 Art.24 of the Basic Law of Council of Ministers. 
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of Ministers has the right to look into the decrees of the Consultative Council (Art.19, 
and see section 2.3.2) and may disagree with them. 
 
The King, as President of the Council of Ministers, carries veto power over its 
decisions. In addition, the first and second Deputies report to the President of the 
Council, while Ministers are required to report to the Council and its President. 
Decisions are voted on by the majority of members present, but are not binding until 
approved by His Majesty. One of its main responsibilities is to study the state budget 
before its issuance in accordance with a Royal Decree and vote on it chapter by 
chapter4.  
 
2.2.2 Consultative Council  
In order for a Government to be legitimate in Islam, it must be based on Islamic 
Principles. Consultation is considered an Islamic Principle; therefore, Government must 
encourage consultation and enforce the rule of consultation at every level of 
Governmental operations. The Saudi government is obliged to consult the citizenry on 
public affairs and abide by agreements made in consultation. In March 1992, the King 
announced thirty articles governing the Consultative Council (CC) and it was apparent 
in his speech that this newly established Council was an extension of the existing 
system. The Council started with 60 members (Art.3), was later extended to 
91members, including the Speaker of the Council, and now consists of 150 members. In 
August 1993, the King appointed members of the Council and the Speaker: members 
are selected and appointed from different sectors based on their experience, knowledge, 
and specialization to reflect all professional groups in the country and to reach a balance 
that mirrors Saudi society as a whole. 
 The CC discusses what is sent to it by the King and makes recommendations. It has the 
ability to initiate laws if ten of its members suggest an idea to the King, which may be 
pursued further on this request (Consultative Council Report, 2006). 
 
According to Article 15 of the Basic Law of Government (BLG), the Consultative 
Council gives its opinion on the general policies of State presented before it by the 
President of the Council of Ministers (the King). In particular, the Council may: 
                                                 
4
 Art.26. The Basic Law of Council of Ministers. 
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a) Discuss the general plan of economic and social development and voice its 
opinion on it; 
b) Study laws, regulations, concessions and international treaties and agreements 
and offer suggestions on them; 
c) Interpret laws; 
d) Discuss annual reports submitted by Ministers and other Government agencies 
and offer suggestions on them. 
 
In 2003, the King issued a decree giving the Consultative Council the authority similar 
to the Council of Ministers to propose new laws without first seeking his permission. 
The move was prompted partly by rare protests in favour of Government reform 
(Consultative Council Report, 2006). 
 
2.3 Government Policy on Business 
Until the emergence of the oil industry, Saudi society was basically engaged in 
primitive agriculture, fishing and the Hajj (pilgrimage) trade.  Most of businesses at that 
time were family owned. The first time foreign companies started investing in Saudi 
Arabia was as a result of the discovery of oil.  These companies made significant 
contributions to a successful Saudi economy, although their business aims and 
objectives constrained the time and money that they were able to dedicate to the 
planning of local business development, the major exception being Saudi Aramco, 
which gave much more help to the local businesses than any other Western company 
(Wright, 1996). 
 
The Seventh Plan5 period (2000-2004) saw a number of initiatives aimed at creating a 
conductive business environment and attracting private investment, particularly foreign 
direct investment. The most important of these initiatives are: 
                                                 
5
 Over the last three decades, Saudi Arabia has witnessed gradual rising accumulation of surpluses from 
oil sales with sharp price and production increases, which have continued for quite a time. To utilise these 
surpluses for the development of human and natural resources, the Saudi government started five-year 
development planning in 1970 as a framework for the process of overall development. Development 
plans have been formulated under the guidance of the Ministry of Planning and National Economy and 
with support from other public agencies. These plans have played a crucial role in developing the country. 
So far, Saudi Arabia has accomplished seven five-year development plans and the eighth development 
plan is being implemented during the current period (2005-2009). The five-year plans are prepared 
according to General Objectives and Strategic Bases and are approved by the Consultative Council and 
the Council of Ministers. 
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(1) SAGIA (Saudi Arabia General Investment Agency), which was created to be 
responsible for national and foreign investment affairs. It issues investment 
licences, facilitates procedures for foreign investors via one-stop-shops 
(comprehensive service centres) in all major cities, proposes policies and 
measures for the improvement of the investment climate, promotes investment 
opportunities and provides relevant information.  
(2) The new Foreign Investment Law issued in April 2000 ensures equal treatment 
for national and foreign investors by allowing foreign companies to obtain full 
ownership of projects and pertinent assets, as well as offering equal investment 
incentives including soft loans provided by the Saudi Industrial Development 
Fund (SIDF). Foreign companies are also allowed to carry over their losses for an 
unlimited number of years for purposes of tax, which has also been reduced to 20 
percent of the profits. 
(3) The Capital Market Law, issued in 2003. In view of the significance of the capital 
market in promoting economic growth, and with stock market and other 
mechanisms being considered as instruments for channelling national savings, 
stimulating national investment and attracting foreign investment, the Capital 
Market Law aims at restructuring and regulating the Saudi capital market by 
developing the institutional structure of the market and completing the related 
infrastructure in line with international best practice to ensure transparency and 
safety of dealings. The most significant features of this law are: 
1. The establishment of three new institutions with administrative and 
financial autonomy intended to replace the provisional measures that 
were adopted by the market. These are the Securities Exchange 
Commission (which is considered a supervisory and regulatory body), the 
Securities and Exchange Market and the Securities Depository Centre, as 
custodian of securities and related settlements. 
2. The separation of the supervisory and regulatory role from the executive 
role of the capital market. The former is fulfilled by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the latter by the Securities Market and the 
Securities Depository Centre under private sector management.  
(4) Establishment of the Human Resources Development Fund in 2000. The aim is to 
support the process of training and educating the national workforce.  
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(5) The launch by SIDF, in collaboration with the commercial banks, of a programme 
of support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), under which SIDF 
guarantees up to 75 percent of the loans provided by the commercial banks to 
SMEs (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006). 
 
2.4 Review of Major Economic Developments  
 
This section will provide a detailed description of the economic environment in Saudi 
Arabia. An examination of the Saudi economic environment, focussing particularly on 
the importance and contribution of oil to the whole economy of the Kingdom will be 
presented briefly. Other socioeconomic indicators such as employment, interest rates 
and inflation rates are also discussed.  
 
2.4.1 Economic Environment in Saudi Arabia 
According to the Energy Information Administration (2007), in the context of becoming 
successfully integrated into the global economy, Saudi Arabia, the largest economy in 
the Middle East, has emphasized the importance of regional unity among Gulf States 
economically, politically and militarily. Reflecting positive conditions in the world oil 
market, Saudi Arabia enjoys continued optimism and improvement in the domestic 
investment environment in all sectors of the economy.  This is due to high oil prices, 
increasing oil production and export earnings, coupled with structural reforms, 
economic diversification and stable macroeconomic policymaking (Saudi American 
Bank, 2008).  
 
As shown in Table 2.1 Selected Economic Indicators, the Saudi economy continued to 
record high growth in all sectors during fiscal year 2006, which remains heavily 
dependent on oil and petroleum-related industries, including petrochemicals and 
petroleum refining.  
 
Table 2.1 Selected Economic Indicators  
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Estimated population (million) 21.5 22.0 22.7 23.1 23.7 
GDP at constant price (billion riyals) 707.1 804.6 938.8 1,182.5 1,307.5 
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GDP at constant prices of 1999 (billion riyals) 637.2 686.0 722.2 766.0 798.9 
Non-oil GDP deflator 99.0 102.1 105.9 110.3 110.2 
Inflation rate (consumer prices) 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.7 2.2 
Aggregate money supply M3 (billion riyals) 390.4 417.5 496.1 553.7 660.6 
Average price of Arabian light oil (US$)* 24.32 27.69 34.53 50.15 61.05 
Riyal’s real effective exchange rate (2000=100) 99.0 90.5 84.4 82.3 81.8 
Ratio of currency in circulation to total money supply 13.4 13.3 12.1 11.6 10.5 
Ratio of total deposits to total money supply 86.6 86.7 87.9 88.4 89.5 
Net foreign assets of domestic bank (billion riyals) 52.5 41.0 47.1 26.4 70.6 
Interest rates on domestic currency deposits (3 months) 2.23 1.63 1.73 3.75 5.02 
Bank capital adequacy ratio (Basel standard) 21.3 19.4 17.8 17.8 21.9 
Actual government revenue (billion riyals) 213.0 293.0 392.3 564.3 673.7 
Actual government expenditure (billion riyals) 233.5 257.0 285.2 346.5 393.3 
Ratio of budget deficit /surplus to GDP -2.9 4.5 11.4 18.8 22.2** 
Exports of goods (billion riyals) 271.7 349.7 472.5 677.1 786.6 
Import of goods CIF (billion riyals) 121.0 138.4 167.8 223.0 248.4 
Ratio of current account surplus to GDP 6.3 13.1 20.7 28.5 27.4 
Current account (billion riyals) 44.5 105.2 194.7 337.0 357.7 
Share price index (1985=1000) 2,518.1 4,437.6 8,206.2 16,712.6 7,993.3 
Source: OPEC, 2007 
 
The major indictors show that the oil price had a positive impact on economic 
conditions in 2006. According to OPEC sources, the average price of Arabian light oil 
rose by 42.2 percent to $50.15 a barrel compared to $61.05 a barrel in 2006, which 
increased the actual revenue of Saudi Arabia (SAMA, 2007). 
 
The increase in oil prices had a positive impact on all Saudi economic sectors. As 
shown in Table 2.3, GDP (at current prices) rose by 10.6 percent to SR 1.3 trillion in 
2006, while the real growth was 4.3 percent, amounting to SR 798.9 billion. 
 
Therefore, the budget of Saudi Arabia was in substantial surplus in 2006, amounting to 
SR 289.7 billion or 22.2 percent of GDP.  The balance of payments current account 
recorded a surplus for the eighth consecutive year, increasing by 6.0 percent over the 
preceding year. This growth in the state budget can be seen as resulting from the 
increased oil price in 2007 (ibid). 
 
According to the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA 2007), actual oil revenue 
increased to SR 604,407 million in 2006 (see Table 2.2), when oil revenues stood at 
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89.7% of total revenues, compared to 89.4% in 2005, while non-oil revenue was about 
10.3%, against 10.6% in 2005.  
 
Table 2.2 Actual Oil and non-oil Revenues (million riyal) 
 
Year 
Oil Revenue 
SR                        % 
Non-oil Revenue 
SR                        %  
 
Total 
Revenue 
2002 166,100 78.0 46,900 22.0 213,000 
2003 231,000 78.8 62,000 21.2 293,000 
2004 330,000 84.1 62,291 15.9 392,291 
2005 504,540 89.4 59,795 10.6 564,335 
2006 604,470 89.7 69,212 10.3 673,682 
Source: Ministry of Finance Report, 2007 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Distribution of the State Budget 2006 and 2007 (by major sectors) 
 2006 
    
Million SR    % of total 
2007 
    
Million SR    % of total 
Human resources development  87,164 26.0  96,483 25.4 
Transport and communication   9,804 2.9  11,329 3.0 
Economic resources development  12,454 3.7  13,902 3.6 
Health services and social development  26,798 8.0  31,902 3.6 
Infrastructure development    4,555 1.4    5,188 1.3 
Municipal services  11,588 3.5  13,576 3.6 
Defence and national security 110,779 33.1 132,922 35.0 
Public administration, utilities & general items   62,814 18.7  61,756 16.2 
Government specialized credit institutions        575 0.2    1,026 0.3 
Subsidies     8,469 2.5   12,808 3.4 
Total 335,000 100 380,000 100 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2008) 
 
The allocation of finance for each of the major sectors increased at varying rates in 2007 
compared to 2006 as it shown from Table 2.3. 
 
2.4.2 Major Socioeconomic Objectives 
In addition to the enhancement of economic growth, employment, exports and the 
diversification of economic activities, the objectives of the Saudi Eighth Development 
Plan (2005-2009) includes greater attention to the provision of care to poor social 
groups and basic health and education services, and balanced distribution of the benefits 
of development among all regions of the Kingdom. In response to regional and 
international economic developments, the Plan adopts the objectives of strengthening 
economic integration among GCC states, enhancing Arab economic cooperation and 
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accelerating the process of merging into the global economy (Ministry of Economy and 
Planning, 2006). 
 
Table 2.4 shows the main macroeconomic indicators and targets during the Eighth 
Development Plan as compared with the recorded achievements of the Seventh 
Development Plan. The macroeconomic projections were developed after taking into 
consideration the internal and external variables that had a direct or indirect impact on 
the Eighth Development Plan. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Table 2.4 Macroeconomic Indicators of the Eight-Development Plan Compared with the 
Seventh Development Plan (%) 
Indicators 
7th Development  
Plan (actual)  
2000-2004 
8th Development  
Plan (targeted) 
2005-2009 
A)   Growth rates (annual average)   
* Real GDP (1) 3.44 4.6 
- Oil sector (2) 2.59 2.73 
-  Non-oil sector 3.93 5.21 
e) Private sector 4.28 5.68 
f) Government sector 2.95 3.82 
* Gross fixed capital formation 4.4 10.72 
 -  Oil sector 16.92 20.12 
 -  Non-oil private sector 2.32 10.45 
 -  Government sector 10.33 3.18 
* Goods and services exports 3.72 3.03 
* Goods and services imports 7.32 4.57 
B)    As share of GDP at current prices (3)   
* Gross savings 39.8 40.8 
* State budget balance 9.4 1.4 
* Current account balance 21.8 18.02 
C)    Unemployment and inflation rates   
* Inflation rate (4) - 0.60 0.60 
* Unemployment rate (5) 7.04 2.84 
 -  Males 5.63 2.42 
 -  Females 15.86 4.35 
 Source: Macroeconomic Projections, Ministry of Economy and Planning (2006). 
Notes: 
• At constant 1419/20 (1999) prices. 
• Crude oil, natural gas and petroleum refining products. 
• By the end of the Plan. 
• Average annual growth of consumer prices. 
• Exclusive to Saudi labour force as a percentage of labour force by the end of the Seventh 
and Eighth Plans. 
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2.4.2.1 Cost of Living 
As Table 2.1 Selected Economic Indicators shows, the general cost of cost of living 
index (1999=100) registered an increase of 2.2 percent in 2006. The wholesale price 
index recorded an increase of 1.1 percent in the same year, while the non-oil GDP 
deflator declined by 0.1 percent (SAMA, 2007).  
The average inflation rate as measured by annual changes in the cost of living indices 
during the twelve months to March 2008 rose by 5.4% (Saudi American Bank, 2008). 
During the period April 2007-March 2008, the rate of inflation for goods and services 
surpassed the rates of the previous five years (2002-2006).  
The group of renovation, rent, fuel and water rose by 10.7 %, food and beverages by 
8.0%, goods and other services by 6.8 %, medical care by 5.6 %, education and 
entertainment by 0.7 % and transport and telecommunications by 0.3 % (SAMA, 2007). 
2.4.2.2 Interest Rates 
The body responsible for fixing the interest rate in the Kingdom is the Saudi Arabia 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), which, like any other central bank, employs interest rates 
as one of the tools to control the money supply in the economy. In comparison to a rise 
of 1.64 percentage points to 5.13 % in the Eurodollar rate in 2006, the average interest 
rate for three month riyal deposits rose by 1.26 percentage points to 5.02 percent. The 
smaller increase in the riyal deposit rate than in the Eurodollar deposit rate resulted in 
the differential between the two average rates turning in favour of the dollar rate to the 
extent of 11 basis points. The trend from 2002 to 2006 is shown in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5 Interest Rates on Riyal and Euro $ Deposits 
 (Average rate on 3-month deposits) 
 
Year Saudi Riyal 
Deposit 
Euro $ 
Deposit 
Differential 
between Riyal 
and Euro $ rate 
2002 2.23 1.71 0.52 
2003 1.63 1.11 0.52 
2004 1.73 1.53 0.20 
2005 3.76 3.49 0.27 
2006 5.02 2.13 -0.11 
Source: SAMA, 2007 
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2.4.2.3 Exchange Rate  
The riyal is pegged to the dollar and this remains a central principle of policy6. SAMA 
maintained the riyal exchange rate with the US dollar at 3.75 per dollar during 2006.  
This rate was made official on January 1, 2003. The declining trend in both the nominal 
and real effective exchange rates of the riyal continued during 2006. The index of 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)7 (year 2000=100) declined steadily from 103.5 
in 2002 to 90.3 in 2006.  Likewise, the index of real effective exchange rate (REER)8 
fell from 99.0 in 2002 to 81.8 in 2006, as shown in Table 2.6 (IME, 2007).   
 
Table 2.6 Indices of Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates (2000=100) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
NEER 103.5 95.9 91.2 90.6 90.3 
REER   99.0 90.5 84.4 82.3 81.8 
Source: IME’s International Financial Statistics, 2007. 
 
The riyal briefly rose to a 20-year high after the US Federal Reserve cut its interest rates 
in September 2007 and SAMA decided not to follow this cut, partly due to concerns 
about the inflationary effects of low interest rates and a lower value for the riyal, which 
returned to its peg against the US dollar in early December of 2007 (SAMA, 2007). 
2.4.2.4 Unemployment  
 
During the mid to late 1980s, in the wake of high oil prices, the oil-producing countries 
of the Middle East experienced rapid development, which contributed to economic 
growth, infrastructure development and the expansion of public goods provision, and 
finally created excess labour demand that could not be met by domestic resources. 
Foreign workers were therefore imported to fill the gaps (Ruppert, 1998). 
The economies of GCC countries became highly centralized and dominated by the 
public sector, partially due to the presence of large publicly owned oil-related 
industries. In order to implement national development plans, the demand for qualified 
workers increased in both public and private sectors during the period of economic 
                                                 
6
 All GCC member countries have the US dollar as official anchor for their currencies. 
7
 NEER represents the trade-weighted average of the Riyal’s bilateral exchange rates with currencies of 
selected countries and the Euro area. 
8
 REER represents adjusted for relative movements in price level indicators of Saudi Arabia, selected 
countries and the Euro area. 
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boom. However, at the same time, the Ministry of Economy and Planning reported an 
annual growth in unemployment of 9.8 percent, bringing the unemployment rate to 
12.02 percent of the total labour force in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with 
unemployment among Saudi males at 9.07 percent and among females at 26.27 percent, 
as Table 2.7 shows. 
 
Table 2.7 Unemployment Rate by Sex and Nationality 
Year Saudi 
Male           Female      
Total 
Non-Saudi 
Male           Female      
Total 
Total 
Male           Female      
Total 
2000 6.54 17.64  8.15 1.13 0.96 1.11 3.78 9.34 4.57 
2001 6.82 17.32  834   .98 0.60 0.93 3.87 9.14 4.46 
2002 7.57 21.70   9.66   .82 0.62 0.79 4.21 11.51 5.27 
2003 8.00 23.18 10.35   .80 0.79 0.79 4.36 12.51 5.56 
2004 8.39 24.40 10.97   .77 0.93 0.80 4.49 13.36 5.82 
2005 8.74 25.41 11.52   .75 1.06 0.80 4.60 14.07 6.05 
2006 9.07 26.27 12.02   .74 1.17 0.80 4.71 14.69 6.25 
Source: Ministry of Economy and planning, 2007  
 
Apart from historical reasons, other factors can be identified as being influential in 
determining the supply of and demand for skilled workers in the Saudi labour market. 
These include a wide range of determinants such as social, economic, political, 
educational, and managerial and externally influenced factors. In general, it is agreed 
“education will be the main inspiration for altering and solving the major problems of 
human resources development in Saudi Arabia” (Al-Abdulwahed, 1981: 186).  
The researcher believes that the increasing levels of unemployment among Saudi 
nationals can be attributed primarily to the poor quality of the Saudi educational system. 
There is also a tendency for young Saudis to be reluctant to take basic low-level 
positions and work their way up into positions of responsibility, as happens in Western 
countries.  Instead, there is an expectation among them that they will be able to enter 
employment in high-level positions where they would supervise other employees who 
might be more experienced than them. 
2.4.2.5 Public Debt. 
 
Until 1988, Saudi Arabia financed its deficits through a drawdown of government 
deposits. The practice of financing the deficit through domestic borrowing started in 
1988 when SR 42 billion (15% of GDP) worth of Government bonds were issued to 
commercial banks and autonomous Government organisa
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rapid build-up in the Saudi internal debt, from SR 237 billion in 1992, or 51% of GDP, 
to SR 650 billion in 2002 equal to 94% of 2002 GDP of SR 659 billion. The public debt 
has continued to rise, reaching nearly 100% of GDP (NCB, 2003). Most of the debt is 
owed to Governmental organizations, which reduces the risks associated with high 
levels of debts. Nevertheless, the Government must still make interest payments on all 
of its debt, and this debt servicing has become a significant part of the budget: SAMA-
estimated SR 32 billion, or 15% of actual expenditures in 2002 at a 5% rate of interest 
(MECG, 2000, and SAMBA, 2002).  
Allocation of the debt between organizations is as follows: 
 
a) Special Government Bond” holders hold SR 235.7 billion. Special bonds 
have been as hoc issuances ad bonds primarily to contractors to honor, late 
payment obligations of the government. 
b)  Farmers and contractors hold SR 37 billion. The government has issued 
special bonds or “Farmers Certificates” to farmers over the past several 
years for late payment for government purchase of crops. 
c) SR 137.9 billion is held by the Retirement Pensions Agency. This pension 
fund manages the retirement pension programmes for government 
employees. 
d) SR 120 billion is held by the commercial banks in Saudi Arabia. 
e) The General Organization holds SR 68.4 billion for Social Insurance 
(GOSI). This organization manages the retirement pension of Saudis 
employed in private sector. 
f) Other establishments and funds hold SR 54.8 billion. (SAMBA, 2002). 
 
Because of the increase of the Saudi budget and huge surplus on its budget due to the 
increase of the oil prices the Saudi government managed to reduce the amount of public 
debt from SR 660billion in 2002 to be SR237 billion in 2008 equal to %13.5 of GDP 
(Arab News, 2009). 
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2.5 Directions of Development Planning in Saudi Arabia9 
According to the Ministry of Economy and Planning (2006b), planning for development 
is a process that is intended to bring about phased and orderly socio-economic 
transformation from an existing state to a new more desirable state. In the context of 
setting targets, the planning process and the plan document give due consideration to 
domestic and external conditions and challenges, which are prioritized in terms of their 
nature and the extent of their impact on the development process. The efficiency of the 
planning process depends on its capacity for continuous renewal and adaptation, in 
order to keep up with the changes and specific conditions of the individual phases of 
development. Thus, where planning is a means of meaningful socioeconomic 
development, the methodology of planning is the structure of that process. The Saudi 
government started five-year development planning in 1970 as a framework for the 
process of overall development to utilise the surpluses from oil sales arising from sharp 
price increases and its ability to increase oil production. These development plans, 
which have been formulated under the guidance of the Ministry of Economy and 
Planning with the support of other public agencies, have played a crucial role in the 
economic development of Saudi Arabia. To date, Saudi Arabia has accomplished seven 
five-year plans and the eighth development plan is being implemented during the 
current period (2005-2009).  
 
2.5.1 Integrated Strategic Planning 
The strategic dimension has been an essential element of the development planning 
process employed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In fact, any development plan has 
to be guided by a vision and a strategic perspective. Over the first five development 
plans, a set of ‘General Objectives and Strategic Principles’ served as the strategic 
dimension and provided the general framework for the objectives, policies and 
programmes of individual plans. Taking a step forward, over and above its general 
objectives and strategic principles, overseen by the Supreme Economic Council and 
approved by the Consultative Council and the Council of Ministers, the Seventh 
Development Plan adopted a long-term perspective vis-à-vis the national economy. 
 
                                                 
9
 Most of the information and economic statistics in this section are based on the reports issued by the 
Ministry of Economy and Planning, Saudi Arabia. 
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2.5.1.1 The Plan’s Indicative Role 
Starting with the Fifth Development Plan (1990-1994), the process of planning for 
development adopted a methodology of indicative planning for the private sector, as a 
complementary approach to the directive planning methodology adopted vis-à-vis the 
public sector. However, certain aspects of the Eighth Plan methodology have been 
further developed to enhance the Plan’s indicative role. This development comes in 
response to the growing role of the private sector over recent years and the expected 
further expansion of that role over the coming years, prompted by the progress of 
privatisation and the process of stimulation of private investments. Among the aspects 
that have been developed are: 
• Increased emphasis on effective policies and improved transparency in 
their implementation. 
• Ensuring that policies are accompanied by relevant implementation 
mechanisms, and setting of specific quantitative and time-bound targets 
for these mechanisms. This will allow for effective monitoring and 
evaluation of performance and efficiency of policies by responsible 
agencies. 
• Listing of strategic projects into a separate chapter of the Plan document. 
The list provides data on project volumes and investment requirements 
and, as such, provides an indicator to the business sector of the size and 
nature of the Plan’s investment priorities. (Ministry of Economy and 
Planning, 2006b). 
 
2.5.1.2 The Plan’s Directive Role 
The emphasis on policies and objectives, particularly those relating to activities and 
outputs, aims at strengthening the role of the implementing agencies at all levels of 
government, in achieving the Plan’s objectives through the selection of the best possible 
programmes, projects and other activities. The process of setting policy objectives 
coupled with relevant implementation mechanisms allows the agencies responsible for 
follow-up and monitoring to improve their performance in carrying out these tasks. 
 
On the other hand, the emphasis on activities and their outputs, the establishment of 
indicators for measurement of the output and the setting of targets for these indicators 
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will contribute to the improved efficiency of the agencies involved, because 
performance criteria are tied directly to activity objectives. For example, the objective 
of health activity is to improve health standards. While health sector inputs, including 
hospitals, physicians and health centres are essential to improve health standards, they 
are not sufficient by themselves. Thus, activity output indicators provide a direct 
reflection of service standards and other activity objectives. 
 
Table 2.8 makes it evident how closely Government expenditure follows the fortunes 
of the Kingdom’s oil revenue, with the Seventh plan (2000-2004) not reaching the peak 
of the ‘boom years’ of the Third plan (1980-1984). The researcher expects in this 
current development plan (2005-2009) that government expenditure will be the more 
than in any previous development plan, due to the huge oil price increase during 2008. 
 
Table 2.8 Expenditure (billion riyal) by Saudi Development Plan (1970-2004) 
 
Expenditure 
First 
plan 
Second 
Plan 
Third 
Plan 
Fourth 
Plan 
Fifth Plan Sixth Plan Seventh 
Plan 
SR   % SR % SR % SR % SR % SR % SR % 
Economic 
resources 
development 
9.5 27.7 97.3 28.0 192.2 30.0 71.2 20.4 34.0 10.0 48.2 11.5   41.7   8.5 
Human 
resources 
development 
7.0 20.6 51.0 14.7 115.0 18.5 115.1 33.0 164.6 48.0 216.6 51.5 276.9 56.7 
Social and 
health 
development 
3.5 10.3 27.6   8.0   61.2   9.9 61.9 17.7 68.0 20.1 87.5 20.8   95.8 19.6 
Infrastructure 
development 
14.1 41.4 171.3 49.3 256.8 40.8 100.7 28.9 74.2 21.9 68.1 16.2   73.8 15.2 
Total 34.1 100 347.2 100 653.2 100 348.9 100 340.9 100 420.4 100 488.2 100 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006 
 
 
The growth targets of the Eighth Development Plan (2005-2009) were set up in a 
manner that reflects the strategic directions of the Kingdom’s long-term economic 
development. These include improvement of the standard of living of Saudi citizens, 
development of human resources, diversification of the economic base and a rise in the 
productivity level of the Saudi economy. The most important objectives and policies of 
the Eighth Development Plan (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006) are 
summarised as follows: 
• Increasing economic growth rates. 
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• Increasing the private sector’s contribution to economic growth and national 
income. 
• Diversifying the economic base. 
• Improving the balance of payments position in favour of the Kingdom. 
•  Realizing a high degree of economic balance and price stability. 
•  Realizing balanced development in all regions of the Kingdom. 
 
2.5.2 Implications of the Saudi’s Accession to the WTO 
Saudi Arabia has concluded bilateral market access negotiations with all interested 
WTO Members. The WTO General Council formally concluded negotiations with 
Saudi Arabia on 11 November 2005 on the terms of the country’s accession and Saudi 
Arabia became a full WTO Member on 11 December 2005. 
 
There were many advantages of accession to the WTO, the most important of which was 
encouraging private sector investors to establish export-oriented industries, as a result 
improving the competitiveness of national products in local and global markets. It also 
enabled the Kingdom to make use of the trade laws and rules in protecting its foreign 
trade sector against unfair practices, such as dumping, imposing arbitrary duties, 
commercial counterfeiting of products and other practices which might have adversely 
affected the stability and development of trade.  
The Kingdom was also able to avoid the unilateral measures and differential trade 
policies practiced by some countries since its exports were no longer subject to dumping 
or counter-tariffs unless within the provisions of WTO legislation. Similarly, the 
Kingdom had the right, according to WTO laws, to resort to various measures to protect 
its trade interests. 
 
The Kingdom’s petrochemical exports were the major beneficiary of the positive 
impacts stated above due to the reduction of custom duties in the WTO member 
countries as well as the removal of constraints, which were hindering penetration into 
the markets of these countries. These factors improved the competitiveness of 
petrochemicals exports. 
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The most serious negative implication of the Kingdom’s accession to WTO lay in the 
increased foreign competition in Saudi domestic markets, particularly in banking, 
telecommunications and consulting services, as well as consumer products.  
 
 
2.5.3 Activation of the Saudi Stock Market 
The endorsement of the Capital Market Law by the Council of Ministers in 2003 
represented a major step towards restructuring the Saudi stock market.   It was able to 
operate more efficiently and expand and create effective instruments for investment of 
savings, while promoting the requirements of transparency, equity and protection of 
dealers. The Saudi stock market is the largest and most active in the Gulf region in terms 
of market capitalization, which reached SR 891 billion in the first quarter of 2007  
(Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2 General Share Price Index (1985=1000) 
Source: SAMA, 2007 
 
In 2006, the number of shares traded rose by 11.6 percent to 68.5 billion, compared 
to 61.4 billion in 2005, due to the effect of the split in April 2006 of the nominal 
value of the shares of all listed companies into SR 10 per share instead of SR 50 per 
share. Therefore, the number of transactions increased by 106.2 percent to 96.1 
million, compared to 46.6 million in the preceding year, with 86 companies trading 
on the Saudi share market at the end of 2006 having an average market capitalization 
of $3,800.6 million per company (SAMA, 2007). 
 
Comparative studies also indicate the possibility of making the stock market more 
developed and comprehensive. However, this will depend to a great extent on the 
effectiveness of the rules to be set by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
regarding the regulation of transactions and conditions for listing of companies in the 
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market, as well as the removal of the constraints, which impede the development of 
the market. In this context, the following mechanisms may contribute to the creation 
of an appropriate investment climate to facilitate the development of the Saudi stock 
market: 
1) Putting more effort into implementation of the Capital Market Law with regard 
to restructuring and regulating investment in securities and providing more 
transparency and financial disclosure to companies which issue shares, to assure 
the safety of dealing in the traded securities.  
2) Ensuring measures for the activation of the primary market for shares. The 
existence of an active primary market is a precondition for an active stock 
market, since it allows the listing of new shares, thereby enhancing the scope and 
activities of the market. It is noteworthy that the level of activity of the Saudi 
primary stock market remains weak. Only 13 companies have been added to the 
companies listed on the market over the last decade, contributing to an increase 
of market capitalization of only 3 percent. To address this weakness and to 
activate the primary market, it may be necessary to: 
a. Accelerate the implementation of the privatization programme. 
b. Encourage the transformation of family-owned companies into joint-
stock companies, which could be listed on the stock market. 
3) Establishing investment banks that will set up and manage investment funds and 
portfolios, as well as providing investment trust services including advice to 
investors, marketing of securities covering public subscriptions and delivering 
other services related to the activation of security markets. 
4) Allowing foreigners to invest in shares of some companies listed in the Saudi 
stock market. This will contribute to channelling the savings of foreigners 
residing in the Kingdom towards productive activities in the Saudi domestic 
economy.  
5) Evaluating the influence of banks’ financing of investment in securities. It is 
noteworthy that bank finance of private sector investments in securities 
increased in 2004 by 49 percent as compared to 2003. This may be one of the 
reasons behind the sharp rise in the general stock price index during 2004. 
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2.6 Public and Private Sectors in Saudi Arabia 
 
Public and private sectors play a crucial role on the Saudi Arabian economy. This 
section will describe the background and development of both sectors. 
2.6.1 Public Sector in Saudi Arabia  
The public sector in Saudi Arabia has grown in parallel with the development of the 
Kingdom itself. At the beginning of the 1970s, the start of economic development in the 
country, Saudi Arabia lacked infrastructure projects and its private sector was unable to 
provide the financial resources and administrative potentialities necessary to execute 
large-scale economic projects to meet the requirements of growth.  
At the same time the intention was to redistribute the increasing income from oil in the 
form of services and public utilities to all community categories at low prices (AL-
Shakawi, 2002).  
 
Trivedi (2002) divided the growth of the public sector into three stages as follows: 
a) Foundation of Public Administration (1902-1953): 
The focus of this stage was on management of individuals without any attempt to create 
a centralized administrative structure. Governors ruled regions with other officials, 
judges and treasurers undertaking principal administrative duties; 
 
b) Centralisation of Public Administration (1953-1969): 
All Government bodies were brought together under the supervision of a single agency 
when the Council of Ministers was established as a central administration in the 
Kingdom. After World War II, there was a tremendous demand for oil, which increased 
Governmental revenue from SR 172 million in 1945 to SR 1,355 million in 1954, and 
led to an increase in the size and responsibilities of Government bodies.  This in turn 
put great pressure on public agencies because they were unable to cope with the new 
practices due to lack of qualification. As a result an administrative gap started to emerge 
and became this became even more evident when the Government was faced with a 
serious financial crisis in 1956.  This crisis was mainly due to excessive spending and 
weak financial control policies within Government departments and drew attention to 
the need to develop modern administrative and public management systems. A serious 
attempt was subsequently made to start a process of administrative reform to create a 
solid central administration within the country; 
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c) Foundation of the Development Administration (1970-Present): 
The launch of the First Development Plan saw the introduction of the Development 
Administration. A number of public enterprises were created to accelerate the 
development process. This was preceded by the creation of centralized Government 
machinery and public agencies capable of planning and executing development projects. 
 
2.6.2 Private Sector in Saudi Arabia  
 
The nature and the scope of economic activity by the Saudi private sector and the 
development of its institutions have been closely linked to the Kingdom’s overall 
development path since the adoption of the First Development Plan. Unlike the situation 
in some countries, the Saudi private sector’s progress has never faced ideological 
constraints, as the Government has consistently shown, both by its stated policies in the 
Development Plan documents and by its actions. 
Its commitment to principles are based first, on the Islamic Sharia and traditions that 
foster freedom for individuals to engage in economic activity of their own choice, and 
second, the philosophy of the market economy, with free access for all individuals and 
groups, as stated in Development Plans and guaranteed by the state.  
During the Second and Third Development Plans, the increase in government 
expenditure, which was of historic proportions, began to shape the modern emerging 
private sector more forcefully. It successfully implemented a wide range of industrial, 
agricultural, healthcare, transport and operations and maintenance projects, establishing 
complementary links between the public and private sectors and avoiding any 
contradictions. (Alsughayer, 2001). 
 
The tremendous expenditure, as a result of the booming economy and huge revenues 
from 1975 until early 1990s, led to private and public sector complacency about 
expenditure. Unfortunately, this attitude had negative consequences for the Saudi 
economy and society. It had created a growing private sector and a population 
dependent on state expenditure, with the result that both private sector and individuals 
had become interested in the state’s policies and performance (Aldamer, 1995).  
However, in the late 1990s encouraging signs of a more mature and autonomous private 
sector began to appear where reliance on Government expenditure had been reduced. At 
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the beginning of the Sixth Plan, several factors indicating the beginning of the private 
sector’s growth were evident, providing grounds for optimism that the private sector 
would undertake an increasingly important role and become a major driving force for 
growth in the Saudi economy in the future (Alsughayer, 2001).  
The Seventh Plan (2000-2005) was anticipated to continue reforms of privatisation and 
economic diversification of the economy and to add even greater emphasis on new 
additional sectors such as training and employment of Saudi population.  
 
The early stages of the policy’s adoption gave the private sector opportunities to engage 
in a wide range of economic activities and enabled it to make an effective contribution 
to the overall development of the Kingdom.   
It was able to enhance its role in the national economy, improve its managerial, 
technical and financial capacity and therefore become more economically efficient in 
terms of both investment and production.  
Thus the sector became capable of mobilizing capital for financing projects and using 
advanced management techniques and technologies in its operations. The Government 
further enhanced its developmental role by creating an investment climate leading to the 
privatisation of telecommunications, power generation, desalination and many other 
fields. By creating these investment opportunities the Government encouraged the 
sector’s role in socioeconomic development. (Ministry of Economy and planning, 2008) 
 
Despite the progress achieved by the private sector, it still faces challenges, which 
should be addressed during the coming period. Foremost among these are: continuing to 
improve the level of competitiveness of the sector to enable it to face the challenges of 
globalization; increasing its contribution to production and investment; providing 
sufficient job opportunities for the growing number of Saudi entrants into the labour 
market and increasing its investments in high value-added projects and activities which 
can be integrated with the basic industrial platforms, particularly the highly competitive 
export-oriented industries (Alsughayer, 2001). 
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2.7 Privatisation in Saudi Arabia 
 
Privatization represents one of the strategic themes relating to the diversification and 
transformation of the Saudi economy. It also represents an important mechanism for 
increasing private sector participation in economic development. However, the oil and 
gas sector is not part of this programme and remains under state control. Following the 
announcement by the Supreme Economic Council of the privatization strategy and 
identification of the public facilities to be privatized, the next important stage was to be 
the preparation of an implementation programme for privatization.  
This entailed: 
a) Preparation of a regulatory framework to support the privatization programme, 
particularly with respect to privatization of infrastructural facilities, including 
development of pricing controls for infrastructure services; 
b) Gradual implementation of the privatization programme, which entailed restructuring 
some Government organizations and transforming them into state-owned joint-stock 
companies.  This was the first step towards full privatization;  
c) Assessing the value of assets of the facilities to be privatized using techniques 
appropriate to the individual facilities. This helped determine the total value of the 
facility and was used as a guide in the privatization process; 
d) Ensuring transparency in decision-making and implementation of measures related to 
privatization; 
e) Making use of specialized advisors in preparing detailed studies and managing the 
privatization implementation programme.  
(Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006b) 
 
The implementation programme involved the preparation of a specific schedule to 
accelerate the process of privatizing the various economic sectors. 
However, despite the initiatives, the more rapid development of Saudi exports required 
even more incentives to exporters that did not conflict with the commitments resulting 
from the Kingdom’s accession to the WTO.  
These incentives included: 
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1) Increasing technical assistance for exporters to reduce the average cost of 
production, improve the quality of exported products and enhance their 
competitiveness; 
2) Intensifying efforts to accelerate implementation of export-related measures and 
provide trade information about overseas importers of Saudi products; 
3) Expanding and activating the Saudi Non-Oil Exports Credit Programme adopted 
by the Saudi Fund for Development to protect the Saudi exporters against default 
of payment; 
4) Studying the possibility of transforming the Saudi Exports Development Centre 
into a public organization with the aim of promoting and diversifying the Saudi 
exports base.  This meant addressing the issues facing exporters and developing 
an appropriate strategy for export promotion. (Ministry of Economy and 
Planning, 2006b)  
 
2.7.1 Privatisation Needs in Saudi Arabia. .  
 
Unlike many developing countries and those of Central and Eastern Europe, Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf countries did not need to transfer their economic system (which 
was considered a prerequisite for the privatisation process to take-off).  
Furthermore, none of the Gulf countries were forced by the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to pursue privatisation as part of an economic 
reform programme, as was the case in many developing countries (Azzam, 1994).  
However, the IMF did call the for acceleration of economic reforms in the Kingdom in 
order to reduce the already large public debt, pressure on public finances, and encourage 
investment. It required that measures were put in place to cut expenditure and 
strengthen controls over spending to eliminate extra-budgetary outlays, and also 
recommended that the authorities made a clearer statement to the market of the 
timetable and steps that would be taken to execute an announced privatisation policy 
(Arab News, 26, 10, 2002).  
In response, the Saudi Finance Minister stressed that the first step to overcome debts 
was getting rid of the annual deficit in the budget, which could be achieved by 
minimizing unnecessary expenditure and increasing revenues through seeking new 
sources of finance.  
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He stated that privatisation “will reduce pressure on the government. The private sector 
will provide services previously offered by the state. This will (positively) affect public 
spending”. 
 The minister further indicated that revenues generated from the sell-off would be used 
to pay for the entire domestic debt (Al-Jarallah, 2002). 
 
AlKadiri (1999) pointed out that incomes from privatisation would make no material 
change in non-oil revenues for budgetary support, although they might reduce slightly 
the debt service portion of the budget.  
He also contended that actual privatisation proceeds over the next 5 years would be 
modest compared to magnitude of the debt. For instance, the sale of 30 per cent of the 
Saudi Telecom Company would yield about SR 650 billion.  
AlKadiri (1999) described privatisation as a short-term remedy: although it gave quick 
cash and cut spending commitments, it was not a long-term solution if there was not 
some form of revenue-generating process to go with it that would be sustainable over 
the long term.  
 
However, other writers have pointed out that in many countries privatisation has led to 
dramatic improvements in customer service, particularly when competition is 
introduced or the private sector is made accountable for service standards (Speakman, 
2002).   
Speakman also referred to both empirical and anecdotal evidence indicating the need for 
Saudi state enterprises to use capital more efficiently, making reference to the costs of 
line installation in Saudi telecommunications as approximately double international 
norms. He indicated that in most infrastructure sectors there were cases of excess capital 
expenditure, whether over-specified container cranes, additional airport terminals, or 
empty hospitals. 
 
The common perception of both informed observers and ordinary citizens in the 
Kingdom was that the public sector was not as efficient and effective as it could and 
should be (Trivedi, 2002).  
The Saudi Arabian Secretary General of the Supreme Economic Council referred to 
privatisation as an important element of the Saudi reform programme and a strategic 
choice, pointing to the need to identify economic activities and Government services to 
be privatized, and to put in place a well-designed privatisation strategy.  
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In 2002 he stated: 
 
Privatisation represents the government commitment to economic 
reform and conveys a positive picture to attract foreign investments. The 
nature of privatisation in Saudi Arabia slightly differs from that in some 
other countries. The creation of the country was based on private 
initiatives and Government intervention in economic activities happened 
during the oil boom years when the economy was growing at a fast pace 
but the private sector did not have the resources or technical ability to 
provide the goods and services that were needed. It simply could not 
create the industries, the housing projects, and the cities, airports, 
railways, roads, and hospitals, universities that were needed to bring 
Saudi Arabia into the modern world. However, the situation today is 
different since the very sophisticated private sector is endowed with 
resources to manage and finance many economic activities (Al-Tuwaijri, 
2002).  
 
Al-Homeadan (2001) argued that King Fahd’s announcement of the privatisation policy 
on May 9th 1994 was due to the failure of some SOEs to maintain an acceptable level of 
service in terms of quantity and quality and as a result the Government had decided to 
allow the private sector to engage in all of the activities that such a sector was capable 
of performing.  
 
In a survey study, Al-Homeadan (1996:286) found that department heads in Saudi 
SOEs preferred privatisation because of  
 
Dissatisfaction with public bureaucracy, the difficulty of maintaining a large 
public sector, the need for the development of markets, for a more productive 
economy, to attract more international investment and ...   the superiority of 
private sector managerial practices to create new economic opportunities, to 
reduce public expenditures, to reduce the budget deficit, to limit government 
intervention in the market place, to increase the private sector’s capabilities, 
and to strengthen the local economy.  
 
Speakman (2002) described the Government’s role in Saudi Arabia as a change from an 
active participant in the economy to an economic policy setter and regulator. The 
private sector would be responsible for the delivery of many infrastructure services, 
which the public sector currently provided. It should play an increasingly important role 
in providing future social sector services, i.e. health, education and housing. Moreover, 
the natural resources sector would operate at full levels of private sector efficiency with 
full accountability to the people of Saudi Arabia.  
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2.7.2 Saudi Arabian privatisation programmes. 
 
The Saudi government has a history of being very innovative in its approach to private 
sector participation. In May 1933 the Saudi government contracted out its oil operations 
to the Standard Oil Company via the formation of Aramco. The policy of acquiring 
technology and foreign expertise by using foreign companies has been pursued since 
1973 through the encouragement of joint-ventures in a wide spectrum of sectors, 
including construction, manufacturing, banking, shipping and petrochemical processes. 
 
By May 1995 there were, for example, 287 joint venture manufacturing projects in the 
Kingdom involving the public and private sector with foreign capital and expertise and 
72% of the capital was in the chemicals and plastics sector (Al-Sarhan and Presley, 
2001; and US-Saudi Arabia Business Council, 1995: 52).  
The Saudi Government had already sold 30% of its shares in SABIC (the Saudi Arabian 
Basic Industries Corporation) to the public in the early 1980s. It also sold 30% of its 
shares in the Saudi Telecom Company in 2002 after five years of preparation and 
restructuring and also assigned the maintenance and operation of many of its agencies to 
the private sector.  These included the Port Authority, the dry port under the supervision 
of the Railway Organization, as well as the operation and maintenance of some 
hospitals, and the maintenance and construction of roads.  
Moreover, the Government used other methods of privatisation, including liberalization 
from legal monopolistic control and permitting the private sector to work and compete 
in a sector run by the Government, e.g. by permitting SNAS, DHL and other companies 
working in fast mail delivery and parcels to compete with the state-owned post 
enterprise.  
The Government was also primarily concerned with setting up appropriate legal and 
regulatory structures for the privatisation process in the Saudi economy to ensure 
competition and avoid monopolistic tendencies.  
The Council of Ministers Decree No. 60 (August 6, 1997) was the starting point to 
establish the eight objectives of privatisation in Saudi Arabia and the principles to be 
taken into account in order to achieve these objectives. The Council of Ministers Decree 
No. 257 of (February 5, 2001) stated that the Supreme Economic Council would be 
responsible for supervising the privatisation programme and monitoring its 
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implementation, in coordination with competent Government organizations, and for 
determining which activities were to be privatized.  
Decree No. 6/22 issued by the Supreme Economic Council on 2 August 2001 provided 
for the reorganization of the Privatisation Committee within the Supreme Economic 
Council under the chairmanship of the Council’s secretary-general.   Members 
represented the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Electricity, the 
Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Planning and National Economy; in 
addition two members were from the Advisory Board for Economic Affairs.  
The Supreme Economic Council Decision No.1/23 dated 4th June 2002 approved a new 
privatisation strategy comprising eight basic objectives, each of which required the 
adoption of a number of policies.  
The new privatisation strategy was prepared in accordance with the provisions of the 
Council of Ministers Decision No. 60 dated 6t August 1990) which stated:  
 
Expanding the private sector’s participation in the national economy and 
enabling it to undertake its role in investment and financing should be in 
line with the national development plans, and positive for both the 
government and private sector. 
 
The privatisation process constituted an important part of the Government’s long-term 
strategy to enhance opportunities for the private sector and improve the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the national economy. This was achieved by encouraging 
participation by the private sector in economic development and employing the most 
appropriate ways of ensuring this would happen.   This included transferring certain 
types of economic activity to the private sector and enabling it to accomplish its 
investments and financing role in accordance with the national development plan.  
 
The privatisation strategy defines a number of administrative and implementation 
procedures related to privatisation, whereby the Economic Council will be responsible 
for supervising privatisation programmes and monitoring their implementation.  
To carry out the required activities and functions necessary for the discharge by the 
Supreme Economic Council of its duties and responsibilities with respect to 
privatisation, the Privatisation Committee is involved in designing the privatisation 
strategy, determining and recommending the public enterprises, projects, and services to 
be privatized, determining the regulatory and implementation procedures for the 
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privatisation process, and monitoring and supervising the implementation of 
privatisation activities.  
Although the strategy clarifies the steps that are to be taken, a specific timetable for the 
process has yet to be established. 
 
The definition of privatisation as stated in the privatisation strategy is  
“The process of transferring the ownership or management of public enterprises, 
projects and services to the private sector, relying on market mechanisms and 
competition, through a number of methods, including contracts for managing, operating, 
leasing, financing, or selling all or part of the governments’ assets to the private sector”. 
 
2.7.3 Sectors that are Candidates for Privatisation 
On 11th November 2002, the Saudi Council of Ministers approved a list of 20 vital 
economic state enterprises and sectors recommended by the Supreme Economic 
Council (SEC) for privatisation as shown in Table 2.9 below. The announcement of this 
list of sectors presented tremendous opportunities for the private sector and had major 
implications for the economy as a whole.  
 
Table 2.9 The Full List of the 20 Enterprises and Sectors to be privatised 
Activities to be Privatised 
1) Sale of State-Owned Shares in Limited 
Companies: 
 
Including the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), 
Banks, the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries 
Corporation (SABIC), the Saudi Arabian Mining 
Company (Ma’aden), the Saudi Telecom 
Company (STC), and local oil refineries. 
11) Municipality Services: 
 
Establishment of slaughter houses and their 
operations; establishment of general markets, 
selling centres and their operation; transportation 
and collection of municipality revenues; cleaning 
and waste removal 
2) Sale of State-Owned Shares in the Capital of 
Joint Arab and Islamic Companies. 
12) Social Services: 
 
Management and operation of social care 
institutions; employment recruitment of Saudis in 
the private sector. 
3) Education Services: 
 
Establishment and maintenance of educational 
buildings; printing of textbooks; school 
transportation; student housing. 
13) Roads: 
 
Management, operation, and maintenance of 
existing highways, and construction and operation 
of new highways. 
4) Health Services: 
 
Establishment and operation of health facilities; 
patient transportation. 
14) Agricultural Services: 
 
Quarantine and operation of diagnostic 
laboratories and veterinary clinics. 
5) Desalination 15) Communications.  
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6) Air Transportation and its Services. 16) Airport Services. 
7) Post Services 17) Railways 
8) Mail Services 18) Sports Clubs. 
9) Grain Silos and Flour Mills. 19) Government-Owned Hotels 
10) Water and Sewage. 20) Services of the Industrial Cities. 
Source: Arab News 13th November 2002. 
 
 
2.7.4 Overview of Other Countries’ Experience of Privatisation. 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s a wave of privatisation programmes took place in many 
industrialised countries. The issue of privatisation in the West was aided by several 
factors. There was the election of Conservative Governments in many Western 
countries such as the UK and the United States.  Conservatives believe strongly in 
allowing market forces to operate in order to promote economic growth. There were 
also structural obstacles to full employment and economic growth during the 1970s due 
to the oil crises. Subsidisation was seen as a serious obstacle to industrial restructuring 
and privatisation became the best candidate to bring about economic adjustment (Cook 
and Kirkpatrick, 1988).  
This section will provide a brief overview of other countries experiences of 
privatisation. The section will provide the experiences of two Western ‘developed 
countries’, two Western ‘developing’ countries and one Arab ‘developing’ country. The 
aim is to find out if it is feasible to compare the Saudi experience with that of any other 
country.  
2.7.4.1 Privatisation in United States. 
The interest in privatisation in the United States goes back to the presidency of Carter; 
for example, the airline industry was privatised under the Carter administration. 
However, the greatest developments took place during the Reagan administration (Pack, 
1987).  
Municipalities, who had been contracting out various services, including garbage 
collection, police and fire brigade services since the 1960s, carried out the earliest form 
of privatisation; since then an increasing number of public agencies have contracted out 
various services to private enterprises. Between 1980 and 1982 the Pentagon offered 
235 contracts to private contractors.  However, privatisation in the sense of divestment 
41 
 
and as an ideological tendency came only as a result of close consideration of the 
Thatcher Government’s model of privatisation (Donahue, 1989). 
Privatisation efforts also came about as a result of the need to reduce the size of the 
Federal Government, including its growing budget deficit. Indeed, public expenditure 
increased excessively, from 9.9 percent of GNP in 1929 to 34.3 percent in 1985 (Pack, 
1987). 
 
In general, privatisation did not happen on as large a scale as in countries like Britain. 
This was due to the relatively small size of the public sector. While the average public 
sector in developed economies represented by 6.7 percent of the total workforce, the 
USA public sector employed only 1.5 percent.(Donahue, 1989).  
 
2.7.4.2 Privatisation in the United Kingdom    
Privatisation has been extensively used in the United Kingdom. Britain is often 
regarded as the principal model for privatisation in the Western world. However, the 
process of privatisation in its “legal arrangements to the terms of sale, was ad hoc”. 
(Veljanocski, 1989: vii).  
The Thatcher Government executed most of the actions, but the process still continued 
under later Governments. There is one obvious result of privatisation in Britain namely, 
the raising of revenue for the Government. Indeed, between 1977 and 1987, the it raised 
£25 billion. In the process, the proportion of GDP attributable to public sector industry 
fell from 9 percent to about 5 percent, while almost one million jobs were transferred 
from the public to the private sector (Hyman, 1989).  
Privatisation, under the form of denationalization, started long ago in Britain. It was 
only in the second half of the 1970s that the current trend started. Before that, 
privatisation was a rather indecisive process as described by Burk (1988: 2): 
 
Looking over the period from 1945 to 1988, a curious theme about the steel 
industry emerges. It was nationalized in 1949 by a Government, which did 
not wholly believe in its nationalization; it was then denationalized in 1953 
by a Government, which did not wholly believe in its denationalization; it 
was then renationalized in 1967 by a Government, which did not wholly 
believe in its renationalization. Only time will tell if it was redenationalised 
in 1988 by a Government, which wholly believed in its redenationalisation.  
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The first privatisation in Britain took place in 1953 with the sale of the United Steel 
Companies. It was not easy for the Conservative Government to implement this 
denationalization as Burk’s account of this first privatisation indicates (Burk, 1988). 
Starting from the second half of the 1970s, privatisation started slowly with the sale of 
shares of British Petroleum to the public in 1977 and 197910 (Hyman, 1989).  
According to Yarrow (1989: 56), this was a “revenue-raising exercise”. This was soon 
followed by the sale of the aerospace industry (1981 and 1985), the shipbuilding 
industry (1985-1986), Amersham (1982), and Cable and Wireless (1981 and 1983).  
Other major sales include British Gas (1986), British Airports Authority (BAA) (1987), 
British Airways (1987), and Rolls Royce (1987). British Steel and the Water Regional 
Authorities were privatized in 1988 and 1989 respectively (Hyman, 1989).  
The privatisation of British Telecom in 1984 was the most popular privatisation 
programme because of its successful implementation in terms of raising revenue as well 
as public participation. The concern over BT’s monopoly power led to the creation of a 
new regulatory watchdog, the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) (ibid).  
Public opinion was very favourable because the programme encouraged individuals to 
participate in the ownership of these companies (Aharoni, 1988). However, many 
members of the public saw these purchases of shares as a means for quick and easy 
profit as they were sold to the public at a below market price. This view was endorsed 
when the value of BT shares immediately increased by 85% of their value.  
While many previous privatizations were under-subscribed (such as Britoil with only 
27 percent of shares bought by the public, and Cable and Wireless with 22 percent), the 
public applied for four times the available number of BT shares (Hyman, 1989). This 
created 2.3 million shareholders and at the same time raised £3.9 billion, the largest sale 
of a public enterprise at the time11 (Hyman, 1989).  
 
The strong commitment of the Government to privatisation was an important boost to 
the programme. However, the more important factor was the performance of the newly 
privatized enterprises themselves. Hyman gives a detailed account of the performance 
of privatized companies in terms of profit growth. For example, Amersham and Cable 
and Wireless increased their profit by a factor of almost five in the first seven years of 
their privatisation; British Aerospace’s profits doubled in six years; and Rolls-Royce’s 
                                                 
10
 The Government sold 17 percent of its shares in BP in 1977, 5 percent in 1979, 7 percent in 1983 and 
36.8 percent in 1987. 
11
 This was later exceeded by the sale of British Gas that raised nearly £8 billion.  
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almost trebled.  Jaguar turned its loss of £44 million in 1980 to profit of £107 million in 
1986. Similar records are found in British Airways, BAA, British Gas, and British 
Telecom (ibid).  
However, performance in other areas appears to be less encouraging. In a study carried 
out by the London Business School and United Research on executives from private 
and public enterprises (two thirds private), only 8 percent saw improved quality as the 
most important factor of success of their enterprise whilst only 27 percent saw product 
quality, and 18 percent saw customer service as a real concern of their organization 
(Waznah, 1996). 
 
Deregulation has had mixed results. The Express Coach Services deregulation first led 
to intense competition, but National Express was eventually able to dominate the 
market by introducing its rapid service with toilet and refreshment facilities. 
Nevertheless, deregulation did have some positive effects such as increasing 
competition between coach and rail services, and in some fields of telecommunications 
(Yarrow, 1989).  
Privatisation, and the clear determination of the Government to support it, helped the 
British economy to attract foreign investment. Foreign investors saw Britain as stable 
place to invest and this increased British foreign reserves. For example, when BT was 
privatized in 1984, 14 percent of the shares were bought by foreign investors (Hyman, 
1989). 
As described above, in many cases the British Government created regulatory bodies to 
protect consumers. The sale of British Telecom and British Gas, for instance, was 
accompanied by the creation of two regulatory agencies, the Office of 
Telecommunications and the Office of Gas Supply. Moreover, the Government kept a 
golden share in most of the privatized enterprises. This was basically meant to prevent 
any undesirable takeover or excessive foreign influence. Under the ‘golden share’, a 
privatized enterprise may have a combination of the following seven restrictions: 
1 Prohibition on one person having an interest in 15 percent or more of the voting 
shares of the company; 
2 Prohibition of total foreign ownership exceeding 15 percent; 
3 Restriction on the issue of shares with voting rights different from those of ordinary 
shares; 
4 Requirement that the Chief Executive be a British citizen; 
5 Prohibition of the removal of Government-appointed Directors; 
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6 Restriction on the disposal of the whole or a material part of the assets of the group 
(material deemed to be 25 percent); 
7 Restriction on the voluntary winding up or dissolution of the company. 
 
This means that the Government did not give up indirect control over most of the 
privatized enterprises (ibid).  
 
However Veljanovski (1989), while agreeing with the privatisation programmes, 
criticizes the lack of structural reform before privatisation. This, he maintains, has 
limited the scope of greater competition, which is the surest and most effective means 
of generating greater efficiency and consumer benefits. Indeed, many public sector 
industries and services kept their monopolistic privileges intact. There was, therefore, 
always the danger that regulation might not be enough to achieve the desired results 
which competition would easily achieve. As Littlechild states:  
‘Regulation is essentially a means of preventing the worst excesses of monopoly; it is 
not a substitute for competition’ (Veljanovski, 1989: 26).  
An example of this is the privatisation of British Gas in 1986 as one entity. This created 
a private monopoly in which the Office of Gas Supply (the regulatory agency) had little 
power of control (ibid). British Telecom was also under public criticism for its poor 
service (Yarrow, 1989). 
 
2.7.4.3 Privatisation in Singapore  
Interest in privatisation in Singapore started during the 1960s, but the actual divestment 
of public enterprises started in the 1970s (Low, 1988). In 1985 the Divestment 
Committee was formed and the Government has since sold off many enterprises 
including a food processing plant and an aviation company. The Government also 
reduced its interest in Singapore Airlines from 100 percent to 63 percent.  
 
The goals of privatisation in Singapore are rather distinct in their nature. In Singapore 
privatisation took place not as a result of the need for funds to pay off public debt or as 
a result of political pressure, but came as a natural process. The Government clearly 
maintained that the proceeds from the sales were not needed. What happened is that 
privatisation of public enterprises occurred when Government thought that enterprises 
had grown sufficiently and could sustain its own activity without the help of the 
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Government. The money raised from the sale of such enterprises was then reinvested in 
other strategic sectors (ibid).  
 
A number of major public enterprises have been privatized, such as the Rapid Transit 
Corporation and the Singapore Broadcasting Services. Other Government corporations 
are also currently under consideration, such as Telecoms, and the National University 
Hospital (Waznah, 1996). 
 
Low (1988: 275) observes : 
 
the Singapore public enterprises system is also a unique case among 
Third World countries insofar as its privatisation is the result of its 
success rather than failure. Along with buoyant growth, public 
enterprises have experienced tremendous success. 
 
 
What is unique about privatisation in Singapore, therefore, is that it is used to raise 
funds to create new public enterprises. Public enterprises are not regarded as a problem, 
which the government seeks to get rid of, nor are they used to raise funds to pay for the 
public debt. In Singapore public enterprises are an integral part of the development 
programme. They take part in a continuous process of creation, development, sale, and 
creation. 
 
2.7.4.4 Privatisation in Malaysia  
There were many goals for privatisation in Malaysia. First the public sector represented 
a heavy financial and administrative burden on the Government, which aimed to reduce 
its involvement in economic activity. There were also economic objectives, such as 
promoting competition, improving efficiency and productivity. As a direct result of 
these, accelerated growth of the economy was hoped to be achieved. Most of these 
objectives were set up in the New Economic Policy (NEP) (Craig, 1988).  
A large proportion of public assets were sold to the private sector. Among these were 
the Department of Telecommunications, the Malaysia Airline System, and Port Kelang 
Container Terminal. Other larger corporations, such as the Malaysian Airlines, 
Malaysian International Shipping Company, Port Klang, and the telecommunication 
system are being considered (Waznah, 1996).  
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Another form of privatisation is also used in Malaysia. Subcontracting has been used for 
a number of years. An example is the maintenance of the National Air Force, which was 
contracted out to the private sector. 
 
2.7.4.5  Privatisation in Egypt 
 In 1961 Egypt undertook a massive nationalization programme, which reduced the 
number of large private companies from 240 to 60. Starting from 1974, however, Egypt 
has been following a more liberal economic policy (called infitah), allowing for the 
establishment of joint ventures and private companies (Ayubi, 1990).  
Between 1970 and 1980, 560 new companies were created of which 113 were joint 
stock companies (Waterbury, 1985). This was aimed at increasing competition between 
private and public enterprises. This apparently had been unsuccessful as public 
enterprises were still suffering from inefficiency. 
One of the most important problems with the internal functioning of Egyptian public 
enterprises was the constraint applied to the enterprises’ management. Indeed, 
recruitment, and promotion were extremely restricted, while production decisions, 
pricing, and investment decision were mostly carried out by the government (Rivlin, 
1985). Despite some proposal for divestment of parts of the public sector during the 
1980s, it seems that contracting-out and joint ventures have been the most favoured 
tools (Ayubi, 1990).  
 
Abd-al-Fadhil maintains that both the private and the public sectors are equally 
inefficient in Egypt and in many Arab countries. According to him, Egypt still suffers 
from a weak financial market, which cannot provide the necessary funds for 
privatisation (Abd-al-Fadhil, 1993).  As Ayubi indicates, the public sector in Egypt is 
still dominant, and the state does not seem to be willing to undergo a large-scale 
privatisation programme. Only in the area of commerce and finance has the state let the 
private sector take the lead (Ayubi, 1990).  
Between 1980 and 1987 several proposals for privatizing public enterprises were 
suggested. Unfortunately, none was carried out. The main reasons for this indecision 
was the “disinclination of Egyptian private capital to invest” as well as to the 
“resistance from public-sector personnel”. (Ayubi, 1990: 97).  A third reason is given 
by Ayubi, namely that “the state and bureaucracy were not prepared to relinquish the 
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control of functions and the special privileges provided to them by the public sector”. 
(1990: 97). 
 
2.7.5 Overview of the Saudi Organisations Under Study 
This section presents a brief profile of the organisations under study and describes the 
Government efforts that have taken place to prepare these enterprises for privatisation.  
 
2.7.5.1  The Saudi Telecom Company (STC) 
The Telecommunication sector of Saudi Arabia was part of the Communications 
Ministry established in 1952 to run all communication operations in Saudi Arabia such 
as post, telecommunication services, roads and railways. In 1975, the Ministry of Post, 
Telecom and Telegraph (PTT) was established to oversee the Saudi telecommunications 
sector (Al-Ansari, 1999).  
In accordance with decree No. 135, the Council of Ministers decided in 1997 to transfer 
telecommunication services (telegraph and telephone) with all their various 
components, technical and administrative equipment to a Saudi Joint Stock Company, 
and decree No. 213 approved the establishment of a Saudi stock company named the 
Saudi Telecom Company (STC). Its initial capital was more than SR 12 billion, divided 
into 240 million shares of equal value of SR 50.  
On 9 September 2002, the Council of Ministers approved an increase in STC’s capital 
from SR 12 to SR 15 billion. The company was established as result of the importance 
of the telecommunications sector and its role in accelerating development. (A 
privatisation team working with the World Bank had recommended privatisation of this 
sector and the Ministerial Committee on privatisation supported it). The STC was 
created as a business-oriented stock company providing all telecommunications services 
previously provided by PTT. 
 
In December 2002, the Government of Saudi Arabia, represented by and acting through 
the Public Investment Fund (PIF or the Selling Shareholder), offered a minimum of 
60,000,000 Shares, representing 20% of the Company, to individuals having Saudi 
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nationality, along with a maximum of 30,000,000 Shares, representing 10% of the 
Company, to the General Organisation for Social Insurance and the Public Pension 
Fund. The offer price was SR 170 per share, with a nominal value of SR 50. The 
Government continued to have effective control over the STC after the offering since 
the PIF retained 70% of the issued Shares. The company did not receive any of the 
proceeds from the sale of the Shares in the Offering.  
 
In 1970, the total exchange line capacity in Saudi Arabia was only 76.6 thousand lines, 
but had increased to about 4.3 million by 2000, representing an average annual growth 
rate of 13.5 percent. The total number of telephones actually operating in the Kingdom 
also increased from 29.400 telephones in 1970 to around 2.9 million telephones in 2000, 
an average annual rate of 14.8 per cent (Ministry of Planning, 2001). Between 1998 to 
the end of 2001, the company’s number of mobile subscribers increased 706%, reaching 
2.5 million at the end of 2001, and the number of fixed line subscribers increased 74%, 
reaching 3.2 million at the end of 2001. 
 
Similarly, the company developed an Internet backbone within its network, as Internet 
subscribers have increased significantly from 1998 to the present. Moreover, charges 
have been reduced to the lowest possible prices. The STC had almost 21,316 employees 
as of June 2002, 87% of whom were Saudi nationals. Its total assets were equal to SR 
40.9 billion in 2002. The company’s operating revenue for 2002 was SR 23.5 billion 
and net income was SR 3.5 billion. Annual revenue growth has averaged 17.1% over 
the last three years and average annual net income has achieved margins of 38.9% 
(excluding Government charges) (GIB, 2002). The STC deals with the Government as a 
related party where balances receivable from and payable to Government agencies at 
the end of year 2002 were SR 2.5 and 3.8 billion, respectively. 
2.7.5.2 The Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) 
In 1972, the Department of Electricity Services was established. It was separated from 
the Ministry of Commerce and given the additional responsibility of planning electrical 
services for the Kingdom as a whole. In 1974, the Ministry of Commerce was divided 
in two. One part became the Commerce Agency, the other the Industry and Electricity 
Agency.  
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In the same year the electricity tariff was set for all companies at a level below actual 
cost. In 1975, the Government adopted ambitious plans for economic development 
requiring very large investment in the development of industry and electrification. The 
Ministry of Industry and Electricity was formed, with an Industrial Affairs Agency and 
an Electricity Affairs Agency. The Electricity Corporation was established in 1976 to 
undertake responsibility for coordinating and achieving the ambitious electricity plans 
contained in the Kingdom’s Development Plan.  
From 1976 to 1981 all community electricity generation was gradually subsumed under 
the four regional Saudi Consolidated Electricity Companies (SCECOs), located in the 
Central, Eastern, Southern, and Western regions of the Kingdom. With the formulation 
of a coherent development plan and the establishment of the SCECOs, the Government 
was able to implement an electrification programme that brought electricity to the towns 
and, from the towns, to the villages and settlements throughout the Kingdom. The first 
SCECO (SCECO-East) was created in 1976. This was followed in 1976 by SCECO-
South. Another consolidated company provided electricity for the south west of the 
Kingdom, and the central region was served by SCECO-Central.  
The General Electricity Corporation (GEC) was a Governmental entity operating under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry and Electricity. It had overall responsibility 
for the Kingdom’s electricity system and had direct responsibility for the provision of 
electrical supplies to rural areas not then covered by SCECOs.  
 
Under its Decree No. 169 dated 19.11.1998, the Council of Ministers approved the 
restructuring of the electricity sector with its main components (generation, 
transmission and distribution) and regulating its administrative and financial status, 
aimed at consolidating the ten electricity companies in the Kingdom into one company 
under the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC). Restructuring the electricity sector was the 
precursor to full privatisation to rationalise electricity consumption and to allow private 
sector independent power producers to participate in this vital sector. 
In November 2001 an independent authority, the Electricity Services Regulatory 
Agency (ESRA), was established to review the cost of electric energy and its tariff. 
From the time the SEC was formed in December 1999 until the establishment of ESRA, 
electricity tariffs were issued by the Council of Ministers. The tariffs used by SEC were 
higher than the ones used by former SCECOs since the new maximum tariff was set at 
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38 Halalas12 compared to 20 Halalas for the old tariff. In October 2000, before 
establishing the ESRA, the Council of Ministers reduced the Tariff significantly and 
maximum tariff went from 38 to 26, which caused a reduction in operational revenues 
by approximately SR 2 billion for the 12 month period ended 31 December 2001, 
compared to the 9 month period ended 31 December 2000.  
 
In 2001, the company’s capital was set at SR 38.3 billion, divided into 765,755,418 
shares (74.15% for the government, 6.89% for Saudi Aramco, and 18.96% for the 
private sector). The share value was set at SR 50. The company’s total assets stood at 
SR 90.6 billion, its total operational revenue was SR 28.3 billion, and its total 
operational expenses were SR 25.5 billion. It ended 2001 with posted profits of $332 
million (SEC, 2001). In 2002, after registering a loss of $182.9 million in the first half 
of the year, the SEC ended the year with a net profit of $270.4 million, mainly owing to 
high power consumption during the hot summer months (Arab News, 20th April 2003). 
The Company served approximately 3.8 million customers in 2001 compared to 
216,000 in 1970 and customers are expected to reach 8.5 million in 2020. Therefore, the 
Saudi Government plans to invest as much as SR 438 billion by 2020 to meet growth in 
demand from a soaring population (up to 38 million) (Arab News, 20 April 2003). It 
also plans to grant concessions to the private sector to construct new power plants 
(generation sector) on a BOT (build-operate-transfer) basis. 
 
2.8  Summary 
 
During the past three decades, Saudi Arabia has paid great attention to the 
implementation of long-term economic reform. The Saudi Government has also put 
great effort into financing Government spending (operation and investment), providing 
public services, building infrastructure projects and financing the growing volume of its 
activities. The effort of economic reform by the Saudi Government has been associated 
with a growing role for the private sector that is reflected in its growing contribution to 
production, investment, employment and exports. 
The Saudi Government’s need for providing public services efficiently, raising enough 
funds, cutting spending that the private sector can handle and completing the 
                                                 
12
 SR 1 = 100 Halalas  
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requirements for the accession to the WTO, such as an open market, led it towards a 
policy of privatisation. The Saudi privatisation experience is different from other 
countries. It is different from any other developing countries as the motivation for 
privatisation is different. The main motivation for privatisation in developing countries 
is the outside pressure from the World Bank and developed countries that force 
developing countries to change and adopt systems based on their successes.  
However this is not the case of Saudi Arabia as the country has entered privatisation 
with total freedom. Saudi Arabia, based on the World Bank classification, is considered 
as developing country but it is a very wealthy country, so it has a unique situation since 
whilst it cannot be considered a developed country, it is a very rich and sophisticated 
developing country. Therefore the Saudi privatisation experience cannot be compared to 
any other country’s experience.  
 
 Chapter Three will provide a review of the concept of Management Accounting 
Control Systems, the aspects of Management Accounting Control Systems, and the 
changes in the aspects that are likely to follow changes in ownership. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 
For businesses the need for organisation, in the sense of determining objectives and 
subsequently developing systems to successfully achieve these objectives, is implicit.  
At the same time, systems that have been put in place need to be controlled and 
monitored against original objectives in order for them to be deemed ‘successful’.   
Indeed ‘Organisation’ of any kind, without some form of control, would be impossible 
(Tannenbaum 1968), a fact further endorsed by McMahon and Ivancevich (1976:349) 
who claim ‘there is practically universal agreement that organisation implies control’ 
and Otley & Berry (1980:232): ‘control is a central and inescapable feature of all human 
organisations’. Flamholz, Das and Tsui (1985) cite three additional elements to be 
considered in the context of control: the external environment, organisational structure 
and organisational culture, all having a significant effect on the nature and change of the 
management control systems.  
 
The chapter will explore the concept and framework of management control systems 
and investigate the relationship between privatisation and control systems. The 
components of management accounting control systems will be explained in this 
chapter. The three elements of the context of control will be discussed as well as the 
relationship between accounting and accountability and control. The final part of the 
chapter will discuss the changes anticipated as a result of changes in ownership namely 
privatisation. Thus the chapter is organised as follows:  
(1)  Concepts of management control; 
(2)  The framework for management accounting control systems;  
(3)  The relationship between privatisation and control systems;  
(4)   A description of the ten aspects of management accounting control systems 
used as a basis for the investigation in this study; 
(5) Description of current Saudi management accounting control systems; 
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(6) Summary including a description of the subsequent hypotheses to be tested in 
the remainder of the project. 
 
 
3.1  Concepts of Management Control 
 
Although there is some ambiguity in defining the meaning of the terms ‘organisation’ 
and ‘control’, there nevertheless remains common consensus that the latter is a 
fundamental part of organisational activity.  In fact, organisation can itself be viewed as 
a control process, occurring when groups of people feel the need to co-operate in order 
to achieve purposes, which require their joint action (Otley and Berry, 1980). 
 
In order to understand the nature and meaning of control in organisations, it is first 
necessary to understand what is meant by control in general. Conceptually a control 
system can be considered as a ‘black-box’, converting a stream of inputs into a stream 
of outputs, with the internal details of the process being ignored for the present.  
 
The term ‘control’ is probably one of the most inadequately defined in the English 
language, having a wide range of suggestions. Rathe (1960) listed ‘57 varieties’ or 
interpretations, ranging from ‘prohibit’ to ‘manipulating’. However, within this variety 
there are two major themes: (i) the idea of control as domination where the person ‘in 
control’ is the one who has the power to enforce his will on others; (ii) the idea of 
control as regulation where the controller detects a difference between ‘what is’ and 
‘what ought to be’ (Vickers, 1967) and here this difference acts as a motivation for 
action.  
Application in a business context includes both of these strands of meaning, implied in 
Webster’s Dictionary definition (1961): 
 
Application of policies and procedures for directing, regulating and 
coordinating production, administration and other business activities in a 
way to achieve the objectives of the enterprise.  
 
 
In a more general sense, control is concerned with the processes by which a system 
adapts itself to its environment. That is, in a self-regulating system, such as a business 
enterprise, both the specification of objectives and the means of their achievement are 
internally generated and form part of the control process. This point of view is reflected 
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in a definition of management control put forward by Lowe (1970: 765) where he 
defines a management control system as: 
 
 
A system of organisational information seeking and gathering, 
accountability and feedback designed to ensure that the enterprise adapts 
to changes in its substantive environment and that the work behaviour of 
its employees is measured by reference to a set of operational sub-goals 
(which conform with overall objectives) so that the discrepancy between 
the two can be reconciled and corrected for.  
 
 
There are multiple dimensions to control in organisations (Merchant, 1985): it is shaped 
by or ‘through’ processes of education, socialization and coercion and due to these 
implied interactive processes control it is often seen as a procedure which cannot be 
directly observed.  
To state that somebody is controlled by, or controls somebody can only be inferred by 
indicators, such as certain patterns of behaviour, or certain meaning individuals attribute 
to a situation or action (Scheyt et al., 2003). 
 
According to Antony et al. (1989), management control is  
 
A tool for managers who use it in their interaction with subordinates. It is a 
people-oriented process. Line managers are the focal points in management 
control. They make the plans for implementing strategies and attaining 
goals, and they are the people who must influence others and whose 
performance is evaluated. 
 
There are four necessary conditions that must be satisfied before any process can be 
said it’s controlled (Otley and Berry, 1980). First, objectives for the process being 
controlled must exist: without an aim or purpose control is meaningless. Secondly, the 
output of the process must be measurable in terms of the dimensions defined by the 
objectives, i.e., the degree to which the process is attaining its objectives must be 
assessable. Thirdly, a predictive model of the process being controlled is required so 
that cause of the non-attainment of objectives can be determined and proposed 
corrective actions evaluated. Finally, the ability to take subsequent action must exist in 
order that deviations from successfully attaining the objectives can be reduced. If any of 
these conditions fail to be met, the process can no longer be said to be ‘in control’.   
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3.2   The Framework for Management Accounting Control Systems  
   
The choice of an appropriate management accounting control system is contingent upon 
the organisation itself, its specific circumstances and the nature of its objectives. 
 
Not only will these objectives heavily influence the choice of performance measures to 
be used, they will also act as the criteria against which the choices that have been made 
can be evaluated (Otley, 1999). Any control system requires objectives and goals 
against which its performance can be assessed, but, as Otley and Berry (1980) maintain, 
no specific contingent formulation is necessary to appreciate that the existence of 
different goals need the selection of different performance measures and control.  
 
 Therefore it is acknowledged that the development of strategies and long-term plans for 
an organisation is part of the planning and control process of management. In a widely 
adopted definition of management control, Anthony (1965) suggested a hierarchy for 
planning and control: 
 
Level 1: Strategic planning: 
Any organisation should have one or more goals and senior management will decide or 
participate in deciding the general nature of the activities that the organisation should 
undertake in order to achieve these goals; 
Level 2:  Operational control:  
Processes devised to carry out the day-to-day activities of the organisation, comprising 
rules, procedures, forms, and other devices that govern the performance of specific 
tasks. 
Level 3:  Task Control: 
Determining the specific tasks needed to achieve the day-to-day activities. 
 
Management control functions as the link between the first two types of planning and 
control stages in order to implement strategic policy. It does not focus on detailed 
operating decisions, nor on the activities that are the focus of task control; rather, it is 
the means by which management ensures that the organisation carries out its strategies 
effectively and efficiently. Thus the two main functions of the process of management 
control according to Anthony (ibid.) are: 
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 a) The planning and coordination function which ensures that the day-to-day tasks are 
performed by all participants to the achieve organisation’s goals; and    
b) Providing a monitoring and feedback function, which is used to ensure that, planned 
actions are achieving desired results. 
 
However, Lowe and Puxty (1989) have subsequently argued that Anthony’s approach is 
too restrictive in that it has ‘assumed away’ many important problems. In their opinion, 
the first was concerned with defining strategies, goals and objectives: as such these 
procedures were complex and ill defined, with strategies being produced as much by 
accident as by design. The second problem concerned the methods used to control the 
production processes, which were dependent upon the specific technologies, which in 
themselves were widely divergent. The final criticism was that Anthony’s reasoning 
concentrated upon planning and control through accounting rationales and contains little 
or no discussion of socio-psychological or behavioural issues.   
 
Anthony’s classification suggested that control was the last stage in the management 
process, but other authors have suggested that management control includes all parts of 
Anthony’s hierarchy, for example, that control must be considered from a holistic and 
organisational perspective, which also relates to the environment (Lowe and Puxty, 
1989).  
In the context of continual change, particularly when organisations are reducing the 
workforce, Anthony’s hierarchy becomes invalid and the holistic view of integrated 
management control succeeds (Otley, 1994). Anthony (1988) later suggested that the 
boundaries between categories are ambiguous, implying that management control can 
be broadly defined. Although Anthony (1965) specifically suggested that the study of 
control should be broadly based in the behavioural sciences, his work showed little 
evidence of borrowing from behavioural science and control has popularly taken on the 
suggestion of accounting control (Otley, 1994). 
  
Management control systems are based on the idea that a system is an assembly of 
interconnected elements that functions as a collective whole (Wilson and Chua, 1993). 
They can be discussed in terms of process (what they do) and structure (what they are) 
(Anthony and Herzlinger, 1980).   In terms of structure, management control systems 
are collections of control mechanisms, each designed to achieve some part of control. 
The structure or mechanisms used by any particular control system should be matched 
with the type of control found in the organisation (Wilson and Chua, 1993). 
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Scott (1981) distinguished closed and open system models, and then within each of 
these categories he further distinguished between rational and natural models. 
In his opinion, closed system theories concentrated exclusively on the internal 
environment of the organisation, with closed rational models, as characterized by the 
scientific management movement. Thus they endeavoured to find the most efficient 
means of organising operations within organisations.  
Closed natural systems approaches emphasise the behavioural aspects of control 
systems. 
 
The beginning of cybernetics and systems theories indicated the emergence of an open 
systems perspective, where the most important development was an emphasis on the 
need to consider the external environment faced by an organisation when designing 
management control systems (Lowe, 1971; Beer, 1972; Emmanuel et al., 1990).  
 
Contingency theories emphasised the importance of contingent variables such as 
technology, organisational size and structure for management control. These were 
rational approaches, however, which tended uncritically to accept the existence of the 
external environment and the need to adapt to it.  
On the other hand, natural models within the open systems perspective were much more 
critical in their approach, emphasising the ability of factors to influence their 
environment. The studies included in ‘Critical Perspectives in Management Control’ 
(Chua, Lowe and Puxty, 1989) which emphasised such issues as the political nature of 
organisational activity, and the ways in which power was exercised.  
 
These open natural models emphasised the changing environment and the ways in 
which management control has developed to deal with and sometimes resist that 
change. Radical changes in the political environment were crucial drivers of the need 
for organisational change including changes in management control in the public sector. 
Controls are considered and can operate at different levels: some are considered 
externally, on a societal level, sometimes by governments, but are operated within the 
organisation.  
Other control systems are designed and operated within the organisation, for example 
management accounting and other performance reporting systems. Organisational 
structure provides a formal framework, which represents particular roles, rules and 
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procedures, and positions and prescriptions of authority.  On a more abstract level are 
the values and ethics of a society, which influence the laws and controls, which are 
possible, as well as separating abnormality from acceptable behaviour.  
Flamholz, Daz and Tsui (1985) capture all three aspects of control just discussed, and 
thus provide a useful model, given its concern with external, internal and cultural issues 
in control. They portray the control context as consisting of three elements: external 
environment, organisational structure, and culture. 
The control context may either facilitate or reduce the effectiveness of the control 
systems in co-ordinating human efforts toward the achievement of organisational goals. 
It may facilitate control effectiveness by the additional control that is applied by several 
dimensions in the various contextual factors; for example, organisational formalisation, 
centralisation or standards of professionalism found in the organisation’s external 
environment. The control context may reduce the effectiveness of the control systems if 
the control systems are incompatible with the norms, values, management philosophy or 
practices in the larger context (Flamholz, Daz and Tsui, 1985). 
 
Kaplan (1983) states that the objective of a management control system is to provide 
information that is useful in decision-making, planning, control and evaluation.   
According to Drury (2002), management accounting control systems are a form of 
result controls.  These systems are largely defined in monetary terms, such as revenues, 
profits and ratios, and may also include non-accounting measures such as the number of 
customer deliveries.  For him, the following steps are involved in result controls: 
 
• Defining the performance dimensions such that they are congruent with the 
organisation’s objectives; 
• Setting performance targets to cover all aspects of performance dimensions; 
• Measuring financial and non-financial performance; and 
• Providing reward or punishment. 
 
Anderson (1988) states that apart from being responsible for the setting of goals and 
decision-making on how these goals are to be reached, managers also play a key role in 
motivating employees to focus their attention on achieving them. According to Black 
and Porter (2000), managers use control as a process to assess whether the current 
operation is congruent with the organisation’s objectives. From one point of view, 
control helps to ensure that the current operating systems meet what the organisation 
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has set out to achieve (Lorange & Scott-Morton 1974; Wheelen & Hunger, 2000). It 
therefore acts as an element in the feedback loop that alerts the manager to adjust 
activities to meet the objectives (Schermerhorn, 1999). From another point of view, the 
managerial control process is seen as deciding what activities the organisation should be 
doing and comparing actual accomplishments with these plans. 
 
The managerial control process thus plays a very significant role in strategic 
management, which involves a long-range planning and strategy development affecting 
current operations, which in turn determines the future success of an organisation. Thus, 
the management control process involves both planning and controlling (Anderson, 
1988; Anthony & Govindarajan, 1995; Black & Porter, 2000; Lorange & Scott-Morton, 
1974). For example, if the organisation’s goal is profitability, managers need to take 
appropriate measures or control those measures that could possibly influence future 
profitability. In so doing, they are able to make adjustments to their plans before 
problems get out of control (Wheelen & Hunger, 2000). 
 
 
3.3  The Relationship between Privatisation and Control Systems  
 
 
It is believed by many that privatisation and market mechanisms will lead to more 
efficient use of resources and their management (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
Privatisation programmes have been widely imposed on less developed countries 
(LDCs) by the World Bank, the IMF and other western donors as a condition for bailing 
out the ailing economies of these countries (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995; Kikeri et al., 
1994; Uddin and Hopper, 1999, 2001, 2003). It argued that privatisation would lead to 
better productive and allocative efficiencies (Boycko et al., 1996). Private enterprises 
are able to organise their factors of production to reduce production costs more 
efficiently than public enterprises. Private enterprises also have better reward and 
incentive systems, which are linked to economic performance and have a much clearer 
principal-agent relationship than public enterprises. Furthermore, the competition in the 
private sector enables private enterprises to be able to allocate resources more 
efficiently than public enterprises. As such privatised SOEs are subject to the discipline 
of the price mechanism through which inefficient activities may be eliminated 
(Rutherford, 1983). It is therefore assumed that productive and allocative efficiencies of 
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SOEs would improve upon privatisation (Adam et al., 1992, Hemming and Mansoor, 
1988).   
World Bank Reports (1995, 1996) justifying privatisation emphasise the lack of 
accountability and transparency in SOEs, and their immunity from market disciplines 
and the scrutiny of legal institutions. Kirkpatrick (1988) argues that if the principal 
objective of privatisation is to increase economic performance, the priority should be to 
increase competition rather than to transfer ownership. 
 
Since the 1980s, privatisation has been the most significant policy in the wave of market 
reforms, which have swept over the global economy (Cook, and Kirkpatrick, 1995).  
After more than a decade, researchers have moved on to address the outcomes and 
effects of privatisation (Uddin, 1997) and understand the performance of privatised 
enterprises (e.g. Weiss, 1995; Karatas, 1995,) together with their impact on societies 
(Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995).  
Some of these studies have addressed the internal issues of organisations (Potts, 1995), 
whilst other researchers have looked at the positive impact it has had on the economy as 
a whole (Nestor and Nigon, 1996; Sergio, 1996; Hartneck and McMahon, 1996). 
  
However, other researchers found the opposite or mixed results (Jomo, 1995; Kararas, 
1995). The World Bank (1992) concluded that privatisation has had a positive impact 
on economic performance, measured in terms of increased investment, improvements in 
productivity, and output growth and diversification. 
 
Most research on internal accounting controls and privatisation has focussed on 
developed countries (for example, USA, and UK) (Espeland and Hirsch, 1990; Wright 
et al., 1993; Ogden, 1993). Espeland and Hirsch (1990) claimed that accounting 
controls played an important role in justifying ownership changes whilst Wright et al. 
(1993) investigated some important issues relating to “Finance and Control in 
Privatisation by Management Buy-Out”. They reported a positive impact made by 
management buy-outs, such as that it enables the introduction of more appropriate 
financial control systems, employment contracts and negotiating machinery, and 
frequently released former subsidiaries from the constraints on investments resulting 
from cash constraints on loss-making parents. They found that privatisation through 
management buy-out produced better financial control systems, employment contracts 
and negotiating machinery, and the release of investment constraints on subsidiaries .
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The reasons for that are the stronger incentives that managers have and that privatisation 
moves the organisation from a bureaucratic to free market position.   
 
Ogden (1994) demonstrated how accounting controls created customers and markets for 
privatised UK Water companies and transformed political objectives into apparently 
organisational performance matters.  
 
Kirkpatrick (1988) has advocated privatisation on the ground that it will have a 
significant impact on economic performance at the enterprise level. He argued that the 
change in ownership will impose the discipline of private capital markets on the 
enterprise, thereby improving productive efficiency.  
 
Potts’ 1995 study concentrated on the privatisation of estate agriculture in Tanzania and 
found that production performance, after the ownership change, had been mixed.   Two 
estates, out of many, had remarkably good production, but most of the other estates 
seem to have experienced further decline for two or three years before recovery. He 
implicates management problems in the declining performance. Potts concludes that 
there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the economic performance of public 
sector estates in Tanzania has been worse than that of the private sector in general. He 
suggests, however, that substantial managerial autonomy and resources are important 
factors in improved performance.  
The study of Karatas (1995), about the performance of pre-privatisation and post-
privatisation firms in Turkey, admits the limitations of available performance indicators 
for the evaluation of post-privatisation performance.  
 
Accounting researchers have examined the transformation of control systems in 
conjunction with ownership issues. The results of their research have highlighted the 
various effects of organisational control in the context of ownership changes (see 
Espeland and Hirsch, 1990; Wright et al., 1993; Ogden, 1993). Some of these studies 
are related to the changes of ownership and its relations to management accounting in 
general. This is due to the shortage of studies on the relationship between privatisation 
and management control systems. 
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Ogden’s study (1994) is comprehensive and relates to privatisation and control issues. 
He attempts to theorise management decisions and the internal performance in newly 
privatised UK Water companies. Ogden analyses how water companies solicited 
customers, instead of being actively pursued by customers themselves, through the 
medium of a competitive market. Privatisation provided this opportunity for 
management and, in turn, management accounting played a central role in translating a 
political objective into an organisational performance matter. 
 
Another study, undertaken by Wickramasinghe (1996), gives a comprehensive 
assessment of privatisation issues and the transformation of control issues in the context 
of a developing country. Wickramasinghe looked at two case studies from Sri Lanka, 
and made a series of comparative interpretations. He found that political influences over 
management control, and ineffective bureaucratic relations were common in the public 
mode of accounting control, while these characteristics were always connected to the 
traditional ‘King Concept’ (non-capitalist behaviour). On the other hand, after 
ownership changes, a private mode of accounting emerged, under which political 
influences and ineffective bureaucratic controls were reduced. He argued that although 
this institutional change was predominant in this mode of accounting, the articulation of 
cultural beliefs, and the dominance of production controls over accounting controls, was 
common to both modes of accounting, in both firms.  
 
 It can be argued that management control systems could be designed to consider some 
variables such as market and price, which is not common in the public sector. 
Nevertheless, accounting researchers have recognised the problematic nature of private 
sector MCS values. Values such as ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ are too subjective 
and value-laden (Humphrey, 1991). Humphrey (1991) also commented that the 
common definition of effectiveness is the goal-model that developed from theories 
viewing the organisation as a machine. Organisations are assumed to be goal-seeking 
entities and their effectiveness is judged by their degree of goal attainment. A related 
assumption is that an organisation’s chances of attaining its goals are maximised by 
increasing the goal-related activities. Yet the identification of goals is not as simple a 
task as assumed by government policy-makers.  
 
Based on the above literature, it can be said that changes in ownership in general, 
especially privatisation, have a great effect on organisation in general and management 
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control systems in particular. The discussion now will turn to identify the aspects of 
management control systems that may be changed because of privatisation and identify 
the importance of each of them on the control systems within organisation. 
 
3.4 Management Accounting Control Systems Aspects 
 
As mentioned earlier, management control requires both planning and controlling 
activities. Planning is the process of setting goals and performance standards, then 
taking action to implement them. Control activities measure performance against these 
goals and standards; then remedial actions are taken to correct any deviations if 
required. Management control involves several activities, including: 
1) Planning what the organisation should do; 
2) Coordinating the activities of several parts of the organisation; 
3) Communicating information; 
4) Evaluating information; 
5) Deciding on what action should be taken; and 
6) Motivating employees to change their behaviour  
(Anthony & Govindarajan, 1995). 
 
The role of management accounting at a strategic level is to support the ‘business 
model’ of the organisation. This denotes how the company chooses to compete. Among 
the most important purposes of management accounting are to cover a wide range of 
financial activities such as financial planning and financial transactions, and to provide 
management with an evaluation of expenditure on property and people.  
 
Medori (1998) identifies the following functional areas of management accounting: 
• Pricing decisions, which require information about the cost of products; 
• Integration of financial accounts and management accounts: this field of 
integration is concerned with the valuation of stocks; 
• Investment analysis, which is concerned with making investment decisions by 
using a number of techniques (e.g. NPV and IRR); 
• Budgeting, which provides a plan for achieving organisational strategy and a 
mechanism for performance measurement; 
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• The Performance Measurement System (PMS), which is used to improve 
process control and evaluation, and to compare the performance of different 
organisations, plants, departments, teams and individuals. 
 
Management accounting control systems (MACS) are seen in this research as a package 
of management accounting control techniques and aspects that have been assembled in 
the MACS used by companies. Ferreira (2002) argued that while designing MACS, 
companies adopt certain MACS techniques and aspects. He stated (p.24): 
 
These techniques will produce information with particular 
characteristics, which become characterising features of the MACS. The 
characteristics of information produced by MACS depend heavily on the 
features of the individual techniques included in it.   
 
 
Based on other literature (Kaplan, 1984; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Stewart, 1991; 
Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Chong and Chong, 1997, Ferreira, 2002) there was a 
distinction between traditional and contemporary techniques. Uddin (1997) in his 
research to provide idealised management control systems in the private sector based on 
the problems that occur in management control systems in the public sector, identified 
five traditional aspects of management control systems which are: organisational 
objectives, budgetary system, intensive systems, accounting system, and effectiveness 
(Table 3.1 Idealised MCS's in Private Sector). Uddin (1997) did his study on 
Bangladesh and he generalized his findings and the aspects of MACS that he came out 
with to all developing countries. Ferreira (2002) added two other aspects to the MACS, 
which are the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) and Costing Systems especially the usage of 
Activity-Based-Costing (ABC), although he considered them as contemporary aspects 
of MACS.  
 
Some other accounting researchers have been aware of the limitations of traditional 
approaches to control (Burchell et al., 1980; Tinker, 1980). These researchers criticised 
these approaches arguing that they were not adequate to explain the broader context of an 
accounting control system. Recently, some contemporary accounting researchers have 
been giving attention to understanding the organisational context of management control, 
systems such as the external environment, organisational structure, culture, and strategy, 
which will enrich our understanding of practices (Tinker et al., 1982; Gordon and 
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Narayanan, 1984; Merchant, 1984; Flamholz, Das and Tsui, 1985; Uddin and Hopper, 
2003; Simons, 1995; Kennedy and Widener, 2008; Berry et al., 2009; Tsameny et al., 
2010).  
 
Table 3.1 Idealised MCS's in Private Sector  
MCS Issues Problems with MCS in Public 
Sector 
Idealized MCS in Private 
Sector  
Organizational Goal 
Setting 
Multiple and conflicting objectives 
are to be set. Objectives are 
formulated with more consideration 
for social and political issues 
Single organizational goals can be 
achieved. They are based on 
commercial criteria 
Budgetary Processes The central authority, using 
bureaucratic mechanisms, prepares 
the budget. It does not reflect the 
reality of the enterprise. It is not used 
for control purposes.  
Budget is seen as an objective and 
rational control tool. 
Role of Incentive 
Systems 
Incentive systems are characterized 
by the permanent wage structure of 
government. Performance evaluation 
is bureaucratically built. 
Reward structures provide 
motivation to measure the 
performance of employees 
Role of Accounting 
Systems 
Accounting systems are constrained 
by governmental regulations for 
control and auditing purposes. It 
ignores organizational settings 
Accounting systems rationally 
provide financial and non-
financial information for control 
Effectiveness Effectiveness is not viewed in terms 
of organizational profitability. It is 
viewed in terms of the achievement 
of governmental objectives. 
Efficient performance of 
organizational activities 
Source: Uddin, 1997 
 
This study will use the five aspects of management control systems that are presented 
by Uddin (1997, two aspects from Ferreira (2002) and the three elements of 
organisational contexts suggested by Flamholz, Das and Tsui (1985) in relation to 
management control to investigate and understand the changes that have been effected 
by Saudi privatised companies after privatisation (Table 3.2). 
 
 Table 3.2 The aspects of MCS and the three elements of organisational context that will 
be investigated in the study: 
Aspect of MCS and Elements of Organizational Context Author 
Objectives Setting and Strategy Uddin (1997) 
The Budgetary Process Uddin (1997) 
Incentive Systems Uddin (1997) 
Accounting System Uddin (1997) 
Effectiveness (PMS) Uddin (1997) 
Balanced Scorecards Ferreira (2002) 
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Costing System Ferreira (2002) 
Organizational Structure Flamholz, Das and Tsui (1985) 
Organizational Culture Flamholz, Das and Tsui (1985) 
External Environment Flamholz, Das and Tsui (1985) 
 
 
3.4.1 Objective Setting and Strategy 
 
Public enterprises have been created for objectives influenced by statutory 
requirements, central government interventions and national and local, political and 
domestic processes (Jones and Pendlebury, 1988). Being consistent with a country’s 
development goals, the public sector has to face conflicting objectives such as profit 
earning vs. providing services to the population. The idealised MCS of the public sector 
does not consider these contradictory factors when setting goals and more often than not 
objectives are set by bureaucrats who are totally unaware of the organisational context 
(Uddin, 1997).  
On the other hand, it can be argued that public sector objectives can be achieved 
through recognising the dynamic nature of the organisation and society. Thus, the 
problems of the public sector may not lie in multiple objectives or ownership; rather 
they lie in the recognition of the reflexive relationship between the organisation and 
society and politics (Hopper et al, 1986). 
 
The view of the idealised MCS of the private sector argues that rational goals can be set 
as they represent a congruence of interests (such as customers, shareholders, and 
managers). In addition, goals and objectives in the private sector are clear, specified, 
measurable and are set based on commercial criteria (Uddin, 2003).  He also stated that 
setting objectives is a result of the collective work of managers at all levels, as each 
division can set its objectives based on the general objectives of the company. 
 
The importance of the relationship between business strategy and MCS is now widely 
recognised in the management accounting literature (Simons, 1995; Gosselin, 1997; 
Otley, 1999). Miles and Snow (1978) made the distinction between four types of 
strategies that they named defender, analyser, prospector, and reactor. They maintained 
that the defender focus is primarily focused on internal operations, prospectors on 
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environmental scanning, whilst analysers divide their attention between internal 
operations and scanning the environment for new opportunities.  
Further, they established a relationship between the strategies pursued and control 
system characteristics. According to them, defenders concentrate on efficiency levels, 
cost control and monitoring trends. By contrast, prospectors keep on monitoring their 
environment in search for new opportunities, leading them to give priority to planning 
activities and using more ‘soft’ measures. In turn, analysers try to combine the better of 
these two worlds keeping their attention not only on internal operations, but also in 
scanning their environment. It is the lower intensity in doing this that makes the 
difference between analysers and both defenders and prospectors. Finally, reactor 
companies do not follow a coherent pattern of behaviour; this implies that no prediction 
can be rationally made regarding their activities. 
 
Simons (1987), in his study about the relationship between strategy and accounting 
control systems, showed that the accounting control system does respond to the 
different strategies and objectives followed by companies. The evidence suggested high 
performing companies following a prospector-type strategy attached greater importance 
to forecast data, to setting of tight budget targets, and to close monitoring of output. 
 
From the above arguments, it would be expected that due to privatisation an 
organisation would change its objectives so that they are set on a commercial basis, 
taking account of other social and political factors, whilst when state-owned it took 
account of social and political s rather than commercial factors. These new objectives 
would enhance the focus on the company’s profitability and achieving organizational 
targets rather than meeting targets set by the government. Each management level in 
each department would share the process of setting objectives, as they would set their 
departments’ objectives and would be held accountable for them.  
 
3.4.2 The Budgetary Process 
 
 
The budgetary tool is the principal control mechanism of financial MCSs. Previous 
research findings in developing countries have revealed that the budget plays a 
traditional role only, not only in control mechanisms of the public sector, as it is only 
concerned with presenting how the organisation spends government money (Hoque and 
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Hopper, 1994, 1997; Wickramasinghe, 1996). However the public sector budget is 
subject to governmental authorisation whilst in the private sector budget is 
conventionally seen as a tool for objective and rational control over sub-units (Uddin, 
1997).  
Wildavasky (1979, 1975) argued that budgeting systems accomplish many purposes 
beyond achieving control since they are forms and sources of power, and serve both as 
guardians of scarce resources (Budgeters) and as advocates of sub-units (Budgetees).   
 
In general, the budget is seen as a means of decision-making, and a process of planning 
and control (Anthony et al., 1992). However in many public enterprises the budget is 
not properly prepared. It appears as a mere adaptation of the previous year’s budget due 
to untrained managers and the absence of management dialogue between accounting 
and other departments (Uddin, 1997).  
Previous studies on public management control have revealed that participation in the 
budget is totally absent in the public sector. Rather, the budget comes from top 
management, which is usually unaware of the circumstances of particular departments 
(Hoque, 1993; Uddin and Siddique, 1995).   
Budgetary control is an important part of a firm’s management control systems 
(Merchant, 1998). The way in which corporate managers seek out performance 
information, the type and detail of the information they ask for and the arrangements 
they have for discussing the results with business-unit managers are all part of the 
budgetary control process (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998). This process comprises 
the following three components: 
 
i. Emphasis on meeting the budget – i.e., the extent to which the evaluation of 
managerial performance is primarily based upon the business unit managers’ 
ability to continually meet the budget on a short term basis (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 1998; Hopwood, 1972). 
 
ii. The amount of information detail required for budget reviews – i.e., the extent to 
which subordinates are required to submit reports that discuss performance to 
date, identify variances and propose detailed corrective actions if it appears that 
the budget targets are not being met (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998; 
Merchant, 1981). 
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iii. The intensity of budget-related communications- i.e., the extent to which 
budgets are used to facilitate information exchange throughout the organization, 
to force analysis and debate, and to assist corporate managers to personally 
involve themselves in the decision-making activities of their business-unit 
managers (Simons, 1995).   
 
Al-Sughayer (2001) in his study of the budgetary process in Saudi Arabia found that 
budgetary control in Saudi Arabia is concerned primarily with regularity and 
compliance and does not direct any attention towards an evaluation of the efficient use 
of resources or the effectiveness of plans and objectives. He gave as a reason for the 
absence of an appropriate mechanism for enforcing budget reforms the fact that in the 
country’s political system power was mainly centred in the hands of the government, 
which led to strong intervention by the government in the budgetary process and control 
within the organisation. Finally he concluded that effective change in accounting and 
budgeting practices would most probably occur if it is preceded first by a change in the 
organisation’s operating strategy and then a reorganisation of its administration and 
structure.  
 
Form the above discussion, it would be expected that due to privatisation, an 
organisation would gain full autonomy in setting its budget and would use it as a tool to 
evaluate and control its activities 
 
 
3.4.3 The Role of Incentive Systems 
 
 
Incentives are an essential element for a perfect control system, yet the idealised MCS 
of the public sector does not place any emphasis on them. The wage structure of the 
public sector in LDCs is largely fixed and extra rewards are rarely used. Wage structure 
and bonus systems are devised by bureaucrats who do not consider organisational 
needs, participant values or production relations, while employing wage structure and 
reward systems on the shop floor (Murshed, 1989).  
On the other hand, the reward structure of the private sector is seen to be more effective, 
since it considers the performance of the individual (Uddin, 2003). Reward systems are 
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concerned with two major issues: performance and rewards. Performance includes 
defining and evaluating performance and providing employees with feedback. Rewards 
include bonuses, salary increases, promotion, stock awards, and perquisites (Kerr and 
Slocum, 2005). 
 
Performance measurement and incentive systems may assist in developing and 
achieving strategies by providing clear signals about the intended strategic direction and 
supplying the necessary motivation by rewarding behaviour that is goal directed 
(Lawler and Rhode 1976). Reward systems encourage employees to work toward 
planned strategic outcomes (Carey 1992). Reward systems require performance 
measurement systems to evaluate performance and determine bonuses (Carey 1992). 
Reward systems can motivate employees to pursue strategic priorities by setting 
performance measures targeted on priorities and sharing rewards between employees 
and the organization, based on achieving these performance targets (Carey 1992; 
Welbourne et al. 1995).  These systems emphasize employee involvement in co-
operating to improve performance as well as formulating rules governing performance 
measures and the distribution of rewards (Bowen and Lawler 1992).  
 
Tsamenyi et al., (2010) in their study of privatised companies in Ghana argued that 
before privatisation, organisations lacked proper supervision of employees. They argued 
that “employees were not disciplined and there was no effective means by which 
workers could channel their grievance” (p: 437). They argued that labour cost efficiency 
was low before privatisation. They mentioned that the governmental organisation has to 
obtain the related ministry’s approval before it can take any action like disciplining 
employees. They stated that before privatisation employees’ wages were not 
competitive enough, resulting in low employee morale and job satisfaction. He also 
stated that due to the lack of creativities and motivations, employees were hardly given 
training and refresher courses by the organisation to keep them up-to-date in their 
knowledge. Finally they mentioned that these entire problems lesser after privatisation.  
 
From the above arguments, it would be expected that as a result of privatisation, an 
organisation would develop a competitive reward system for its employees based on 
accurate evaluation of employees’ performance. In addition the organisation would 
provide its employees with adequate training and development activities to keep them 
up-to-date and improve employees’ performance. 
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3.4.4  The Role of Accounting Systems 
 
 
An appropriate accounting system is an important tool that gives visibility to the 
activities of an organisation, and can help enforce accountability (Uddin, 2004). 
Roberts and Scapens (1985) argue that the use of accounting information in 
organisations should be understood in terms of the role it plays in the production and 
reproduction of systems of accountability 
 
The ‘New Public Management’ literature is a valuable source of studies concerning the 
importance of accounting in changing organisational contexts, and of relevance to this 
study, given its consideration of an industry which moved from a public sector 
nationalised industry to a new privatised status (Uddin, 2004). 
With regard to the earlier discussion of accountability, there are important implications 
for accounting in the move from the emphasis on stewardship in the old public sector to 
the new emphasis on measures of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Attempts to 
quantify performance mean that accounting has a central role as a control mechanism in 
public sector reform and several authors have considered the effect of this in a variety of 
organisational contexts. These studies are helpful in considering not only the external 
environment of control within which change was taking place, but also the relevance of 
accounting for internal and cultural issues (ibid). 
 
An important issue in relation to external accountability is the use made of accounting 
information in regulatory decision-making, and the reporting requirements for 
management in this regard. Given that accounting information is presumably an 
important factor in the regulator’s decisions, to what extent is he/she required to 
disclose the accounting basis of decisions? With regard to the internal operations of the 
organisation, the new emphasis on profitability and efficiency would also impact on the 
priorities within the organisation  (Ferreira, 2002).  
 
 
With regard to the external environment, authors such as Miller and Rose (1990) 
recognise the importance of accounting in enabling change at the macro level of society 
as a whole.  They discuss the importance of how regulatory mechanisms enable 
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‘government at a distance’, in particular the use by government of a range of 
‘technologies’ and the complex mechanisms through which it becomes possible to link 
calculations at one place with action at another.  
Humphrey, Miller and Scapens (1993) discuss the rise of ‘accountable management’ in 
the public sector and emphasise the usefulness of accounting-based technologies in such 
initiatives, with their potential for extending discretion and choice for individuals, while 
still ensuring that actions are taken in accordance with broader economic, financial and 
social objectives of government. However, they emphasise that: 
 
The continuing mobilising power of the accounting potential, in the face 
of unmet expectations, unintended consequences and criticisms, suggests 
that ‘accounting should be accounted for’ (Hopwood, 1985:cited in 
Humphrey, Miller and Scapens, 1993 p: 18, 19).  
 
 
Considering now the importance of accounting to the internal environment of 
organisations, Humphrey (1994) examines the role of private sector management 
consultants in the implementation of FMI (Financial Management Initiative) in the 
probation service. His study illustrates the difficulties of applying traditional 
management accounting principles in complex public sector organisations, and 
questions the claims to expertise of the consultants with their ‘quite restricted notions of 
management and control’. This theme of doubting the efficacy of private sector 
accounting practices for the public sector is recurrent in much of the NPM literature. 
Several authors (Carter, 1989, 1990; Humphrey and Pease, 1991; Pollitt, 1986, 1990; 
Hood, 1991) focus their research on the variety of performance measures that have been 
introduced to different areas of the public sector, in the name of promoting ‘economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness’. They suggest that the dominance of financial and 
economic measures may render other discourse less visible, and suggest that wider 
issues such as quality of service and equity in its provision are likely to suffer as a 
result. Keat (1991) in discussing issues of the restructuring of organisations suggests 
that the model of the commercial enterprise has taken on ‘paradigmatic status’, manifest 
in various corporate organisations undertake by public sector managements to provide a 
sharper focus on financial performance. 
 
Turning now to studies that emphasise organisational culture, it has been argued that 
accounting can play an important role in transforming organisational cultures (see 
section 3.4.9). Laughlin (1991) points out that accounting systems are an important part 
73 
 
of an organisation’s design and crucially linked to its interpretive schemes. Dent (1991) 
and Capps et al (1989) both examine accounting’s capacity to provide new frames of 
meaning within which organisational actors may operate. Dent’s study documents the 
eventual rise of the new business culture in European Rail over the traditional 
engineering/railway culture, and the resistance to change along the way. Other 
important studies in this vein include a series of articles written about the National Coal 
Board (Berry et al, 1985; Hopper et al, 1986; Capps et al, 1989), which emphasise the 
importance of tradition and organisational culture for understanding management 
control in the NCB, within a changing social and political environment. Ogden (1994, 
1995, and 1997) has examined issues of accounting and accountability in the context of 
the water industry. In the case of utilities, privatisation has meant a new focus on 
profitability and shareholder value. Ogden (1995) discusses these changes in relation to 
the water industry in the UK in terms of the emergence first of ‘a vocabulary of costs’ 
and subsequently of a ‘vocabulary of profits’. Ogden emphasises how the professional 
judgments of engineers have become less important as more attention has been devoted 
to financial measures and argues that resistance to the change is illustrated by senior 
management’s continuing efforts to transform the corporate culture from one based on 
engineering and operating demands to one based on business priorities and customer 
needs.  
 
Miller (1992: 80) provides an interesting view of accounting information’s role in 
decision-making, which is relevant to the regulatory process, and which encapsulates 
the findings of many of the studies just discussed: 
 
Along with other practices of government, the technologies of 
accountancy often intersect poorly with the specifics of the ‘real’. The 
conditions that would make them work ‘perfectly’ are frequently absent, 
unplanned outcomes emerge, and new situations make existing 
technologies obsolete. Paradoxically, this is not an obstacle for 
calculative technologies but a source of their strength, for the alleged 
shortcomings of one calculative technology allow consultants and others 
to demonstrate the advantages of a new one. As with government, we find 
a conviction that there exists a calculable answer to the problems of the 
enterprise and even of social life. This conviction, often devoid of 
empirical evaluation, underlies much of contemporary accounting.  
 
 
 
It can be argued that Management control systems in the public sector view an 
accounting system as a system, which only prepares annual reports for auditing and 
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stewardship purposes. These reports are not considered in problematical decision-
making or controlling purposes. Decisions in most cases depend on bureaucratic 
procedures. Accounting information is rarely used for this purpose. On the other hand, 
the idealised MCS of the private sector views accounting systems as instruments for 
providing qualitative and quantitative information (Uddin, 1997). The usefulness of 
accounting information in decision-making does not depend on the way it is presented, 
rather on the way it is interpreted. It is thus apparent that the idealised role of 
accounting in private and public sectors disregards its social construction. Critical 
accounting studies have argued that accounting information cannot be useful until and 
unless it is interpreted in the socio-political context of the organisation (Tinker et al., 
1982; Berry et al., 1985; Hopper et al., 1986; Cooper and Sherer, 1984).  
 
From the above arguments, it would be expected that accounting information in 
privatised organisations would serve more purposes than in the public sector. The 
accounting systems that would be used in the privatised company would provide 
qualitative and quantitative information and reports for internal control purposes and to 
aid decision-making. In addition, it would be expected that accounting information 
would provide fair presentation of the organisation’s financial situation for investors. 
 
 
3.4.5  Effectiveness 
 
 
It is argued by accounting researchers that proper control systems play a significant role 
in effective organisations. Nevertheless, the term ‘effectiveness’ is itself a questionable 
word, depending on how it is viewed (Humphrey, 1991). Organisational effectiveness 
refers to the extent to which organisational goals are achieved. Conventionally, 
organisational effectiveness has been seen as the degree of efficiency achieved through 
organisational functions. Idealised MCS accept this concept of organisational 
effectiveness (Uddin, 1997). Idealised control systems have problems in addressing 
complex organisational issues. It is also recognised that control systems are subject to 
various limitations driven by social, political and cultural factors (Hopper et al, 1986). 
In idealised management control systems, effectiveness can be recognised by sufficient 
performance measurement tools (Uddin, 1997).  
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One of the main roles of management accounting systems is applying performance 
measurement systems, which become a central focus of much management accounting 
research. Otley (2001) suggests,  
 
Much of the thrust of the ‘new’ management accounting has been 
centrally concerned with the issues of measuring organisational 
performance (P:248). 
 
 
Olson and Slater (2002) state that performance measurement is at the heart of the 
management control process in any organisation. As new strategic objectives are 
identified, the organisation may realize the need for new performance measures that 
encourage and monitor new actions (Dixon et al, 1990). Thus, organisations may use a 
broad range of performance measures to reflect the diverse nature of management 
decisions and efforts (Holmstrom, 1979; Banker and Datar, 1989; Feltham and Xie, 
1994; Ittner and Larcker, 1998a). 
Traditionally, PMSs have provided a means of monitoring and maintaining 
organisational control (Nanni et al., 1992), which is the process of ensuring that those 
strategies are implemented by an organisation that would result in the achievement of 
overall goals and objectives (Brignall and Ballantine, 1996). Various writers have 
defined performance measurement differently. For instance, Marshall et al. (1999) 
define PM as the development of indicators and collection of data to describe report on 
and analyze performance. Taking a more comprehensive angle, PM is a function of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of actions, according to Neely et al. (1995), who propose 
three definitions of a PMS as follows: 
 
1. The process of quantifying the efficiency and effectiveness of actions; 
2. A metric used to quantify the efficiency and/or effectiveness of actions; 
3. The set of metrics used to quantify both the efficiency and effectiveness of 
actions.   
 
Kaplan and Norton (1996b) maintain that measurement is a key factor, as management 
is impossible without both internal and external measures, and these have a huge 
influence on all personnel and stakeholders. Thus,  
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if companies are to survive and prosper in information age competition, 
they must use measurement and management systems derived from their 
strategies and capabilities (p.75). 
 
 
Behn (2003) holds that managers can use performance measures (PMs) to “evaluate, 
control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, learn and improve” (p.586). He 
emphasises that there is no single performance measure, which is capable of fulfilling 
all of these eight purposes. Managers must recognise those purposes that any given PM 
might serve and how these measurements could be effectively employed. Hacker and 
Brotherton (1998) argue that an effective measurement system is one that helps 
managers to determine whether the activities which are being carried out within a 
facility do indeed support the achievement of objectives, thus helping the organisation 
to achieve its stated vision.  
 
The information age environment has made it imperative for both manufacturing and 
service organisations to acquire new capabilities for competitive success. How well a 
company manages its intangible assets will have more bearing on its success than its 
physical, tangible assets (Kaplan and Norton, 1996c; Evans, 2005). Neely et al. (2004) 
emphasise that PMSs are an essential part of company strategy. Furthermore, executives 
may introduce new strategies and innovative operating processes rather than using the 
same short-term financial indicators they have been using for decades, such as return on 
investment (ROI), sales growth and operating income. Effective measurement, in their 
opinion, must be an integral part of the management process (Vokurka, 2004; Brewer et 
al., 2005).  
 
PMSs can be classified into three main categories, two of which are quantitative 
measures of performance. The first comprises market measures, that is, those that reflect 
changes in stock prices or shareholder returns, and the second comprises summary 
accounting-based measures, which can be defined in either residual terms (e.g. net 
income after taxes, operating profit, residual income, economic value-added [EVA]) or 
ratio terms (e.g. ROI, return on equity [ROE], return on net assets [RONA]). The third 
category is qualitative measures, assessing subjective areas of performance such as 
ethical behaviour and the satisfaction of stakeholders, customers and managers (Parnell 
et al., 2000). They may also include employee satisfaction, delivery performance, 
process improvement, measures of material and parts delivery time, throughput time, 
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due-date performance, quality, machine flexibility, and inventory levels (Hendricks et 
al., 1996).  
It is often argued that a drawback of accounting measures is that they induce a short-
term focus (Jacobs, 1991). They are by nature backward looking and thus do not 
accurately reflect the effects of employees’ efforts or decisions on future corporate 
performance. This problem is particularly acute in situations where investments in 
intangible assets are important (Lev, 2001). Managers whose performance is evaluated 
in terms of accounting income are discouraged from making investments in intangible 
assets by their conservative accounting treatment. 
 
The shift to non-financial measures was not a criticism of financial measures as such, 
but a reaction to a change of question. Whereas to answer the original question, ‘How 
am I doing against my objective?’, it was reasonable to measure financial progress, 
when the question changed to ‘What should I be doing for the future?’ this was no 
longer appropriate, since financial PMs were essentially backward looking (Al-Sumairi, 
2009).  
Ghalayini and Noble (1996) review the differences between traditional (financial) and 
non-traditional performance measures (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 Comparison between traditional and non-traditional PMs 
Traditional Performance Measurements Non-traditional Performance Measurements 
 Based on outdated accounting systems 
 Mainly financial measurements 
 Intended for middle and top managers 
 Lagging metrics (weekly or monthly) 
 Difficult, confusing and misleading 
 Lead to employee frustration 
 Neglected at shop floor 
 Fixed format 
 Do not vary between locations 
 Do not change over time 
 Intended mainly for monitoring performance 
 Not applicable to JIT, TQM, etc. 
 Hinder continuous improvement 
 Based on company strategy 
 Mainly non-financial measurements 
 Intended for all employees 
 On-time metrics (hourly or daily) 
 Simple, accurate and easy to use 
 Lead to employee satisfaction 
 Frequently used on shop floor 
 No fixed format (depend on needs) 
 Vary between locations 
 Change over time as needs change 
 Intended to improve performance 
 Applicable to JIT, TQM, etc.  
 Help to achieve continuous improvement 
Source: Ghalayini and Noble (1996) 
According to Kaplan (1983), many academics, professionals and consultants 
encouraged the need for manufacturing companies to adopt non-financial performance 
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measurements, which then became a principal feature of PMSs and were used more 
extensively within companies (Frigo and Krumwide, 1999).   
  
Ittner, Larcker and Randall (2003) conclude that the importance of all non-financial 
performance categories to long-term organisational success is less than the anticipated 
use of these categories in performance measurement and decision-making. They also 
indicate that extensive use of PMs for one managerial purpose does not necessarily 
imply that they are used for another. The overall evidence of the effect of non-financial 
measurement on accounting-based performance was mixed. The results also proved that 
non-financial measurement usage was significantly associated with innovation strategy, 
quality strategy, the length of the product development cycle, industry regulation and 
the level of financial stress. Finally, the association between non-financial 
measurements and company performance was dependent on whether the use of these 
measurements matched the company’s characteristics. According to Kaplan and Norton 
(2001), there is a view that non-financial measures are better indicators of long-term 
performance and that they sustain the monitoring by managers of progress towards 
strategic objectives.   
 
There is empirical evidence to suggest that financial and non-financial measurements 
are not substitutes. Rather, the latter are used as additions to the former (Govindarajan 
and Gupta, 1985). However, it is only recently that effective frameworks of 
performance measurement have emerged that integrates both types. These frameworks 
work on the principle that management accounting information systems cannot rely on 
financial measurement alone. Professional accounting associations have also 
encouraged the use of integrated performance measurements (Neely, 1999).  
 
Based on the above arguments there was lack of the use of proper performance 
evaluation system on SOEs. It would be expected that privatised organisations would 
use more sophisticated performance evaluation systems including both financial and 
non-financial indicators. 
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3.4.6 Balanced Scorecards 
 
 
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996, and 2001) define the Balanced Scorecard as a 
framework to facilitate the translation of the business strategy into controllable 
performance measures. In particular, the BSC is considered a comprehensive system of 
strategically aligned performance measures. Niven (2002: 16) defines the BSC as  
A carefully selected set of quantifiable measurements derived from an 
organisation’s strategy. The measurements selected for the Scorecard 
represent a tool for leaders to use in communicating to employees and 
external stakeholders the outcomes and performance drivers by which 
the organisation will achieve its mission and strategic objectives.  
  
The BSC is beneficial to organisations in many ways. For instance, it focuses on 
accountability with respect to goals and objectives, and relates strategy to performance. 
It provides a means to assess whether progress is being made and enables the 
organisation to adjust accordingly. It gives employees a better understanding of the 
cause-and-effect relationships in regular activity (Misiaszek and Oriot, 2002; Vaivio 
and Jarvenpaa, 2002; Sandkuhl et al., 2003; Neely et al., 2004; Ahn, 2005; Anand et al., 
2005; Crawford and Scaletta, 2005; Dilla and Steinbart, 2005; Lawson et al., 2005; 
Phillips and Louvieris, 2005). Many other benefits of the BSC have been recognized in 
previous studies and mostly they are related to control over the organisation overall 
activities. 
 
Kaplan and Norton (2001a) argue that the BSC has evolved as a framework for 
measuring organisation performance. Recognising that measurement has consequences 
beyond reporting the past, they elaborated the BSC concept from a mere performance 
measurement system to an organising framework for a strategic management system.  
Many researchers concur with the notion that the BSC is a strategic management tool, 
enabling senior management to communicate their vision for change, at the same time 
empowering business divisions and employees to find new ways of accomplishing day-
to-day activities while working towards the company’s strategic objectives (Epstein and 
Manzoni, 1998; Ritter, 2003). According to a recent Institute of Management 
Accounting survey of performance, the scorecard has proved to be an effective tool of 
strategy communication and clarification (Salterio and Webb, 2003). The benefits of 
using the BSC as a strategic management tool (Bailey et al., 1999) are: 
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• Enhancing communication within the organisation. 
• Promoting the active formulation and implementation of organisational 
strategies. 
• Improving the alignment of divisional or individual goals with the organisation’s 
objectives and strategies. 
• Updating organisational strategies and making them visible. 
• Aligning annual or short-term operating plans with long-term strategies. 
• Aligning performance evaluation measurement and long-term strategies. 
 
Norreklit (2000) contends that apart from financial and non-financial measurements, the 
BSC also contains outcome measures and the performance drivers of outcomes, which 
are linked together in cause-and-effect relationships, making the PM system an 
integrated control system. Also, Kaplan and Norton (2001b: 94) recommended that  
 
Every measure selected for a BSC should be an element of a chain of 
cause and effect relationships that communicates the meaning of the 
business unit’s strategy to the organisation.  
 
Thus, controlling the essential factors in a cause-effect relationship between measures 
may lead to a much better perspective on the requirements the business has in order to 
achieve its intended outcome performance (Lawson et al., 2005).  
 
Interview data reported from a case study of a Fortune 500 company suggests that 
managers believe that the cause-and-effect relations included in their scorecard have 
resulted in increased efficiency and profitability (Salterio and Webb, 2003). Chang et 
al., (2002, cited by Kasperskaya and Oliveras, 2003) offer some preliminary evidence of 
the existence of cause-and-effect relationships within the Performance Assessment 
Framework (PAF) of the National Health Service in the UK. 
 
BSC is a system that help organisation to transfer its strategies into controllable 
performance measures for the organisation and its employees. As a result the use of 
BSC can provide more efficiency to the organisation. It can be argued that an 
organisation can be efficient without using BSC if it uses the right performance 
measures and has a clear method for translating its business strategies into performance 
measures In the case of most of SOEs, they lack tools for translating their strategies and 
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goals into controllable performance measures; therefore it would be better for the 
organisation after privatisation to apply BSC, as the benefit would outweigh the cost. 
 
 
3.4.7 Costing Systems 
 
According to Drury (2000), a cost and management accounting system should generate 
information for meeting the following requirements: 
1. Allocating costs between costs of goods sold and inventories for internal and external 
profit reporting; 
2. Providing relevant information to help managers make better decisions; 
3. Providing relevant information for planning, control and performance measurement. 
 
The first item above is required primarily for meeting external financial accounting 
requirements. Most organisations produce internal profit statements for their business 
units at monthly intervals (Drury and Tayles, 1995) for management purposes. Thus, 
the first requirement is necessary for both financial and management accounting 
purposes. Many service organisations, however, do not hold inventories, so they do not 
need to allocate costs between goods sold and inventories. Routine and non-routine 
financial reporting is required for meeting the second requirement. Routine information 
is required at periodic intervals relating to the analysis of the profitability of 
products/services to ensure that only profitable products/services are marketed.  
 
Non  -routine  financial information is also required for those strategic decisions that are 
made at infrequent intervals such as the introduction of new products or services and the 
negotiation of long-term contracts with customers. Accurate cost information is required 
for decision-making since inaccurate costs can lead to incorrect decisions such as the 
discontinuation of profitable products and the continuation of marketing unprofitable 
products. Less accurate information relating to product costs may suffice for meeting 
the first requirement above (profit measurement for a company or business unit) since 
the aim is to allocate costs between inventories and cost of goods sold at the aggregate 
level rather than the individual product level. 
 
Drury (2000) explained the major differences between traditional and ABC systems. 
Both systems rely on what has become known as the two-stage allocation process. In 
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the first stage traditional costing systems assign indirect costs to cost centres (normally 
departments), whereas ABC systems assign costs to each major activity centre rather 
than departments. Therefore, the first distinguishing feature between the two systems is 
that ABC systems assign costs to a greater number of first stage cost centres (i. e. cost 
pools). 
The second stage allocates costs from the cost centres to cost objects (e. g. 
products/services). Traditional costing systems allocate indirect costs to cost objects 
using a small number of allocation bases/cost drivers that tend to vary directly with 
volume produced. Direct labour hours/cost and machine hours are the allocation bases 
that are mostly used by traditional costing systems.  
In contrast, ABC systems use many second-stage cost drivers including drivers that do 
not vary directly with volume produced. Examples include the number of production 
runs and the number of purchasing orders for allocating the costs of production 
scheduling and purchasing to cost objects respectively. Therefore, the major 
distinguishing feature of ABC systems is that they rely on a greater number of cost 
centres and different types of second stage cost drivers. By using a greater number of 
cost centres and cost drivers that are based on cause-and-effect allocations, ABC 
systems should report more accurate product/service costs. Traditional cost systems are 
likely to report less accurate costs because, in the first stage, they often allocate costs to 
only a very small number of cost centres (sometimes a single cost centre for the whole 
business unit) and make extensive use of arbitrary allocations in the second stage of 
allocating indirect costs to cost objects. 
 
The criticisms of traditional product costing systems relate mainly to the reporting of 
inaccurate costs for decision-making. Traditional product costing systems are 
considered to be sufficiently accurate for financial accounting and profit measurement 
purposes. This is because it may not be necessary to measure accurately the resources 
consumed by individual products. The objective of the costing system here is to provide 
a reasonably accurate analysis of the total costs incurred during a period between cost of 
sales and inventories. Cooper and Kaplan (1988, p. 22) argue that most organisations 
use traditional costing systems, designed primarily for meeting financial inventory 
valuation requirements, to generate cost information for decision-making requirements. 
They claim that such costs are accurate enough for financial accounting, but are mostly 
totally inadequate in terms of accuracy for decision-making.  
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In recent years many researchers have drawn attention to the fact that traditional costing 
systems are unable to cope with the developments, which have occurred in business 
environments. By the mid-1980s, the prominent critics of traditional costing systems 
(Kaplan, 1985; Cooper and Kaplan, 1987) were highlighting their deficiencies in terms 
of the methods used to allocate indirect costs to products/services. They assert that 
direct labour or other volume-based costs drivers fail to measure the consumption of 
non-volume based activities accurately and, hence, result in distorted product or service 
costs. Using purely volume-based cost drivers tends to lead to over-cost high volume 
products and services and under-cost low volume products or services. 
As the business environment in Saudi Arabia changed by implementing the 
privatisation policy, it would be expected that privatised companies would improve 
their decision-making process by applying an accurate and efficient costing systems, 
such as ABC. 
 
 
3.4.8 Organisational Structure and Control 
  
 
 
Organisational structure is an important element of control in organisations and this 
section will consider some of the views in the literature on why different structures 
exist, why they change and how they contribute to the control of organisations with 
different characteristics. An important feature of organisational change in the public 
sector in recent years has been the reform of organisational structures to facilitate the 
introduction of a new focus on market rather than public service modes of organisation.  
 
The institutional economics theory of markets and hierarchies suggests that 
organisational structure will depend on the cost of obtaining information about 
organisational processes and outputs. Williamson (1975) suggests that the governance 
structures of organisations will take the form of markets or hierarchies depending on 
which one allows economic transactions to be conducted at lowest cost. The main 
distinction between the two is that in hierarchical organisations transactions are 
mediated by rules and procedures rather than by prices and the laws of supply and 
demand, as in market structures. From an institutional economics point of view, 
hierarchy is an inferior form of organisation, likely to result in inefficient operations. 
84 
 
Ouchi (1980) suggests that where outputs are easy to measure, but transformation 
processes are not well understood, the market structure is satisfactory, while 
hierarchical organisations are better suited where transformation processes are well-
understood but outputs are difficult to measure.  
 He adds a third structure, which is the clan, where neither outputs nor transformation 
processes are well understood. A significant feature of organisations in which clan 
structures are important is the pre-eminence of professional expertise and judgement, 
and a sense of common purpose, based on shared values and beliefs, which binds 
individuals together without the need for more formal mechanisms of control, with 
traditional examples including the health and education sectors. Hierarchies and clans 
have been the prevailing structures in the service-delivery state, with the former based 
on bureaucratic mechanisms, strongly supported in many cases by common recognition 
of the importance of public service ethic. 
Ezzamel and Willmott (1993) are critical of the markets and hierarchies framework that, 
as they argue, ignores the importance of power relations and the fact that market 
relations are usually based on a hierarchical structure of domination. Emphasising the 
importance of both political and cultural discourses in determining and defining 
appropriate structures, they contend that: 
 
…The discourses and practices of economic rationalism are not ‘given’ 
or ‘natural’ but arise within and serve to secure and legitimise particular 
(historical) power/knowledge relations (1993, p.111).  
 
 
In discussing the changes in the public sector, which have occurred in an attempt to 
introduce more market-based practices, they emphasise the importance of new 
structures of domination that serve the rise and reproduction of new groups in power. 
They also stress that such changes have strengthened hierarchical forms of control at the 
expense of clan modes of regulation, using examples from the health and education 
sectors to illustrate their case. While accountability in a hierarchical organisation is 
from subordinate to superior, based on legitimate authority, under a clan structure 
accountability is based on peer review. The authors emphasise that the increasing 
importance attached to new calculative and rationalistic technologies of accounting that 
promote competition and financial accountability may be incompatible with the ‘sense 
of purpose and service’ which is a tradition in the public sector. They suggest that new 
modes of governance violate basic tenets of faith in the public sector, with the result 
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that professionals have employed their developed clan control as weapon to attempt to 
resist changes, or at least to maximise their control over new arrangements. 
 
 
They suggest five possibilities for organisational change deriving from the above.  
Firstly, actors may adopt new interpretive schemes, e.g. a move from a professional to a 
managerial approach to running an organisation is likely to lead to new structures 
evolving. Secondly, new values and interests may emerge, which require new 
structures, e.g. a new emphasis on profitability rather than service provision in the 
public sector. Thirdly, since the structuring of organisations is a political process, power 
relations are important, and the ascendancy of new factions of power may lead to the 
emergence of new provinces of meaning that subsequently shape the production and 
recreation of organisational structures. Finally, the last two possibilities for structural 
change relate to contextual constraints. Changes in technology, for example, may 
impact on organisational structure. More interestingly, turbulent change in the external 
environment may force changes in organisational structure. 
 
The term ‘horizontal organisation’ has been used to highlight a perspective which views 
organisations as structured around a small number of business processes, or work flows, 
which link the activities of an organisation to the needs and capabilities of suppliers and 
customers (Ostroff and Smith, 1992). It is a perspective that has led to calls for 
management control researchers to pay more attention to lateral relationships, which 
involve co-operation and coordination amongst managers at similar levels of the 
hierarchy (Otley, 1994; Hopwood, 1996; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 2004). 
Whilst modern organisations tend to be flatter, they are still hierarchies. So the 
challenge for management control is to develop concepts and systems that orchestrate 
both horizontal and vertical relationships (Berry et al., 2009). Techniques such as 
activity-based cost management and the Balanced Scorecard can provide ways of 
thinking about cost, value and performance that connect parts of the value chain 
between suppliers and customers. But they are not without their critics, given that major 
expectations of horizontal organisation are to encourage flexibility and learning, both of 
which often require effective co-ordination across the internal (functional) boundaries 
of organisations (ibid).  
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Perhaps more promising research into the relationship between management control and 
horizontal organisation has focused on the concept of responsibility accounting, which 
for several decades has linked organisation theory and management control theory. As 
originally conceived, it presented a model of organisations divided into responsibility 
centres, such as departments or divisions, where managers were individually 
accountable for sub-unit performance. Central responsibility accounting has been the 
controllability principle: the notion that a manager should be evaluated only on that 
which he or she controls (Berry et al., 2009). 
 
As a result of privatisation, it would be expected that an organisation would change its 
structure to be clearer in terms of responsibility centres, as each department or centre 
will have a clear description of its accountability and responsibilities. In addition, the 
main concern of the organisation would change from only providing products and 
services, regardless of the economic benefit and customer needs, to be more concerned 
about customers’ needs. Moreover, the restructuring of organisation due to privatisation 
would make managers co-operate more in setting sub-units goals and objectives. 
 
 
3.4.9 Organisational Cultural and Control 
 
 
   
Organizational culture is often defined as a net, which is woven around deep basic 
assumptions, beliefs, understanding, sense making and values shared by the 
organizational collectives. As a concept, it has developed through historical processes 
and it has potential for further changes. It can be said, however, that, to some extent at 
least, members of organizations tend to behave according to the patterns of an 
organizational culture (Alvesson and Berg, 1992; Martin, 1992). Geertz (1973:145) 
defines culture as the following way: 
 
Culture is the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret 
their experience and guide their action; social structure is the form that 
action takes, the actually existing network of social relations. Culture and 
social structure are then but different abstraction from the same 
phenomena. 
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In looking further at the wider concept of organizational culture, it can be observed that 
there are often different subcultures within organizations. For example different 
professional groups have different views of the world and the nature of their business. 
Accountants might subscribe to one kind of philosophy and marketing people to 
another. Indeed, each group may have developed its own specialized language and set 
of favoured concepts. In this process of definition and delineation, functional barriers 
can be very real, resulting in a set of professional subcultures that could lead to great 
difficulty in communication (Jarvenpaa, 2007). 
 
 
Culture is typically presented hierarchically, based on the stability and tangibility of the 
cultural elements. Artefacts, such as physical products of the culture, collective mental 
frameworks (such as symbols and heroes) and collective action patterns (such as 
rituals), form the outer part and values form the inner part and basic assumptions at the 
core of the culture. These basic assumptions are the hidden, mostly unconsciously, and 
taken-for-granted structure of meaning that guide human behaviour.  
Organizations have their own symbols, which represent special messages for their 
members. In addition, heroes represent the valued characteristic of the organization and 
provide role models.  
Rituals are ceremonial events, which support the values and beliefs of organizations and 
can strengthen a sense of identity and mutual connections. Symbols, rituals and heroes, 
as well as the physical artefacts such as system or products – the most visual forms of 
cultural – are human artefacts and they are, thus, the easiest cultural elements to replace 
(Hofstede et al., 1990; Alvesson and Berg, 1992). Many aspects of an organization’s 
culture are thus embedded in the routine of everyday life.   
 
Smircich (1983), in discussing the significance of the concept of culture for 
organisational analysis, argues that it is possible to view culture either as a variable or 
as a root metaphor. Culture as a variable can be understood in two ways. When viewed 
as an external independent variable, it is: 
 
…considered to be a background factor, an explanatory variable or a 
broad framework influencing the development and reinforcement of 
beliefs…it is imported into the organisation through the membership. Its 
presence is believed to be revealed in the patterns of attitude and actions 
of individual organisation members (p.343).   
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When viewed as an independent internal variable, culture is defined as: 
 
 
…social or normative glue that holds an organisation together. It 
expresses the values or social ideals and the beliefs that organisation 
members come to share. These values or patterns of belief are manifested 
by symbolic devices such as myths, rituals, stories, legends and 
specialised language (p.344).   
 
 
Many discussions of recent changes in the public sector address aspects of cultural 
change from the ‘culture as variable’ perspective. Metcalfe and Richards (1990) say that 
Rayner considered change in the ‘culture of Whitehall’ to be an essential prerequisite 
for lasting reform of civil service management, since ‘an impoverished concept of 
management’ was believed to restrict public managers to programmed implementation 
of predetermined policies, without addressing issues of adapting policies and 
organisations to environmental change. Management was concerned only with internal 
routines and procedures, and management control was exercised through well-defined 
hierarchies of responsibility and authority.  
Wilson and Hinton (1993) discuss attempts to address these shortcomings as being part 
of a move from an administrative to a managerial culture. They suggest that the 
emergence of ‘new managerialism’ is characterised by the importation of private sector 
concepts and techniques into the public sector, moving public services to a market or 
profit-oriented culture. Dawson (1991) defines this particular development as ‘client 
culture’, which may be differentiated from a market culture by the absence of financial 
goals, and the existence of unwilling customers with no choice of service (e.g. social 
services clients).  
 
 
Culture was held to affect organizational members’ perceptions of technical controls, 
which meant the different national or organizational cultures might “require” different 
controls. Culture has two important effects on the MCS (management control system) 
process. It can affect the choice of stimuli to which the individual attends, or it can 
affect any value judgment about the stimuli. Studies of this kind proceeded from 
definitions of generic organizational control subsystems (e.g. planning. monitoring, 
evaluating and rewarding, Birnberg & Snodgrass, 1988, p.447) whose functioning could 
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then be confirmed as more or less effective depending on the psychological dispositions 
(cultures) of their users (organisational members).  
 
 
Alnamari (1993) argued that in a management accounting context differences arise in 
both the planning and control dimensions and the choice of organisational design. 
Planning for the future is one area of difference. In developing countries, including 
Saudi Arabia, there is a widespread belief that no one can influence to any degree 
events in the future. Events occur simply as a matter of nature. This type of belief or an 
attitude toward the future differs from that of Western societies. In Western societies 
most of the people see themselves as having choices, which can influence outcomes in 
the future.  
Lane et al (1988) argue that in a situation like this, goal setting would tend to be hesitant 
and vague and that budget systems would be futile. The feeling of being unable to 
influence events in the future would in effect complicate the problems of getting 
managers to work for the objectives of the company, to meet budget objectives or even 
to take a serious part in planning and control efforts.  
 
Similar problems arise on the control side where Saudis do not like mistakes being 
pointed out or admit that they have no explanation for variances. This attitude seems to 
be found in many developing countries as part of the culture. Therefore, personal 
evaluation of a manager’s performance in such circumstances must be handled 
carefully. All criticism in front of others should be avoided. Discussion of a manager’s 
performance should be a very private matter and should be oriented to company 
objectives and how the mangers can help achieve these objectives, rather than to his 
own shortcomings. Also, with regards to performance evaluation, the relationship 
between superior and subordinate in developing countries is often a personal one and 
Saudi society’s culture is no exception. The predominance of this type of relationship 
then places participants at a disadvantage in the performance management process that 
demands a relatively objective and rational focus on job tasks and goals and on action 
plans to meet them. It can be seen in Saudi Arabia that there are some companies that 
do not hire relatives, friends or people from the same tribe (Alnamari, 1993). In 
addition, Saudi people in general, in terms of preferences for qualifications used to 
favour engineers, believing any ideas they produce and trusting them more than any 
other people. However, this was the situation 15 years ago, and now the society has 
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changed and is more ready to accept and trust different qualifications (Al-Dehailan, 
2004). 
 
Another phenomenon in developing countries is the tendency to extreme centralisation. 
Savage (1978) argues that managers in developing countries like most people of these 
countries, are the products of highly-structured, traditional societies, where all authority 
is derived from family (or tribe) position and submission to authority is seen as the way 
to avoid the anxieties of living. Since authority in the traditional society derives from 
position (as family or tribal leader or as business owner), only the elite are seen to have 
authority. Authority is a symbol of eliteness and for an official or an owner to give up or 
delegate authority is to give up a part of his eliteness. This may help explain why people 
from traditional societies often find it impossible to delegate authority even though they 
may agree with the concept of delegation as being necessary. Furthermore, individuals 
with tribal authority find it difficult to act in a business subordinate role. 
 
It would be expected that privatised companies in Saudi Arabia would experience 
changes in the culture of the organisation and in their employees’ attitudes towards the 
organisation. It would be interesting to investigate whether the changes in culture are a 
result of organisational efforts to change culture or whether they are a result of changes 
in other aspects of the companies such as changes on human resource systems or 
changes in reward systems or changes in accountability centres.  
 
 
3.4.10 External Environment and Control  
 
 
For this study, the external environment comprises the economic and political 
environment, the regulatory bodies and their official pronouncements, as well as public 
opinion, reflecting the prevailing values and ethics of society. This section will 
concentrate in depth on the UK, as there is a lack of resources on other countries’ 
experiences. Dissatisfaction with the way in which many public sector organisations 
were operating led the Conservative government, elected under the leadership of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979, to effect significant changes in the sector.  
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For the nationalised utilities, privatisation was seen to be the answer, since these 
industries were in the unusual position for a public sector organisation of being self-
financing and charging individual consumers for products, at least partly on the basis 
of usage levels. Thatcher's determination to improve the efficiency of operations and 
break the power of the trade unions, together with her vision of a share-owning 
democracy, were important reasons for her decision to privatise the previously 
nationalised industries (Heald and Steel, 1984; Veljanovski, 1987; Graham and 
Prosser, 1991). The lack of a profit motive in public utilities, their protection from fear 
of bankruptcy and the lack of performance evaluation and incentives for management 
were all seen as factors, which contributed to their problems, which could be 
successfully addressed by privatisation. Freeing industry from the ‘dead hand of the 
state’ legitimated the changes.  
 
All of the above initiatives are characteristic of attempts by government to render more 
visible the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public service operations, and 
consequently to increase accountability for performance by service providers (Hood, 
1991; Pollitt, 1990). The rationale has been to introduce the market-based practices of 
private companies, by means of surrogates for competition such as the 
purchaser/provider split, the growth of contractual arrangements and flexibility in pay 
and conditions for staff to enable high performance to be rewarded. Many performance 
indicators have been devised to enhance visibility (Wilson and Hinton, 1993; Carter, 
1991; Pollitt, 1990). The appropriateness of private sector practices for public sector 
organisations has been contested by a number of authors. Stewart and Ranson's (1988) 
comparison of private sector and public sector models (Table 3.4) provides a useful 
summary of the different principles applicable to the two ideal types: 
 
Table 3.4 Public Sector Model vs. Private Sector Model 
Private Sector Model Public Sector Model 
Individual choice in the market Collective choice in the polity 
Demand and price Need for resources 
Closure for private action Openness for public action 
The equity of the market The equity of need 
The search for market satisfaction The search for justice 
Customer sovereignty Citizenship 
Competition as instrument of the market Collective action as instrument of the 
polity  
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Exit as the stimulus Voice as the condition 
Source: Stewart and Ranson (1988) 
 
 
They emphasise the distinctive nature of the public sector, highlighting the importance 
of collective decisions for the provision of public services, and considerations of equity 
and justice, which are absent from the private sector model. They also distinguish 
between customers and citizens, saying: 
 
The public domain has its own conditions, which are ignored at their 
peril. The public are not merely clients or customers of the public service 
organisation. They are themselves a part of that organisation as 
citizens. Citizenship can be a basic value in the public domain. In 
building citizenship management has to encompass a set of relationships 
for which the private sector model allows no place. (p. 15) 
 
 
 
The 'notion of enterprise' and the development of an 'enterprise culture' have been 
discussed at length by several authors (Keat, 1991; Morris, 1991; Rose, 1992). Keat 
(1991) says that the reforms undertaken to encourage an enterprise culture involve an 
extension of the domain of the free market and competitive forces, requiring the 
reconstruction of institutions along the lines of the 'commercial enterprise'. Also 
important is the adoption of new marketing techniques and 'previously alien 
vocabularies and discourses', in particular the emphasis on the consumer, a term which 
has supplanted specific references to recipients of public services, such as student or 
patient.  
 
The UK Conservative government saw the main benefit of privatisation as the 
introduction of competition, which would both reduce costs and improve the quality of 
service (Casson, 2004). Aharoni (1991) claimed that the improvement of efficiency in 
an organisation is more likely to be the result of a strengthening of the influence of 
market forces than of changes in ownership. Competition can be introduced without 
privatisation, and in many cases privatisation does not result in increased competition. 
He claimed that privatisation alone, without the introduction of competition, may 
simply transform a public monopoly into a private monopoly. Therefore he argued that 
regulation is often the result of creating private sector monopolies. With strong 
competition the need for regulation is less 
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In her study about gas industry in UK, Conrad (1999) argued that once privatisation is 
introduced in a country, competition might be introduced as well. This will make the 
business environment more open and it will encourage the government to bring 
pressure on the regulatory bodies to be more flexible and clearer in their relationships 
with organisations. The information required from privatised organisations by the 
regulatory bodies would be different, as the purpose of asking for this information has 
changed. She stated that with privatisation there would be a change in the nature of the 
stakeholder group, so the relationship with them would be changed. Before the 
privatisation it was only the government, which owned the organisation, but after 
privatisation there are other investors and shareholders beside the government, who 
need more transparency and more detailed and different kinds of information. Before 
privatisation the government set the prices of the services, but after privatisation, and 
because of competition, the organisation needed to set its services prices by itself. 
Sometimes these prices needed to be approved by the regulatory body, acting to 
counter the risks of monopoly power. The organisation would need to convince the 
regulatory body that the set of the prices that it selected was legitimate by providing 
them with accurate and clear cost information. 
 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, SOEs were considered to be governmental bodies that 
spend money as requested, so the regulatory bodies would ask for information that 
showed how the company spent the money received from government. The main two 
regulatory bodies in Saudi Arabia before privatisation were the Ministry of Finance 
and the related Ministry to the organisation (Alharthi, 2001). The government set all 
the prices of the services and products that were provided by SOEs and sometimes 
these did not cover the cost (Al-Dehailan, 2004). 
 
From the above, it would be expected that as a result of privatisation, the role of 
ministries would reduced and new regulatory bodies would be established. These 
regulatory bodies would be concerned more with developing a fair market and their 
requirements would be different from government requirements. In addition, it would be 
expected that the organisation would have more autonomy in its pricing and would 
experience less involvement of regulatory bodies. Moreover, as a result of privatisation, 
there would be different stakeholders, such as suppliers, customers, shareholders, and 
banks, so their needs would be different in terms of their required information.  
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3.5 Management Accounting Control Systems in Saudi Arabia 
  
 
Because State-Owned organisations in Saudi Arabia mainly emphasised non-
commercial rather than commercial objectives and physical production planning rather 
than financial planning and control, management and cost accounting were ineffectively 
carried out and deficient in achieving a sufficient level of planning, control and 
accountability (Al-Dehailan, 2004). 
Organisations’ prime concern was to comply with statutory obligations and internal 
rules and regulations. However, statutory obligations were viewed as interventions and 
obstacles to achieving the organisations’ objectives as well as generally conflicting with 
internal rules and regulations (Ibid). 
 
The levels of control and accountability were weak; nevertheless they were slightly 
better in partly state owned than wholly owned enterprises because wholly owned 
enterprises faced more intervention. This not only demotivated organisations’ 
management and reduced operational efficiency, but also encouraged corruption13 
within management. These were mainly the result of the absence of adequate controls. 
Therefore, the lack of performance accountability in wholly-owned enterprises was not 
only due to the lack of good quality information or inadequate financial and managerial 
accounting systems and reports, but also due to the substantial impact of outside 
intervention, for example by the Ministry of Finance or high ranking royal family 
members, on many internal decisions. (Ibid; Ramamurti, 1991; Ayub and Hegstad, 
1986). 
 
The level of control in state owned enterprises was weak in terms of value for money. 
This was due to the lack of control over efficiency in the level of expenditure, level of 
revenue, and the inadequate use by managers of organisations’ assets and economic 
resources. SOEs suffered from a great lack of cost awareness (Al-Dehailan, 2004). 
 
The value for money concept was difficult for Saudi SOEs to achieve due to their lack 
of autonomy, which resulted in inadequate finance and budget to achieve the 
                                                 
13
  Corruption in this context means that misuse of the public money intentionally, and in most cases 
taking this money to the corrupted person’s account. 
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organisation’s corporate plan. The bureaucratic role of the Ministry of Finance in 
financing certain activities based on the approved budget motivated bargaining for 
funds between enterprises and the MOF, and reduced interest in economic efficiency 
and the effectiveness of services or products provided (ibid). The lack of available 
information and low contribution of management accounting to quality information 
provision, scientific management and cost techniques, may be a result of inadequate 
qualifications, since management and finance accounting skills in some organisations 
were underdeveloped or virtually nonexistent; or the lack of integrated IT systems due 
to the inability to update current accounting systems (ibid). 
 
Accounting can clearly play an essential role in providing information that enables 
better cost control and pricing decisions as well as better management of cash, 
inventory, accounts receivable, projects, and fixed assets (Pallot, 1998). However, the 
present examination and evaluation of current accounting practices in Saudi SOEs in 
general, and government budget-supported organisations in particular, shows that 
accounting systems have had little impact in providing adequate quality information 
which can be used for pricing, planning, and controlling day-to-day management and 
other managerial decisions (Al-Dehailan, 2004).   
 
Due to the lack of adequate cost and managerial accounting systems and integrated 
information systems, the quality of information is insufficient to help decision makers 
draw a clear picture of the financial results of the various departments and activities of 
enterprises or achieve effective internal control (ibid).  
 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
 
This chapter aimed to explain the literature that related to management accounting 
control systems and the changes that occur in it due to the changes in ownership, 
particularly privatisation. The chapter started by defining the concepts and the 
framework of management accounting control systems. The literature related to the 
changes in the MACS and its relationship to privatisation was investigated.  
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Most of the literature in this chapter argued that privatisation would change the MACS 
in any organisation. However, there were other authors who questioned this argument, 
as they believe that privatisation alone would not change the MACS without changes in 
other elements, which are the external environment, organisational culture, and 
organisational structure. 
 
The chapter described the aspects of the management accounting control systems and 
the elements of organisational context that were used as a basis for the investigation in 
this study. The literature showed that due to privatisation there would be changes in the 
ten aspects of management accounting control systems as follows: 
 
• Objectives setting and Strategy: organisations would set their objectives on a 
commercial basis rather than on a social basis. Moreover, all management levels 
in all departments would participate in the process of setting objectives.  
• The Budgetary Process: organisations would have autonomy in setting their 
budgets. In addition, budgets would be used as evaluation and control tools 
within organisations. 
• Incentive systems: organisations would develop competitive reward systems 
based on fair evaluation systems of the employees’ performance. In addition the 
organisations would become more concerned about staff development and 
training. 
• Accounting Systems: the accounting system would provide qualitative and 
quantitative information and reports for internal control purposes, decision-
making purposes, as well as placing more emphasis on fair presentation of the 
financial situation for investors.  
• Effectiveness (PMS) and Balanced Scorecard: organisations would develop 
more sophisticated approaches to use performance indicators to measure 
performance at different levels in the organisation. These approaches would 
include both financial and non-financial indicators. An example for a 
comprehensive approach is the Balanced Scorecard. 
• Costing Systems: organisations would use more sophisticated approaches (for 
example ABC) to manage costs effectively and to help the organisation in 
setting prices. 
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• Organisational Structure: structures would be clearer in terms of responsibility 
centres and they would be more focused on meeting customers’ needs.  
• Organisational Culture: organisations would make an effort to change their 
employees’ culture towards the organisation by providing them with training 
programmes. These attempts would have an effect on the employees in terms of 
understanding their accountabilities, changing their views towards customers, 
and moving their mentalities from a bureaucratic mindset to a commercial 
mindset  
• External Environment: the relationship between organisations and regulatory 
bodies would be clearer in terms of responsibilities and requirements, which 
would lessen government involvement in the organisation’s policies. In addition, 
there would be changes in the kind of stakeholders, which would lead to changes 
in their relationship with the organisations, as their requirements would change. 
This would affect the kind of information that organisation has to provide based 
on each stakeholder’s needs.  
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Chapter 4. Research Methodology and Methods 
 
Introduction  
 
Having discussed theoretical research issues, this chapter then describes and justifies the 
research methodology and data collection procedures used in undertaking the research.  
 
It concludes by stating the specific objectives of the research in the light of discussions 
in previous chapters regarding privatisation in Saudi Arabia and changes on 
management control systems.  It justifies the choice of the two companies in question 
and the use of the case study method as being the most appropriate for this particular 
research. Thus the structure of the chapter is as follows: 
 
Section 1:  General categories of research classification; 
Section 2:  Qualitative approach to research;  
Section 3: The research design; 
Section 4:  Data collection types:  primary and secondary including justification for use 
of the case study method. 
Section 5: Data collection methods including Interview design, procedure and analysis 
of data.  
 
4.1    Classification of Research Methods 
Hussey and Hussey (2003) classify research into four categories, based on its purpose, 
process, logic and outcome. Table 4.1 Categories of Research shows these categories.  
Table 4.1 Categories of Research  
Type of Research  Basis of Classification  
 Exploratory, descriptive, analytical or predictive 
 Quantitative or qualitative 
 Deductive or inductive 
Purpose of research 
Process of research 
Logic of research 
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 Applied or basic Outcome of research  
Source: Hussey and Hussey (2003) 
 
Three types of research, described below, can be distinguished on the basis of their 
purpose. 
1. Exploratory research examines possible reasons for a particular practice; it will be 
based on hypotheses that will be developed and then tested on a larger scales.  This 
research is considered  ‘open’, uses flexible data collection methods such as the case 
study technique, personal observation and historical analysis of secondary material, 
and involves the collection of a wide range of data (Hussey and Hussey, 2003). This 
approach is usually adopted where there is a paucity of literature in terms of 
previous studies.  As a technique it is useful when ranking research questions in 
terms of priority and helps to gather early information on practical problems that 
may be encountered during the research (Aaker et al., 1995). 
2. Descriptive research is used extensively in social science studies (Aaker et al., 
1995). In a business context, it involves the description of the specific activities of a 
company or a group of companies. Descriptive research identifies and collects data 
on the characteristics of a particular problem, describes phenomena as they exist and 
examines problems at a deeper level than an exploratory study (Hussey and Hussey, 
2003). 
It fulfils at least four different purposes, viz.: 
 Provides a clear picture of some aspect of the social environment; 
 Describes the characteristics of certain research problems; 
 Estimates the proportion of people in a specific population who behave in a 
certain way; 
 Makes predictions. 
3. Analytical research goes further than descriptive research by trying to explain how 
and why a certain problem exists. It looks for causal relationships among the 
variables identified in order to understand the phenomenon or problem that is being 
studied. (Hussey and Hussey, 2003). 
This research can be classified as descriptive research for the following reasons: (1) it 
will provide a clear picture of MACS changes in Saudi privatised companies, (2) it will 
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examine other possible reasons for the changes in MACS, and (3) it will provide 
suggestions for governments undertaking future privatisations on how best to improve 
MACS within the privatised companies. 
 
4.2   Research Approaches 
 
Different methodologies can be used for collecting data from various sources. Data 
collected can be classified as qualitative when it consists of text describing situations, 
individuals or circumstances around a phenomenon, and quantitative when the 
information is in a numerical form (Huberman and Miles, 2002, Blaxter et al., 2001).  
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) claim that both qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
data collection can be used appropriately, irrespective of whether the research 
philosophy involved is positivist or interpretive.  
Theoretically, the nature of the research problem dictates the choice of methods; in 
practice, however, constraints such as time and funding greatly influence the 
researcher’s choice of methods.  As this research will be qualitative in nature, point 
4.2.1 explains the approach in depth and briefly highlights differences between 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
 
4.2.1  Qualitative research 
 
The term ‘qualitative method’ covers a range of interpretive techniques that seek to: 
 ‘Describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the 
frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world’ 
(Van Maanen, 1983).   
 
It refers to a kind of data-gathering technique, which includes document reviewing, 
interviewing individuals and conducting focus groups and observing phenomena  
(Paton, 1980).  
Morgan and Smircich (1980) argue that qualitative research is an approach rather than a 
particular set of techniques and that its usefulness and appropriateness depends on the 
nature of the research issue being studied.   
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Qualitative methods yield data which are “rich, full, earthy, holistic, ‘real’; their face 
validity seems unimpeachable; they preserve chronological flow where that is 
important, and suffer minimally from retrospective distortion… Furthermore, their 
collection requires minimal front-end instrumentation” (Miles, 1979, p.560). 
 
Kirk and Miller (1986) assign the following steps to any qualitative approach to 
research: invention, discovery, interpretation and explanation. Similarly, Hignett and 
Wilson (2004) identify five key points which distinguish qualitative from quantitative 
methods: words and pictures, rather than numbers; few cases, many ‘variables’, instead 
of the reverse; sampling developed during study, rather than pre-assigned; iterative 
analysis; and reflexivity as to the role of the researcher.  
Remenyi (1998) asserts that qualitative methodology reflects  
 
a theoretical point of view that advocates the study of direct experience 
taken at face value; and which sees behaviour as determined by the 
phenomena of experience rather than by external, objective and 
physically described reality (P: 46).  
 
With reference to a positivist tradition, qualitative projects largely serve the purpose of 
exploratory studies, which then lead into more structured or quantitative studies 
(Deshpande, 1983; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  
Qualitative research is also often used as a first step in the design of structured interview 
surveys (Hakim, 2000). 
 
The approach differs from quantitative research in its concern with interpreting meaning 
in textual rather than numerical data through the use of statistical methods. According to 
Hakim (2000), one of the greatest advantages of qualitative research is the validity it 
lends to the data, as they are normally collected in sufficient detail for the results to be 
taken as true, correct, complete and believable reports of participants’ views and 
experiences.  
In spite of this, qualitative research suffers from a major drawback in the sense that the 
small number of participants who are usually involved may lead to concerns being 
raised about the representativeness of the sample (Hakim, 2000). Thus, qualitative 
research is concerned with the depth rather than the breadth of data. 
Miles (1979, p.590) notes that  
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Qualitative data tend to overload the researcher badly at almost every 
point: The sheer range of phenomena to be observed, the recorded 
volume of notes, the time required for write-up, coding, and analysis can 
all be overwhelming. But the most serious and central difficulty in the use 
of qualitative data is that methods of analysis are not well formulated. 
 
Qualitative research also suffers from the problem of subjectivity, as the chances that 
researcher him or herself could act as a measurement tool are increased as compared to 
quantitative research (Walter and Gall, 1989). 
 
Several features define the nature and design of qualitative studies: taking a holistic 
approach in investigating a phenomenon; performing the study in a natural setting so as 
to make the conditions as close to reality as possible (Walter and Gall, 1989).  This 
second feature has the benefit of allowing more flexibility and responsiveness to the 
‘multiple realities’ that the researcher is faced with while investigating a complex field 
situation.  A further feature is selecting the sample for observations purposively rather 
than randomly, which has the benefit of helping the researcher avoid missing samples 
that could be considered as ‘outliers’ under a random selection process. 
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2001) lists two basic ways to analyse qualitative data: 
1. Content analysis involving studying the frequency of occurrence of key phrases in 
texts or interviews. Here, although the researcher may grasp the key concepts in the 
data, it will be difficult to understand the reasons for their occurrence. 
2. Grounded theory, which recognises the difficulties involved with analysing large 
amounts of non-standard data produced by qualitative studies. Therefore, rather than 
imposing an external structure, research involving grounded theory derives its 
structure from the data (emergent themes and patterns), this structure is therefore 
grounded in concepts used by the social actors themselves. 
 
Table 4.2 lists some of the differences between quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
However, Remenyi (1998) argues that since research into strategic issues merits the 
collection of data concerning ‘how’, ‘why’ and ‘what’, the two approaches can often be 
used complementarily. Furthermore, qualitative and quantitative methodologies are not 
opposites or divergent; rather, they are concerned with different dimensions of the same 
phenomenon. At times, these dimensions may appear to conflict with each other, but 
even in such cases, the underlying unity may become visible on further exploration.  
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Table 4.2 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Approaches 
 Qualitative Approach Quantitative Approach 
Types of question Probing Limited probing 
Sample size Small Large 
Amount of information Substantial Varies 
Requirements for 
administration 
Interviewer with special skills Interviewer with fewer skills 
Type of analysis Subjective, interpretive Statistical, summation 
Hardware Audio recorders, projection 
devices, video recorders, 
pictures, discussion guides 
Questionnaires, computers, 
printouts 
Degree of reliability Low High 
Source: McDaniel and Gates (2002) 
 
 
Because of the nature of the information that was needed for this research a qualitative 
approach will be used. The research needed detailed information on the pre-
privatisation and post-privatisation situation in Saudi Arabia, as well as the opinions of 
respondents, which can best be provided by a qualitative approach and would be 
difficult to obtain from questionnaires.   
  
 
4.3 Research Design 
 
This section describes the research design that was used to conduct this project, 
beginning with a review of the literature on the changes in management accounting 
control systems due to the changes in ownership status. Following the literature review, 
the research questions were framed and the case-study method was selected to 
investigate the research questions. Sequencing of data collection was done. Interviews 
were first conducted with selected top, middle and lower level of managers in the 
companies chosen for the case study. The qualitative data was analysed using content 
analysis. 
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4.3.1 Literature Review 
 
The literature review examined previous research on the topic, which included research 
projects and bibliographic material relevant to the topic.  The Literature Review chapter 
(chapter three) discusses the concepts of management accounting control systems and 
its framework. It also describes the components of management accounting control 
systems and the changes that occur when there is a change in the ownership of the 
organisation (i.e. privatisation). In addition it investigated the expected changes that 
might arise in the organisations under study in Saudi Arabia.  
 
The research objectives emerged from the review of the management control systems 
literature and therefore were informed by previous research findings.   A gap exists in 
the literature in terms of research carried out on management control systems changes in 
Saudi Arabian private companies.  
 
4.3.2 Research Objectives 
 
The aim is to study two newly privatised Saudi companies in depth.  The objectives are 
as follows: 
 
1 To investigate the nature of change in management accounting control 
systems in the two post-privatisation Saudi companies; 
2 To determine the factors other than privatisation that led changes in the 
management accounting control systems in the selected companies; 
3 To examine whether privatisation improve management accounting control 
systems or not; 
4 To examine the impact of cultural, political and structural factors on the 
changes in the management accounting control systems of Saudi privatised 
companies; 
5 Propose recommendations drawn from findings relating to Saudi privatised 
companies that might assist the government of Saudi Arabia when it 
privatises other organisation. 
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To address these objectives, the following research questions were developed: 
1. What were the changes that appear in management accounting control systems 
in privatised Saudi companies? 
2. What were the factors that affected the changes on the management accounting 
control systems other than privatisation? 
3. Does privatisation improve management accounting control systems? 
 
This is not intended to be a comparative study of the changes in management control 
systems in different countries, rather a comprehensive analysis of the changes in 
management control systems in two specific organisations, in one country, namely 
Saudi Arabia.  
 
4.4 Data Collection 
 
Two types of data are available to researchers: primary and secondary. Collection 
methods for each and their advantages and disadvantages are discussed below. 
 
4.4.1   Primary Data 
 
Primary data is that which is directly collected for the first time by the researcher from 
primary sources (Rummel and Ballaine, 1963).  
Ghauri et al. (1995) argue that in cases where secondary data is not sufficient to answer 
research questions, primary data should be collected.  
Methods of primary data collection include case studies, participant observation, 
interviews and questionnaires. Since the primary data technique used in this research is 
the case study, the following subsection explains in some detail the concept, advantages, 
and disadvantages of the case study method. 
 
4.4.1.2      The Case Study Method 
Over the past fifteen years, several writers identified a need for researchers to study 
accounting, and in particular management accounting, in its practical setting using case 
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study research (Otley, 1984; Scapens, 1990; Macintosh and Scapens, 1990, 1991; 
Scapens and Macintosh, 1996; Boland, 1993, 1996; Humphrey and Scapens, 1996).  
Yin (2003) states that the case study method represents a comprehensive research 
strategy comprising particular techniques for collecting and analysing data.  Case study 
research can cover a broad range of basic methods of data collection, include 
information from a wide variety of sources and increase the robustness of analysis of 
issues. Methods are used in a variety of ways by accounting researchers’, for example, 
they are used to describe, illustrate, experiment, explore and explain most accounting 
and control issues.  
However, the various uses of case studies rely on quite different theoretical and 
methodological perspectives (Scapens, 1990) and the particular use made of case study 
research methods will depend on the nature of the research questions, epistemological 
stance and methodological position of the researcher (Scapens, 1990; Otley and Berry, 
1994; Nandan, 1997).  
This particular study will take the form of an explanatory case study using an 
interpretive methodology. The two case studies in this thesis are used to explain the 
reasons for observed practices in a specific context rather than to produce 
generalizations.  
 
Hussey and Hussey (1997) describe the case-study approach as an extensive 
investigation of a single instance of a phenomenon of interest. For Yin (2003), a case 
study represents an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context and which is particularly appropriate where the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not very apparent. Thus, the best application of 
the case study method is when in the opinion of the researcher the context of the 
phenomenon being investigated has an effect on the phenomenon itself.  
On the other hand, Stake (1995) argues that the case study is not a methodological 
choice, but rather a selection of what is to be studied. Yin (2003) lists the most 
important data sources for use in case studies as documentation, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical objects.  
Table 4.3 list the strengths and weaknesses of each of these data sources, which 
researchers should consider. Most of the weaknesses can then be minimised through the 
use of triangulation. 
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Table 4.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Six Sources of Evidence 
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation Stable– can be reviewed repeatedly. 
Unobtrusive– not carried out as a 
result of the case study. 
Exact– contains exact names, 
references and details of an event. 
Broad coverage– long time span 
covers many events and many 
settings. 
Retrievability– can be low. 
Biased selectivity, if collection is 
incomplete. 
Reporting bias– reflects (unknown) 
bias of an author 
Access– may be deliberately blocked. 
Danger of false or unreliable 
documents.  
Archival Records 
 
(As above for documentation). 
Precise and quantitative. 
 
(As above for documentation). 
Accessibility for reasons of 
confidentiality. 
Interviews 
 
Targeted – focuses directly on case 
study topic. 
Insightful– provides perceived 
casual inferences. 
Response bias. 
Inaccuracies due to poor recall. 
Reflexivity– interviewee says what 
interviewer wants to hear. 
Direct Observation 
 
Reality– covers events in real time. 
Contextual– covers context of event. 
 
Time consuming. 
Selectivity– unless broad coverage. 
Reflexivity– event may proceed 
differently because it is being 
observed. 
Cost– hours needed by human 
observers. 
Participant 
Observation 
 
(As above for direct observation). 
Insightful into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives. 
(As above for direct observation). 
Bias due to investigator’s 
manipulation of events. 
Physical Artefacts Insightful into cultural features. 
Insightful into technical operations. 
Selectivity. 
Availability. 
Source: Adapted from Yin, 2003:86 
 
Case studies offer the possibility of understanding the nature of accounting in practice 
both in terms of the techniques, procedures, systems and the way in which they are 
used. Using a qualitative case study approach, researchers are now beginning to shed 
light on the way in which accounting systems permeate organisational, social and 
political relationships. (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983, 1986, 1988; Macintosh and 
Scapens, 1990, 1991; Broadbent et al., 1991; Jones and Sefiane, 1992; Alam and 
Lawrence, 1994; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Power and Laughlin, 1996; Boland, 1993, 
1996; Scapens and Macintosh, 1996). 
 
In conclusion, the case study approach results in the balancing of different methods as it 
gives the researcher the option to choose from multiple techniques of data collection. 
 
 
108 
 
4.4.1.2.1 Justification for Using the Case Study Method 
 
A qualitative case study method has been adopted in this study for several reasons.  
First, the case study offers the possibility of a more holistic understanding of the nature, 
context and process of change in management accounting control systems from the 
point of view of the participants. It deals directly with each individual case in its actual 
context (Bromley, 1986; Scapens, 1990).  
At the same time, it carries implications about the extent to which the resulting analysis 
is applicable to other, similar cases. Thus, rather than working from the top down, i.e. 
from abstract theory to individual or particular case, the case method works from 
bottom up, from the analysis of particular case to the development of ‘case law’ (Al-
Aiban, 1991).  
 
Second, the lack of large-scale abstract and general concepts in social and behavioural 
sciences makes individual human beings and social organisations the relevant units of 
study.  
 
Third, the case study enables a researcher to interact with what is being researched and 
the research environment itself, allowing for a better understanding of the context of the 
control.  
 
Fourth, a case study offers the opportunity for one aspect of an area of interest to be 
studied in some depth within a limited time scale.  
 
Finally, interesting issues emerging from the interpretation and analysis of study can be 
easily crosschecked with other materials in the case study. The information obtained 
will give a more accurate and representative picture than a single research method 
because case studies draw on data gathered by many methods (see table 4.3). 
Although this study focuses on only two organizations, the results are not intended to be 
used as a basis for generalization. In other words, this study has not been conducted 
with generalization in mind.  
The aim is to describe and explain, in a rich and detailed manner, how and where 
changes occurred in management accounting control systems and what their 
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consequences were for organizations and members. The explanations offered are neither 
designed to test any priori assumptions nor sought to establish causal relationships. 
 
The choice of factors, events and data for analysis, although no doubt coloured by the 
researcher’s own judgement, have been vouched for in this study and kept in check in a 
number of ways (e.g. multiple sources of data). The process of using multiple methods 
and sources of collecting data in order to provide evidence on a particular issue is 
known as ‘triangulation’ (Ryan et al., 1992).  
Triangulation dictates that different methods and resources are integrated when drawing 
conclusions. Thus the individual strengths and weaknesses of the various methods are 
identified and applied in such a way that all strengths and weaknesses counterbalance 
each other.  
Triangulation can therefore be seen as a strategy that aims to overcome problems of 
validity and bias. It serves two main purposes, viz., confirmation (Denzin, 1970) and 
completeness (Jick, 1983). To further ensure the validity and reliability of this study, the 
researcher adopted the following strategies.  
First, the researcher spent an adequate amount of time in the research setting, 
established an adequate relationship with the participants and used both examination of 
documents and interview techniques.  
Second, the researcher used a tape recorder to record the interviews to produce 
transcripts, which allowed a good degree of assurance and reliability.  
Third, the researcher took notes while the interviews were in progress.  This reduced the 
chance of losing data should mechanical fault arise and allowed close attention to be 
paid to interesting topics.  
 
4.4.1.2.2 Reasons for selecting the two Saudi privatised companies 
 
This research is conducted in two Saudi privatised companies namely Saudi Telecom 
Company (STC) and Saudi Electricity Company (SEC). These two companies were 
selected for several reasons. These reasons are: 
 
1. They are the first companies that have been privatised in Saudi Arabia. Both of 
the companies were privatised on the same time. The time since these two 
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companies were privatised until conducting this research is enough to reveal the 
affects in MACS in both companies therefore the changes would be noticeable. 
2. Both of the companies still have employees who worked in the companies 
before privatisation. Subsequently, those employees can describe the situation 
before privatisation and identify the changes clearly. 
3. The researcher has personal and friendship communication in both companies. 
These relationships can help in obtaining more and clearer information. 
 
4.4.2 Secondary Data 
 
Secondary data has been defined as having been gathered previously and for purposes 
other than the requirements of the current research. An alternative definition is 
“published information which has been collected for some information need” (Stewart 
and Kamins, 1993). Secondary data are mostly historical, and do not require access to 
respondents or subjects. The major sources of such data are books, periodicals, 
governmental and official publications, theses, dissertations and other similar sources. 
The defining distinction between primary and secondary data is that the person who 
finally draws conclusions from the latter is not the one who collected it (Stewart and 
Kamins, 1993; Rummel and Ballaine, 1963). As a consequence, secondary data have 
the disadvantage that they were not designed specifically for the needs of the current 
research. Therefore, it is imperative that the researcher test secondary data for accuracy, 
bias and soundness (Zikmund, 2000). 
 
Saunders et al. (1997) classify secondary data in three categories:  
a) Documentary secondary data, including written documents such as reports, minutes, 
transcripts of speeches, books and journals, and unwritten documents, including films, 
pictures, drawings and video recordings;  
b) Survey-based secondary data, which has been collected for other purposes by other 
researchers; and  
c) Multiple-source secondary data, which comprises a combination of types a) and b) 
before the researcher uses them.  
Saunders et al. (1997) contend that secondary data are largely used in the case study and 
survey types of research, but have also been used in experimental studies. 
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Churchill (1995) advocates that researchers should start with secondary data, and only 
when such data are not sufficient for the purposes of the research should they look for 
primary data.  
 
Use of secondary data can save much time and money (Churchill, 1995; Ghauri et al., 
1995) and can help researchers compare different research methods in order to select the 
most appropriate approach to collecting primary data (Ghauri et al., 1995).  
 
4.4.2.1   Reasons for using secondary data 
 
Researchers are increasingly dependent on the use of secondary data.  Nachmias and 
Nachmias (2002) list three basic explanations for this: 
(1)  Conceptual-substantive reasons 
In some subjects and fields of research, and for some research problems, e.g. those 
involving political and historical issues, the only data available for researchers may be 
secondary. Such data can assist researchers to gain a better grasp of the historical 
context of the research problem by analysing data collected earlier on similar issues. 
Secondary data may also be used for comparative purposes.  
Hyman (1987, p.17) believes that 
 
Secondary analysis of a series of comparable surveys from different points 
in time provides one of the rare avenues for the empirical description of 
long-term changes and for examining the way phenomena varies under the 
contrasted conditions operative in one [or several] society [ies] at several 
points.  
 
(2) Methodological reasons 
Secondary data is also popular because of the methodological advantages provided. 
These are: 
1. Reliable and accurate secondary data provide opportunities for replication, 
which means that the current research can appear in a number of future studies, 
giving it more credibility; 
2. It is possible to use longitudinal research designs, as the data can often be 
available over a period of time; 
3. Secondary analysis may enhance the measurement by expanding the scope of 
independent variables used in the operationalisation of concepts;  
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4. It enables the researcher to increase sample size and the number of observations, 
leading to more encompassing generalisations. 
 
(3) Economic reasons 
A third reason for the increasing dependency on secondary data it is less expensive than 
primary data. 
 
4.4.2.2 Disadvantages of using secondary data 
The major disadvantage of secondary is that, at best, it will only be an approximation to 
the kind of data the researcher would like to employ in testing hypotheses (Nachmias 
and Nachmias, 2002).  
There is bound to be a considerable difference between primary data collected 
personally by the researcher with specific research purposes and intentions in mind, and 
the data others have collected for other purposes.  
 
A further problem with secondary data is the issue of access. Researchers might face 
difficulties in finding data related to the research problem, which might be inaccessible 
because the original researcher has not put them in the public domain. It is not 
mandatory for researchers to make their data available for secondary users.  
Finally, if the researcher lacks information on how the data was collected in the first 
place, it may to some extent compromise secondary data analysis, as this information is 
important in determining any potential source of error or bias and any problems with 
internal or external validity (Nachmias and Nachmias, 2002).  
Whatever type of data is collected and whatever method is used, issues of validity and 
reliability arise and those related to the research in question are discussed below.  
 
4.5 Data Collection Methods: 
 
Data was collected in this study through a combination of interviews and documentary 
evidence. Several data collection methods were used in an attempt to reduce the risk of 
the researcher missing important data that might be relevant for analysis. In fact, these 
multiple methods enabled the researcher to collect far more data than could be used. To 
ensure that data collection was properly carried out, regular contact and constant 
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discussions with the supervisor were maintained throughout this study. Such close 
supervision ensured that the focus was maintained within the framework agreed at the 
outset. 
The process of data collection was organised and conducted in two stages: interviews 
and organisations’ documentation. The interview stage entailed a series of intensive 
semi-structured interviews. The sources of the second stage included a review of 
organisations’ documentary evidence. Although organisational documentary evidence 
was collected and used in the analysis and discussion of the issues that arose in this 
study, the focus of the study was essentially on the interviews. The following is an 
outline of the interview objectives, design and procedures. 
 
4.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews: 
 
 
One of the most important sources of case study information is the interview (Yin, 
2003). An interview can be defined as a face-face verbal interaction between two people 
where one of the persons involved, the interviewer, asks the other person, the 
interviewee, questions so as to gather information on his/her opinion or beliefs in 
his/her fields (Alsbab, 1990).  
Many studies have suggested that personal interviews are the best method to gather 
information, although information on facts and certain opinions can also be obtained 
through other means, such as by post, email or telephone. However, some information 
can be obtained only in one-to-one interviews, particularly if the interviewee is an 
academic (Campbell, 1980).  
Interviews, in general, are more strenuous than other approaches in terms of gathering 
data and analysing the results. Arranging interviews with people can also be difficult if 
they hold positions of importance, e.g. decision-makers in either governmental or 
private organisations (Hibberd and Bennett, 1990). 
Interviews can be used in a number of ways: as the main vehicle of research, merely as 
an exploratory device that identifies variables and relations, to suggest hypotheses and 
guide research, or as a supplement to other methods of research. In the course of this 
study, interviews were used as the vehicle of the research.  
The interviews in question were conducted with employees who played an important 
role in the control systems. The major objective was to provide a description and an 
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analysis of the control systems and the perceptions of the major control systems 
participants.   
Interviews were designed to explore the real worlds of the interviewees to enable the 
researcher to gain insights into how they saw the main issues of this study, i.e. 
influences and consequences of privatisation on management accounting control 
systems, impact on members’ behaviour and the impacts of external and internal factors 
in the control systems (Yin, 2003). 
The process of conceptualising and conducting qualitative research interviews can be 
divided into four steps: defining the research question, creating the interview guide, 
recruiting participants and carrying out the interviews (Symon and Cassel 1998).  
Bottlett (1987) lists a number of factors which can influence the quality of the 
interview: the selection of people who will participate in the interview, making all the 
adequate and necessary preparations for the interview, having a pre-planned design for 
the interviews and the questions, carrying out a dry run before the interview, ensuring 
the reliability of the information obtained, recording the interview, recognising the 
necessity that the researcher should have background information on the interviewees 
and having an understanding of the goal of each question.  
 
4.5.1.1  Advantages of Interviews: 
Semi-structured interviews were particularly appropriate for this thesis because they 
gave those interviewed the opportunity to discuss the issues in a way they could control. 
Arksey and Knight (1999: 81), argue that the significance of interviews is evident: 
 
... When we need to ask numerous open-ended questions, or open-ended 
probes, such open-ended questions are important in allowing the 
respondents to say what they think and to do so with greater richness 
and spontaneity.  
 
 
At the same time, interviews maintain control over the order of sequence in which the 
questions are answered and they provide a sense of focus on the reflected verbalised 
thoughts of the interview subjects, thereby providing valuable insights into the 
subjective understanding of the individuals’ life worlds (Stone and Holland, 1996).  
The interview method provides opportunity for follow-up and enables the interviewer to 
clarify and answer questions in cases where difficulties in understanding what is meant 
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by a particular question are encountered by the interviewees. An interview clarifies the 
world of beliefs and meaning of participants rather that their actions because what 
people claim to think, feel or do does not always agree with what they actually do.  
 
Interviews have the advantage of high response rates when compared with other 
techniques as a result of the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. 
The response rate can be as high as 95% (Nachmias, and Nachmias 2002) and general 
population samples tend to produce this rate (De Vaus, 1996; Oppenheim, 1992).  
Interviews are considered to be the most appropriate method of data collection, as it 
makes it possible to check accuracy, as well as to verify and/or refute the data obtained 
through dialogue and observations (Kerlinger, 1973).  
Finally, Fraenkel and Wallen (1993) re-emphasise that the main advantage of 
conducting face-to-face interviews is that it makes direct contact with respondents 
possible. 
In-depth interviewing is a method involving intensive one-one interviews with a small 
sample of respondents in order to understand and explore their perspectives on a 
particular idea or situation. One of its major advantages is that the interviewer is able to 
gather much more detailed information than can be obtained from other data collection 
methods, such as surveys. It provides the interviewer with the opportunity to introduce a 
particular topic if it has come up during the discussion. The interviewer should allow 
the discussion to flow as naturally as possible since some topics are bound to arise 
without being explicitly raised by the interviewer.  
 
Furthermore, interviews provide access to many different groups of people and 
therefore much varied information, so clarification of words and concepts are easily 
accomplished. An interview is a more effective and visible method and can be easily 
combined with case study material. It also allows for detailed exploration of the 
important ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin, 2003). Interestingly, the interviews in this 
study allowed for the examination of actual relations between various control elements 
and the level and types of involvement that each had in the control systems. 
 
It should be noted that postal questionnaires were not used in this study because of 
limited contacts between researcher and the researched. A survey method would not 
have permitted an in-depth investigation of control systems nor would it have enabled 
explanations of observed control processes.  
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In addition it would not have given any opportunity to clarify questions or overcome 
any unwillingness on the part of participants to answer particular questions. It is 
important to note here that a postal survey or questionnaire would have been open to 
misinterpretation of questions as well as the possibility of non-cooperation in 
completing it. In addition, there was no guarantee as to who had completed them.  
Low response rates, particularly when respondents have no special interest in the 
subject of the questionnaire is another problem, as is a lack of opportunity to follow 
through a particular reply (which is possible in an interview) and the difficulty in 
adequately establishing casual connections between the different variables (DeVaus, 
1996) when analysing the collected data.  
Furthermore, postal questionnaires ignore the historical, political and socially 
constituted nature of control systems because of its grounding in rationalist thinking 
(Preston, 1991).  This ignores the individual as an active agent involved in constructing 
and shaping control systems in organisations (Tsamenyi, 1997).  
 
Criticising survey research, DeVaus (1996: 7) has argued that: 
 
Surveys just look at particular aspects of people’s beliefs and actions 
without looking at the context in which they occur. Taken out of context it 
is easy to misunderstand the meaning of behaviour.  
  
 
He further argues that: 
 
Surveys seem to assume that human action is determined by external 
forces and neglect the role of human consciousness, goals, intentions 
and values as important sources of action. (Ibid, p.8) 
 
 
Any research must take people’s beliefs, values and goals, which motivate behaviour 
into account “when developing and evaluating why people behave and think as they do” 
(ibid, p.8) 
Furthermore, ethnographic methods such as direct observation and longitudinal study, 
which have the advantages of spending more time on the research sites and repeating 
data collections over a long period over interviews, were not suitable for this study. 
Both methods are time-consuming and more importantly require resources that were not 
available to the researcher.  
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Direct observation is difficult in the sense that the researcher cannot be at the place of 
an incident because he/she does not know where and when it will occur and even if the 
occurrence of the instance is known, the presence of the researcher may interfere with it 
(Gummesson, 2000).  
Longitudinal studies are also difficult in the sense the researchers find it very hard to get 
funding to complete them, as in the case of this study (Hakim, 2000).  A further 
disadvantage that is specific to longitudinal case studies is that the analysis of data from 
a longitudinal study is substantially more complex than other equivalent analysis of 
other methods because they involve large data files (Hakim, 2000).  
A further drawback of both these methods is the possibility of the researcher being 
captured by the organisation as he/she is trying to create a more personalised 
relationship with study members to promote their active interest in the study.  
 
4.5.1.2 Disadvantages of Interviewing: 
 
The disadvantages of using interviews are to some extent a reflection of their 
advantages. Primarily, interviews are much more expensive than postal questionnaires, 
travel costs and call-backs being examples of some of their expenses.  
Another disadvantage is the amount of time needed at the data processing stage. 
Coding, i.e. classification of data collected and briefing are examples of the time 
consumption problem (Ryan et al., 1992). In using interviewing as a mechanism of 
studying social phenomenon possible bias is another limitation. This is likely to occur 
as a result of some motivation on the part of the respondent or interviewer or both to 
falsify information (Al-Aiban, 1991). While recognising these limitations, interview 
research is still considered to be a better approach in explaining and exploring control 
systems in its actual organisational context.  
 
4.5.1.3 Design of Interview Questions: 
Semi-structured interview questions were developed for this study (see Appendix A)14. 
These questions were used only as a basic guideline during the interview to ensure that 
all relevant topics were covered, to provide a direction for questioning and to help the 
                                                 
14
 Questions were prepared initially in English and were then were translated to Arabic since English was 
not the first language of the participants. Hence, the interviews were conducted in Arabic, (see Appendix 
A), transcribed in Arabic and then translated into English to be used in the analysis. 
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researcher conduct the interview in a systematic and comprehensive fashion (Berry, 
1976; Otley, 1976; Patton, 1987; Murshed, 1989; Hoque, 1993).  
In most cases, supplementary questions were asked, particularly when initial responses 
needed further elaboration or when new issues emerged in the course of discussions. 
Questions were redrafted to suit a particular manager or accountant and special 
circumstances, or when the original questions were unclear and/or interviewees 
misinterpreted them.  
It could be said that the questions were in a continuous state of refinement as interviews 
progressed. Therefore, it is more accurate to describe the interviews as discussions 
designed to achieve understanding of managers’ and accountants’ views and opinions 
on the issues rose. They allowed participants to express their views about the different 
aspect of their respective organisations and control systems. All interviewees had to see 
the questions before interviews were conducted.  
 
The interview questions were divided into five sections. In the first section, interviewees 
were asked general introductory questions about their time in the organisation, the 
position they held and their experiences.  
In the second section the interviewees were asked about the external environment, 
which included regulatory bodies and the Government, and its impact on management 
accounting control systems. This section sought their personal views, opinions and 
perceptions of the external environment and control systems based on their own 
experience during the time they had been working for the organisation.  
The third section focused on the changes in organisational structures that had taken 
place in the two organisations since privatisation. This section asked the interviewees 
about their experience of the impact of the changes of the structures on the control 
systems.  
The fourth section asked the interviewees about the changes in organisational culture. It 
sought their personal views on the effect on management accounting control systems. 
 The final section had specific questions for accountants. This section asked participants 
about changes that occurred in accounting information techniques and budgetary 
processes as control tools. 
 
119 
 
4.5.1.4 Interview Procedure: 
As indicated earlier, data collection for the study relies largely on field interviews, 
which were conducted between early October, and end of December 2007. Although the 
original period of time for the study was 3 months, the two organisations in question 
allowed further calls and personal checks, which led to an extension.  
Initially, access was arranged in advance with the management of the two organisations. 
A letter explaining the objectives of the study and the possible involvement of 
employees was sent to the two organisations.  This was followed up by telephone calls 
to each organisation, during these calls the researcher was able to discuss the reasons for 
and objectives of the research and the need to conduct the interview. 
As a result, permission to continue with the research was received from the Managing 
Director and Director General in the two organisations and allowed the researcher 
access to all relevant material and documents during the course of the study.  This also 
enabled informal discussions with employees and managers to be held in order to solicit 
their views, perceptions and impressions about management control systems and 
privatisation. 
 
Twenty-five people from the two organisations were identified and chosen for 
interviews (see Table 4.4, and Table 4.5). It was felt that a larger number of interviews 
were both impractical and unnecessary due to the likely redundancy in the later 
interviews. The general consensus in the two organisations was to involve only 
managers and employees directly involved in management control systems that were 
there before privatisation since other managers and employees would have little or no 
knowledge of the management accounting control process.  
Almost all related managers and employees in the two organisations were interviewed.  
The extent of coverage was intended to make the research more representative of the 
two organisations.  
Interviews were conducted during on-site visits, times varying in length from half an 
hour to two and a half hours. Every interview started with a statement of the importance 
and objectives of the study. The main purpose of this statement was to eliminate any 
doubts the interviewees might have about the purpose of the research, to assure 
interviewees of the confidentiality of information provided and to emphasise the 
importance placed on the view of the respondents regarding their perceptions and 
attitudes towards control systems and the impact of privatisation.  
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Table 4.4 Numbers and Description of Interviewees in STC 
NO Description Refer to as Experience 
1 Director of Corporate 
Performance. 
 
 
Interviewee 
1 
He has worked for the company since 
1994. He worked in the budgets 
department; then he was in the team, 
which changed the accounting systems 
from governmental to commercial 
systems. He was the head of the BSC 
team.  
2 Financial Control 
Professional. 
 
 
Interviewee 
2 
He has worked in the company since 
2003. He worked in different companies 
before. He has a BA in finance.  
3 Senior Analyst, 
Corporate Care. 
 
Interviewee 
3 
 
He has worked in the company since 
2001. He has an MSc in finance.  
4 ABC revenue Analysis 
Manager, ABC Cost 
Accounting. 
 
Interviewee 
4 
He has worked in the company since 
2002. He worked first as an income 
analyst. Then he became the Director of 
the Income Analysis department.  
5 Director, Regulatory 
Studies & Support, 
Regulatory Affairs. 
 
Interviewee 
5 
He worked in the company from 1984-
1994; then he came back from 2004-date. 
He was in the Planning Department. Then 
he was the Director of the Engineering 
and Planning Department. When he came 
back he became the Director of 
Regulatory Studies & Support.  
6 Head Business 
Development Office, 
Senior Advisor-
Organization. 
 
Interviewee 
6 
He has worked in the company since 
2002. He has an MBA and a PhD in 
business administration. He has an 
extensive academic experience  
7 Strategic Planning 
Director, Strategic 
Planning. 
 
Interviewee 
7 
He is an LSE graduate. He has worked in 
the company since 2000. He used to work 
for the Central Bank. He worked in 
Strategic Planning. and has been the 
Director of the Strategic Planning 
Department since 2004. 
8 Financial Reporting 
Director. 
 
Interviewee 
8 
He has worked in the company since 
2000. He worked in the Credit & 
Collection Department for 4 years. Then 
he moved to the Financial Reporting 
Department.  
9 Director, Financial 
Control. 
 
Interviewee 
9 
He has worked in the company since 
2001. He has an MSc in accounting. He 
worked in different companies for 15 
years before he came to STC. 
10 Outside Network 
Section Manager, 
Regulatory Affairs. 
 
Interviewee 
10 
He has worked in the company since 
1998.  
11 General Manager of 
Accounting. 
 
Interviewee 
11 
He has worked in the company for 22 
years. He worked first in the Income 
Department. Then he went to USA to do 
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his MSc and PhD. He came back before 
privatization. He was the head of the 
team, which was responsible for 
transferring the accounts from the 
Ministry of Finance to the company. After 
the company was established, he became 
the Director of the Cost Accounting 
Department for 4 years, and then he 
became the General Manager of 
Accounting. 
12 Director, Budgeting, 
General. Admin. 
Financial Planning & 
Budgeting. 
 
Interviewee 
12 
He has worked in the company for 20 
years. He worked in the Planning 
Department. Then after privatization he 
worked in the Financial Planning & 
Budgeting Department and now he is the 
Director of the Department. 
13 Director, Credits 
accounts, General. 
Admin. Accounting. 
 
Interviewee 
13 
He has worked in the company since 
1991. He worked as an accountant. Then 
he worked in the Budget Department. 
After privatization he continue to work in 
the Budgeting Department. Then he 
moved to work in the Alzakah (tax) 
Department.  
14 Head of Financial 
Affairs 
Interviewee 
14 
He has worked in the company since 
2001. He has an MSc from the USA. He 
has extensive experience in different 
companies and accounting firms.  
15 Accountant, Budgeting 
Department. 
 
Interviewee 
15 
He has worked in the company since 
2001. He has a BA in accounting. He 
worked in different companies before 
joining STC. 
16 Accountant. Interviewee 
16 
He has worked in the company since 
2003. He has a BA in accounting. He 
worked in different companies before 
joining STC. 
17 Director of HR 
Development 
Department. 
Interviewee 
17 
He worked in the company from 1984-
1994. Then he went to USA to do his MA 
and PhD in HR management. He came 
back to the company in 2002. He has 
worked in the HR Development 
Department since 2002.  
 
 
Table 4.5 Numbers and Description of Interviewees in SEC 
No Description Refer to as Experience 
1 Executive Vice President 
& CFO 
Interviewee 
A 
He has worked in the company since 2004. 
He had huge experience in different 
companies before he joined SEC 
2 Director, Accounting 
Department 
Interviewee 
B 
He has worked in the company for 27 
years. He started as an accountant. He 
worked in different departments before he 
become the Director of the Accounting 
Department. 
3 Director, Management 
Accounting Department. 
Interviewee 
C 
He has worked in the company since 1982. 
He was sent by the company to finish his 
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MA and MSc in accounting in the USA.  
4 General Manager, 
Finance Department. 
Interviewee 
D 
He has worked in the company for more 
than 15 years. He has a BA in accounting.  
5 Director, Financial 
Reporting Department 
Interviewee 
E 
He has worked in the company since 2001. 
He has a BA in finance. He worked in 
different accounting and finance firms 
before joining SEC. 
6 Accountant. 
 
Interviewee 
F 
He has worked in the company since 2000. 
He has a BA in accounting. He worked in 
different companies before joining SEC. 
7 Accountant. 
 
Interviewee 
G 
He has worked in the company since 2000. 
He has an MSc in accounting. He worked 
in different companies before joining SEC. 
8 Executive Director of 
HR Development 
Department 
Interviewee 
H 
He has worked in the company since 2004. 
He has an MBA from USA. He has 
extensive experience working in different 
companies before joining SEC. 
9 An engineering  Interviewee I He has worked in the company for 23 
years. He was in different places and 
different cities around Saudi Arabia.  
 
 
 
 
During the interviews questions introduced by the researcher led to discussion.  In the 
preliminary stages of the fieldwork, discussions were held with a number of accountants 
in the two organisations to obtain a broader view of the existing accounting and control 
systems. From these discussions, a short report on the background of the industry, 
Government, market and the two organisations under scrutiny and detailed descriptions 
about the mechanics of the management accounting and control systems was prepared. 
Every possible precaution was taken to ensure that descriptions and facts about the 
organisations and their control systems were error-free. A transcription of each 
interview was produced and submitted to every interviewee for confirmation of the 
facts.  
 
The interviews were tape-recorded and notes of selected key issues were also taken at 
meetings in order to help the discussion. It is commonly accepted that tape-recorded 
interviews have both advantages and disadvantages. It allows everything to be 
documented and permits the interviewer to be more attentive to the interviewee and may 
also increase rapport between interviewer and interviewee (Hoque, 1993).   
However, during an interview a tape-recorder may lead to biased responses when 
interviewees are commenting on confidential or sensitive issues. It was expected that 
when it was possible to use tape-recorders reliance on notes would be minimised and 
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the researcher would be free to concentrate on responses. Otherwise, notes were taken 
when confidential information was revealed and discussed. Also, it was found useful to 
take notes of selected key issues to achieve several objectives: firstly, to help formulate 
new questions during the interviews when participants showed special interest in certain 
areas; secondly, to help review the discussion when replaying the tape for writing the 
manuscript text; finally, to allow the researcher to be aware of the documentary 
evidence deemed relevant during the interview and to serve as an aid in the collection of 
those documents. 
 
4.5.2 Documentary Evidence: 
 
As indicated earlier, the purpose of collecting documents was to understand the 
historical development of each organisation and to examine accounting and control 
systems. Historical data proved to be very useful in revealing regulatory, social, 
political and economic forces. The researcher believes that past events were useful in 
understanding changes in social, political and economic situations in Saudi Arabia. 
Because the research is both a theoretical and empirical analytical study, it made full 
use of official documents to collect evidence.  
 
Examples of these documents are: 
 
1. Government documents, annual reports, press releases, media reports, 
corporate plans, financial plans, production plans and internal memos; 
2. Published and unpublished journal articles, books and newspapers; 
3. Internal forms, archival records, paperwork and progress reports. 
 
 
Documents relating to the two organisations were collected during on-site visits. In 
cases where documents were not of immediate use or where the organisations had 
multiple copies, permission was obtained for the researcher to keep a copy. Although 
some documents were returned at the end of the study, permission was obtained to take 
notes. 
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These notes were combined with the other sources to analyse the data. The documentary 
stage continued to the last stages of the thesis to constantly modify and review the 
theoretical chapters using new material available in the area of the research focus.  
 
4.6 Summary  
This chapter has reviewed and discussed the research design and methodology issues 
that researchers need to deal with. Additionally, it has attempted to explain briefly the 
features of qualitative research and to justify the adoption this approach, using interview 
and documentary approaches in the collection and analysis of the data. Saudi Telecom 
Company (STC) and Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), as Saudi privatised companies, 
were the case study for understanding the changes in MACS because of privatisation. 
In-depth interviews with different levels of managers in both companies were conducted 
to provide data on their experiences and ideas concerning these particular issues. 
Documents from both companies were collected in order to achieve triangulation. This 
allowed a richness of data and a comprehensive treatment of the changes on MACS in 
both companies to explore the effect of privatisation and provide other factors that 
might change MACS rather than privatisation. 
 
Chapter five will deal with the analysis of the qualitative data obtained from interviews 
and documents. 
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Chapter Five: The Changes in Management Control Systems after 
Privatisation 
Introduction: 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the changes that happened in the organisations 
under study after privatisation and is based on the findings from interviews and 
supporting documents that have been collected from the two companies. 
 
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part explains the changes made to 
STC’s management accounting control systems. These changes will be discussed in the 
following sections: planning and budgeting, Balanced Scorecard (BSC), ABC and 
costing systems, accounting policies and accountability, reporting systems, performance 
evaluation, relation to external environment, HR and reward systems, changes in 
organisational structure, and changes in culture. The second part of this chapter is going 
to illustrate the changes to SEC’s management accounting control systems using the 
same sections as for STC. The last section will summarise the main changes that have 
taken place, highlighting similarities and differences between the two companies.  
 
The discussion of the results includes quotes from interview respondents. As all of the 
interviewees wished to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the issues explored, 
they are referred to by number or letter, as shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, which 
indicates roles and places in the hierarchy. All the interviews were conducted in the 
Arabic language, and subsequently translated into English by the researcher. 
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5.1  Changes to STC’s management accounting control systems: 
As a result of privatisation, the aspects of the management accounting control systems 
had been changed. These changes will be explored in the following sections. 
5.1.1 Changes in Planning: 
As most of interviewees mentioned, before privatisation STC was a state owned 
company whose objectives and strategies were based on Government plans. The Saudi 
Government viewed telecommunications as a public service - and non-profit making 
obligation that had to be provided. 
The company at that time had no strategic vision apart from following Government 
orders. As one of the interviewees stated: 
 
Before privatisation we only had one goal, which was to provide the 
service as instructed by the government regardless of the revenue that we 
could make or the losses we could incur. At that time we undertook lots 
of projects without even asking about the cost or the profit. We used to 
have orders from the Ministry to undertake a project: the cost of it would 
be stated but of course we didn’t know anything about the profit. The 
system basically was: this is the money; spend it on this and this and this. 
As employees, we had no company goals, departmental goals or even 
personal goals. (Interviewee 11)  
 
Before privatisation STC suffered from financial inefficiency due to having a 
multiplicity of projects and objectives. Many of these were not profitable, for example 
providing services to unprofitable areas, or engaging and sponsoring certain social 
events that were of no benefit to the company.  
The majority of senior managers at STC gave reasonable justification for this, which 
was that usually STC received grants from the Government to continue services viewed 
as socially desirable. Thus the organisation provided services it would otherwise carry 
out differently if run on a purely commercial basis.  Often they hired extra staff to fulfil 
their obligations, or set up a plant or provided services in a particular area to promote 
regional development.  
Once competitors entered the market the Government ceased its involvement in this 
area, which gave STC more autonomy in setting its objectives and controlling its 
resources and spending.   Thus after privatisation, STC started to set its own goals and 
objectives.  
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While conducting the field study at STC, the researcher observed that in every corner of 
the company’s headquarters there was a notice setting out seven main objectives that the 
company wanted to achieve. Whilst the notice was in Arabic the English acronym for 
what it summarised – FORWARD - was also displayed. This is described as follows: 
 
F      Fulfil Mobile Potential 
O     Offer Wholesale Services 
R     Re-invent Home Communication 
W    Win Enterprise Customers 
A     Achieve External Growth 
R     Re-organise Internal Structure 
D     Derive Operational Efficiencies 
  
When the company established the FORWARD objectives, it tried to make sure that all 
employees at all levels understood it by organising workshops at all levels within the 
company and in all regions of Saudi Arabia. One of the directors stated: 
 
Establishing objectives was a crucial requirement of the planning 
process. The major challenge for the top managers at that time was to 
make sure that the objectives of the company were clear and understood 
by all employees. We had to spend lots of money to organise workshops 
all over the company and everywhere in Saudi just to make sure that all 
employees understood what exactly the company wanted. (Interviewee 6) 
 
 
Based on these clear objectives STC started to set clear plans for its operations.  
The company has 11 main departments: the Board of Directors is responsible for 
setting main goals for these departments.  Thus plans were set by top managers 
and subsequently cascaded to lower levels of management. The President and the 
Heads of Department held meetings to break down the main goals that had been 
set by the Board of Directors. These goals were both financial and non-financial. 
For example15, the goals of the Director of Procurement in 2007 had four main 
categories, which were: financial, customer services, internal affairs and 
development, and each category had several detailed goals (see Figure 5.1). Since 
privatisation, STC has changed its objectives several times and subsequently made 
changes to its organisational structure (see section 5.2.9). 
                                                 
15
 This example is based on a classified document that the research has collected from STC. 
  
Figure 5.1 Goals of Director of Procurement in 2007
16
 
Source: Classified Documents from STC 
 
It is clear from the above that the company has full autonomy in setting its goals and 
objectives.  This autonomy has also affected the company’s ability to set its own service 
prices: the situation now is that STC has the freedom to
approval of the Telecommunications Agency before applying them, thus preventing the 
development of a monopoly. 
 
Since STC has been private 
Agency refusing the
prices are competitive and within the reach of
customers) (Interviewee, 1).
  
 
 
                                        
16
 The usual situation with project payments:
but they take some time or pay in instalments. 
2007 is paying 75% of the old payments. 
reducing the price of any supplies they need for any kind of trade
 
Financial
reducing the 
prices of 
trade
paying at least 75% 
of the old 
transactions 
executing at 
least 70% of 
new projects 
by the end of 
July
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5.1.2 The budgetary process at STC: 
 
Before privatisation, budgetary control at STC could be described as a primitive control 
system (Al-Dehailan, 2004). Budgets and the processes of budgeting were important 
only insofar as they provided management with an estimate of the total amount or 
volume of cash available, but were not used as tools that could be used to plan how the 
monies allocated were going to be spent.  
In other words, budgets were originated based on the need to oversee rather than to 
control or direct spending. The planning and controlling processes were centralised at 
the Ministry of Telecommunications and the Ministry of Finance. Both Ministries 
developed them into the final budget, which was part of the government budget by 
gathering information related to the draft budgets (interviewees 1, 11, 12 and 13). There 
were no formal discussions or consultations with the departmental managers or the 
company’s top managers. In fact company managers did not have any input into the 
budget whatsoever. Hence, when the budget was prepared, no consideration had been 
given to the impact on any part of the company, even though figures written into the 
sales budget, for instance, would have clear repercussions for production, materials, 
finance and other budgets. One of the interviewees who worked at the company before 
privatisation states that: 
 
When we were under the government, we were just responsible for 
spending the money. We spent the money based on the Ministry’s 
instructions... We did not have any contribution to preparing the 
budget.... even the projects; we were merely told to execute certain 
projects regardless of their benefits to the company. (Interviewee 13) 
 
The above statement shows that the government was only concerned with allocating 
cash. 
 
As a result of privatisation, the budgeting system was established. The new process has 
clear guidelines outlining each Head of Department’s tasks, authority and responsibility 
at each stage. Nevertheless, it still took the company several years to come up with clear 
guidelines. The guidelines were made to assist the company in achieving its strategic 
goals, therefore they were  
 
 
130 
 
Subject to changes based on the changes on the company structures and  
Strategic goals (interviewee 12)  
 
The guidelines were finalised in 2003. Details of the budgetary process will be 
discussed in the following subsections. 
5.1.2.1 Preliminary Stage 
The fieldwork investigation revealed that the first actual step in the formulation of 
STC’s budget is the preparation of the budget circular. An Executive Committee that 
meets to discuss and set a time frame for the following year’s budget development 
prepares the circular. Members of the committee include the President, Vice President, 
Directors of the Finance, Corporate Strategy, Personnel, Home and Enterprise 
Departments together with the Chief Accountant. During this meeting, the Committee 
decides on what to include in the circular. It will usually contain a summary of the 
financial conditions, budget timetable, growth rate, cost savings and the responsibility 
of each Head of Department based on the company’s key goals and strategic aims. 
 
The circular is then distributed by the Director of the Finance to all Departmental Heads 
to develop their own individual budgets. Heads of Departments have to inform 
employees under their supervision about the instructions for budget preparation and 
monitor their work. All departments are required to adhere to what is in the circular. 
(Interviewees, 11, 12, 13) 
5.1.2.2 Preparation stage: 
After receiving the circular a preliminary meeting is held between the President, Chief 
Accountant, five Department Heads: Personnel, Home, Enterprise, Network and IT, and 
sometimes other Heads of Departments. The purpose of this meeting is to set 
preliminary expectations for the proposed budget and emphasise the need for co-
ordination across departments so that all parties are working on compatible plans. The 
IT and the Network Departments are advised to work in a co-operative manner with the 
three other main Departments (Personnel, Home, Enterprise) in developing the 
quantitative budgets since their budgets impact on each other and the rest of the 
company.   
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The Chief Accountant is the one who is responsible for co-ordinating the whole budget 
effort between the various Departments, especially Personnel, Home and Enterprise. 
After the preliminary meeting or meetings, each department is then required to prepare 
its own detailed budget. (Interviewees 11 &12) 
 
After the preparation of all department proposals, the co-ordinator (Chief Accountant) 
gathers all proposals, examines them and prepares a draft budget. The Chief Accountant 
is authorised to discuss any budget with any Head of Department if he is not satisfied 
that his budget has been prepared in accordance with the guidelines. After examining all 
proposals, the Chief Accountant calls the first official budget meeting to review the 
drafts.  
It is obvious that STC uses the top-down, bottom-up; top-down approach. The process 
starts from the Head of the company to the Departments with the circular, budgets then 
go and back from Departments to the President for approval and then are returned back 
to Departments (see: Drury, 2008; Anwar, 2007).  
5.1.2.3  Review Stage: 
Obviously, the budgetary process including the review stage requires an iterative 
approach. Each draft budget has to be repeatedly adjusted until all the budgets are 
mutually consistent. Therefore, several budget meetings are held in which changes are 
made to the original drafts until an agreement among departments is reached.  
In STC, a Budget Committee of which all members of the Executive Committee are 
members holds these meetings. Unlike the Executive Committee, the Budget 
Committee includes all Departmental Heads. The President chairs the Committee: its 
aim is to discuss the implications of each budget on the rest and assess whether the 
various budgets fall in line with overall organisational objectives. 
 
It is noteworthy that the empirical investigation (Interviewees, 11,12,13 &14) revealed 
that joint co-operation in the review stage often leads to difficulties in reaching a final 
budget that is acceptable to all departments.  Departments disagree with each other’s 
estimates, disagreements create tensions and conflicts between heads of departments 
because:  
132 
 
(1) Each head of department has influence over the content of the budget. Although 
some consultation is usual, the degree of influence varies dramatically from one 
head of department to another; 
(2)  The public sector mentality17 that some department heads still have makes them 
so obstinate when it comes to their department’s proposal.  
 
Indeed, one of the Department Heads stated that: 
 
We used to suffer from old generation people when it came to the review 
of the budget.  They each thought of it as their own department and were 
driven by a need to get what they wanted regardless of the implications 
of their specific budget requirements on the overall budget. We are 
getting lucky lately as the new policy of the Board of Directors is to keep 
them away from the Head of Department positions even if they could not 
get rid of them. But there are still some of them here. (Interviewee 12) 
 
It can be argued that each figure entered into a budget is the result of a discussion and 
bargaining process between the Head of Departments, their employees and the top 
management. 
5.1.2.4 Approval Stage: 
Budgets are approved based on the recommendation of the Budget Committee. After 
reviewing the budget, the President and Chief Accountant meet with the Board of 
Directors to present the budget to them. The Board discusses and approves the budget at 
this meeting. Although the Board’s approval is considered a routine procedure, the 
approval is undertaken to legitimise the budget and to ensure that the budget is seen as 
an official valid document. This then creates a practical implication that binds the 
organisational actors. All heads of departments and managers have to operate within the 
final budget. 
  
                                                 
17
 Most of the interviewees stated that the main problems with old employees (governmental), that they 
don’t like changes. They also have a lot of bureaucracy in their way of work.  They are not active when it 
comes to teamwork as they resist ideas come from others and don’t like to be ordered by others specially 
if they are younger.  
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5.1.2.5 Execution and Feedback Stage: 
After the Board approves the budget, it is sent by the co-ordinator to all Heads of 
Department. The interviews showed that, once a department receives its budget, it could 
proceed with its activities. A monthly report is then prepared to compare the 
department’s actual performance with its budget. The checking of the actual results 
against the budgeted figures provides information on the course affairs are taking, and 
this normally leads to changes in the way things are being done, or in the plans and 
budgets themselves, or in both.  
This report shows variances and in some cases it shows what action has to be taken. All 
Heads of Departments are accountable for achieving their budget and they will be held 
responsible for any variances. The comparisons also help to improve the budgeting 
procedures in later periods.  
The interviews showed that if the Head of Department were responsible for a variance 
then it would affect his bonus. One case cited was that a Head of Department was asked 
in writing by financial control about certain variances. Since his answer was not 
convincing they requested a meeting, which found him directly responsible for the 
variances in question. This had to be reported to top management, which subsequently 
cost him his bonus and eventually his position in the company.  (Interviewee 17) 
 
5.1.3 Costing Systems 
 
Before privatisation STC was following the MOF regulations and rules on its costing 
system. One of the interviewees (11) stated that: 
 
 When the company was governmental we didn’t care about the cost of 
anything as all projects came from the Ministry and our job was only to 
execute the project and spend the money they gave us as they indicated.  
 
After the company was privatised it applied a traditional costing system until 2003. The 
only reason for that, as it was mentioned by one of the respondents, was the lack of 
qualified people, knowledge and time to develop an alternative approach. Interviewee 
11 stated that: 
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When privatisation started in STC we had a lack of qualified people who 
were able to apply such sophisticated systems as ABC. We also needed to 
be able to apply a system that enabled us to calculate our costs. We 
found that the best way was applying the traditional costing systems, as 
we had some staff that were familiar with these and recruit qualified 
people to train current staff for the new system. 
 
 
The above statement shows that the plan for applying the ABC was in the mind of STC 
managers, however the decision to use a temporary (traditional) system and delay the 
application for ABC was well justified. As discussed in chapter 3, to apply ABC for the 
first time, time, knowledge, and effort are needed: initially STC did not have these.      
Although it was clear that STC gradually reduced its overall basket of prices, 
accompanied by very substantial improvements in profitability as well as in the range 
and quality of services, some managers still expressed their dissatisfaction with high 
costs. They expected more cost reductions to have taken place after cost and 
management accounting systems had provided a technical role enabling better-informed 
cost control and pricing decisions.  This was coupled with better management of cash, 
inventory, accounts receivable, projects, and fixed assets. A senior manager remarked: 
 
Reasonable justification for the high level of costs could be the dramatic 
changes, which led to the need to outsource most of the technical issues 
to consultancy companies. However, this judgment could be ambiguous, 
especially since adequate management and cost accounting systems 
existed beforehand.  The recent introduction of performance indicators 
and output measures in order to evaluate and compare achievements, 
and also the adoption of an Activity Based Costing system, should help to 
drive financial and non-financial transparency and accountability and 
clarify the picture of cost-benefits and responsibilities (Interviewee 12). 
 
5.1.4 Implementation of the Balanced Scorecard: 
 
One of the main problems that faced STC when it became a private company was how 
to turn strategies and subsequent plans into realistic targets for employees, since these 
would be used to monitor and evaluate personal and department performance. This 
major deficiency led the company to search for a new technique that could solve the 
problem; ultimately this was in the form of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). 
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At STC, a comprehensive plan was prepared for the implementation of BSC in early 
1999. The initial BSC was implemented in a specific pilot department in 2000. At the 
end of that year top management realised the benefits of BSC and decided to implement 
it in all company sectors and departments. In 2001 the Department for Total 
Performance was set up to be responsible for implementing BSC and for sorting out any 
problems.   
Top management was looking for a specific system to help the company measure 
employee performance against company strategy to achieve total control. STC needed 
to  
Measure employee satisfaction and deliver its strategy in a proper way… 
therefore the BSC was found to be the system that might help them 
(Interviewee 12) 
A further interviewee believed that STC stimulated its employees using BSC:  
“… STC tried to make the employees aware, especially at middle and 
high levels about the importance of BSC for the company. It provided 
them with many seminars about BSC … they also attended many BSC 
events in and outside Saudi Arabia” (Interviewee 1). 
 
STC decided to convert BSC applications from manual to automatic.  The director 
stated: 
A lot of BSC software was available but we were very careful to choose 
a suitable system that may meet our requirements…therefore, we 
decided to choose CorVu18 (Interviewee 1).  
The software was installed at the end of 2002 for the whole company. 
At STC strong leadership, commitment, and participation by top management were 
required to achieve successful implementation of BSC. A Saudi Telecom interviewee 
who was a member of the BSC implementation team stated that:  
 
 The BSC team firstly explained the BSC concept to all the top 
management individually… all executives agreed that the BSC could 
                                                 
18
 CorVu is a Software brand, made by American company to provide Performance Management and 
Business Intelligence solutions for mid- to large-sized companies throughout the world. It is a pioneer in 
the automation of the Balanced Scorecard; it provides an easy way to view the current performance, 
strategy and key business drivers of a company (http://www.corvu.com/). 
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support the company in the short and long term.... Top management and 
senior staff were very supportive and committed to BSC and they always 
discussed BSC results in their meetings... In 2002 the company decided to 
link the executives’ compensation and rewards with the BSC’s results. 
(Interviewee 1) 
 
In essence, STC appointed a special team for BSC. The appointed employees were 
committed to the BSC project and possessed key attributes such as being strong team 
workers, acceptable levels of experience in performance measurement, and fluency in 
speaking English19.  
The interviewee reported  
STC provides employees with detailed guidelines for BSC 
implementation in PowerPoint and Word, in Arabic and English 
languages. 
 
In essence, STC believed that the BSC connected the company with its customers in a 
proper way “… BSC enabled us to use appropriate measures” (interviewee 12). 
STC’s Balanced Scorecard has about 25 measures for the entire prospect “create a 
customer survey to measures our customer satisfaction and have their comments”. In 
addition, in 2003, the STC created its strategy maps as an improvement to its BSC.  
The BSC system was integrated into the company’s systems. “… The company found 
no difficulty in integrating BSC with other systems” (interviewee 1). The BSC team 
established a so-called ‘KPI library’ to assist the departments to determine their KPIs.  
The BSC project had to be transferred from a strategic process to the implementation of 
a management control system in a more operational sense. Therefore, the distribution of 
the BSC implementation project plan had to be cascaded from the top to the bottom 
level. 
As previously stated, STC had a clear plan for BSC implementation. Top management 
agreed all its steps; the short-term plan was to implement BSC within 14 weeks at high 
                                                 
19
 The reason for choosing speaking English employees is that the software is in English, and the training 
they are going to have is in English under American trainers from the software company. 
 company level (Figure 5.2) whilst the long
whole company in three years. 
However the interviewee believed that 
The top management attempt
less than two years … because they reali
(interviewee 1)
 
As noted, STC had an adequate information system. This was utilised to help the BSC 
team, as well as special software for BSC implementation, to cascade BSC from the 
to the bottom level.  
STC also planned to roll out the results between its departments. The interviewee stated 
BSC processes and results cascaded from top to bottom … and 
out between the different departments
important role in our company … each BSC result may help us to refine our 
measures or process
put the BSC reports as a 
 
Figure 5.2  STC Initial Plan for BSC Implementation
Source: STC Documents (2005)
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STC has achieved many benefits from BSC implementation. The BSC enables the 
company to fulfil its strategy and assess measurements regularly. Interviewee (1) 
pointed out  
The BSC helps the company to fulfil its strategy by linking the measures 
with the company’s strategic objectives … BSC also helps us to assess 
the measures themselves.  
 
The BSC results also assist the company in delivering information to the right 
personnel, in the right format, at the right time, and in the right quantity. The 
interviewee also indicated  
We found that the BSC helped us to discover and resolve problems … 
take the right actions … and develop new performance standards  
 
While the possible benefits of BSC are obvious, its implementation across organisations 
may encounter many obstacles. The interviewee from STC said that 
 
We encountered a few obstacles and challenges in the first 
implementation of BSC such as culture and integration obstacles … but I 
believe the most important one was the resistance from some employees 
... But we resolved this problem by convincing those employees that BSC 
is for measuring and improving performance, not to blame them 
(interviewee 1). 
 
The above statement proves the difficulties of changing the mindset of the Saudi 
Telecom staff into that appropriate for a commercial service provider, which is attractive 
to customers, competitive in the marketplace, and is able to make its service activities 
profitable.  
 
A senior manager revealed that the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard concept 
created significant changes in measuring and managing the performance of the business 
units, not only from a technical viewpoint but also from a financial and commercial one. 
He stated that: 
 
The development of a new information system went along with the 
development of the Balanced Scorecard. At the time of the decision to 
adopt the Balanced Scorecard, there was no clear vision on the 
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management control structure to be developed for Saudi Telecom. Nor was 
there a clear strategic vision on STC’s position in the market and on its 
position within the Saudi market. The introduction of the concept was a 
process of muddling through because there was no strategy and clear 
objectives, nor did we have any experience with target setting, and there 
was a lack of financial and commercial information. The development of 
the Balanced Scorecard made clear that a discussion about strategy and 
objectives was needed, and gave an insight into the information that 
should be gathered. The concept of the Balanced Scorecard would help us 
to get a clear picture of the effectiveness and efficiency of our activities 
and relations with our customers. Also, it would support the discussion 
about our strategic possibilities and strengths and weaknesses. 
(Interviewee 12) 
 
 
5.1.5 Changes in accounting policies and accountability:  
 
In the past, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) stipulated that the organisations under study 
must fulfil its requirements and submit their reports on a cash basis (Al-sughayer, 
2001). But as a result of privatisation, both the Telecoms and the Electricity Company 
changed from cash based to accrual based accounting.   
It is clear the MOF required these organisations to maintain their accounts on a cash 
basis in order to provide their services within budgeted appropriations. The nature of the 
Government’s goals at that time was to keep spending within budget whilst achieving 
an acceptable level of service and this was the main reason for the Government 
requiring cash based accounting from organisations.  
However, there was no clear reason for not adopting systems that would achieve their 
objectives, provide decision-makers with more information for control and planning 
purposes, and determine the accurate cost of providing these services.  
 
Organisations that maintain their accounting records in accordance with adequate 
accounting standards, national or international, and whose information is subjected to 
independent audit, will report higher quality information (Ruffing, 1993). Therefore, 
compliance with accounting standards will enhance financial accountability as it 
contributes to the reliability, consistency and transparency of financial information. 
Moreover, it provides a good base for valuation, which is the most important issue in 
reform transactions20 (IFAC, 2001).  
                                                 
20
 In the case of Saudi Arabia; one of the reform transactions for the Saudi economy was privatisation. 
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STC faced an accounting change from a cash to an accruals base as a result of 
privatisation. This change has had a radical impact because the lack of information in 
the previous system made the valuation of most assets difficult.  
The interviews showed that STC faced a very serious valuation problem when opening 
its accounts, not only because of the previous adoption of a cash based accounting 
system, but also due to the absence of ownership documentation for some of its real 
estate, where it had only the right of use.  
Moreover, engineering managers’ reports were not integrated and clearly reflected in 
the financial reporting. Before privatisation, the engineering managers in Governmental 
organisations only cared about achieving projects within the budget agreed regardless of 
its cost, even if they could manage it at a lower cost. Therefore the engineering 
manager’s reports usually contained detailed technical information with little financial 
information, which made it useless for any financial reports (Interviewee 11). However, 
when privatisation took place, the company opened its accounts not only by following 
Saudi Accounting Standards but also in accordance with American Accounting 
Standards. A general manager described these events as follows: 
 
The use of government accounting in the Telecoms sector left a heavy 
legacy. There were no accounting records of assets, any ownership 
documentation of some of the lands that we used to provide our services.  
It took us a long time with national and international consulting 
companies to come up with the opening balances. Although we had used 
cash based accounting before, we also had other reports that were used 
internally by our line managers but these reports were not integrated and 
were mainly prepared and used by engineering managers. The old 
records at the Ministry of Telecommunications helped a lot in providing 
the opening balances. When we opened our accounts, there was an 
intention to engage in a joint venture with an international company so 
we followed both Saudi and American Accounting Standards to be ready 
to list and trade our stocks locally and internationally on the New York 
Stock Exchange. (Interviewee 11) 
 
 
The same general manager explained the difficulty of asset valuation in the following 
comment: 
 
Asset valuation was very difficult because the majority of records of 
historical cost did not exist. There was no comprehensive record of the 
assets or their historical cost. There was no comprehensive record of 
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land and buildings owned or occupied by the company. The valuation 
team had to use numerous methods to collect the documents needed to 
open the balance sheet. The former supervisor at the Ministry had some 
documents that helped, and, because the majority of network repair and 
maintenance was conducted by external contractors, the team also used 
their records because they maintained detailed asset records that were 
often more complete and accurate than those maintained within STC. 
(Interviewee 11). 
 
Due to the lack of previous accounting systems, Interviewee 11 also revealed that the 
company had had to invest heavily in order to open its new accounts: 
 
Due to the lack of quality information obtainable from the previous 
accounting systems the STC was forced to pay millions for accounting 
firms to open its new accounts. In the beginning we had a contract for 
millions with a large accounting firm just to bring all our documents 
together in order to help open the new accounts. Then we had to have 
another large accounting firm value our assets and prepare the first 
financial statements, and also another large accounting firm to audit our 
accounts. We now realise the crucial need for cost and management 
accounting to provide accurate, reliable, relevant, and timely 
information for decision makers since an accurate cost system is very 
important as a result of privatisation and potential competition.  
These tasks were impossible to do on our own so we were forced to 
engage the services of consulting companies to help us establish most of 
these systems. (Interviewee 11). 
 
 
One of the problems that faced STC before and after privatisation (but prior to the 
market becoming competitive), was that it had huge accounts receivable due to the lack 
of collection, or as a result of the nature of its main customers since it had to provided 
its services to other governmental ministries and their departments or to “special 
people” regardless of their ability or intention to pay21.  
This could have seriously weakened its ability to finance or update some of its assets 
and systems, and achieve its planned objectives. But after competitors entered the 
market, the Government was forced to deal with STC as a regular supplier: these days 
recovering debt is no longer a problem.  
                                                 
21
 Those “special people” might include some Royal family members or some other powerful people in 
the country who have no intention to pay, thinking it is not necessary to pay the Government any money 
since its perceived existing wealth means it does not need any further finance.  
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However, as one of the interviewees pointed out, STC still sometimes cannot treat 
certain special Government Departments as normal customers and they have to be more 
flexible towards them in relation to debt collection22.  
 
While the majority of managers in STC revealed that organisational restructuring was 
very difficult due to the previous Government environment, they argued that the new 
accounting tools and techniques provided an essential communication language for the 
new commercial environment. In the past there had been no pressure to pay attention to 
the financial results of each organisational unit, to clarifying supplier-customer relations, 
or to market developments (interviewees 1, 11, 12, 13). Therefore, there was an urgent 
need to set up a new system to provide management information about aspects of 
financial and customer operations, for example, customer needs for specific services and 
the need to open new markets in new regions, as well as general market information.  
Managers showed more awareness and recognised the necessity for sufficient cost and 
management accounting systems to provide adequate information for controlling and 
planning. In order to meet the new challenges, the company established new divisions, 
such as cost accounting using the Activity Based Costing system (ABC), asset 
management23, independent internal auditing24, and performance indicators using the 
BSC. There was a need to manage the various organisational units in such a way that the 
employees within the units would become aware of not only their technical performance 
but also their financial and commercial performance.  
 
The financial statements that organisations prepare for external purposes are dependent 
on the nature of the accounting system they follow and the extent to which professional 
accounting standards are adopted. STC prepares its financial statements according to 
Saudi Professional Accounting Standards’ requirements25, therefore the contents of its 
financial statements are standardised. It is now easy to obtain the annual reports of the 
company in Arabic and English.  
 
                                                 
22
 The implication is that they sometimes have to accept slow payment.  Nevertheless the situation has 
improved since competition: the company is now responsible for its own debt collection even if it is still a 
slow process.  The number of these Governmental departments has been reduced therefore it can be said 
now that only very high levels of the Royal family can be late with payment: others have to pay on time. 
23
 This division is aims to use the best techniques to manage the company’s assets, and make sure that the 
assets are used properly.  
24
 This will be covered later in a separate section.  
25
 It was mentioned earlier that they also prepared their financial statements according to US GAAP. That 
was only at the beginning of the company, because there was a plan for joint venture project with a US 
company. 
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Some managers revealed STC paid a great deal of attention to providing reliable and 
relevant information in its annual financial reports in order to build a high level of 
confidence for the company’s potential investors. The move towards privatisation 
pressured STC to maintain its records based on acceptable standards of measurement 
and reporting and to disclose fully financial statements audited by independent auditors. 
The majority of managers described the reform of STC as a successful experience, 
despite weaknesses or limitations, because of its pioneering status in Saudi Arabia. 
Although STC had not yet solved all the restructuring problems, competition would put 
pressure on the company to become more concerned not only with maximising profits, 
but also with reducing costs and paying more attention to performance accountability 
and value for money. 
5.1.5.1 Performance Evaluation: 
As discussed earlier, before privatisation the main job of the company was following 
MOF orders regarding projects. At the same time the main responsibility of the 
company was merely to spend the Ministry approved budget and therefore the need for 
locating KPIs was unnecessary.  
 
After privatisation and for the purpose of measuring the organisation’s performance, 
STC had adopted the Balanced Scorecard system in order to provide high-level 
managers with comprehensive, integrated and timely financial and non-financial 
information linked to the key strategic goals of the company (Interviewee 1).  
STC had an awareness of performance indicators, specifically (i) financial in terms of 
meeting the budget and (ii) non-financial in terms of the quantity and timing of 
production. The organisation set the indicators in light of the required services and 
available budget and he Board of directors approved the indicators after examining 
them (Interviewee 11). 
STC has a set of financial performance indicators such as: Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR), Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR), Net Present Value (NPV), and 
Undiscounted Pay Back and Return on Investment (ROI).   STC also has other, non-
financial indicators, such as customer satisfaction, and numbers of new subscriptions. 
(STC documents, 2007).   
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5.1.5.2 External and Internal Audit: 
Saudi companies are required to provide their financial statements for an independent 
and objective check; however the role and effectiveness of external auditors26 vary from 
organisation to organisation for a number of reasons (Al-Dehailan, 2004). The main 
causes of differences are the nature of the organisation’s ownership as well as the 
sources of finance.  
 
As indicated earlier, STC had to spend a huge sum of money to open its accounts when 
it was privatised. One of the main reasons for that was the absence of auditing.  Most 
managers at STC pointed out that neglect of the audit role before privatisation had led to 
the organisation being charged substantial sums to set up new accounting opening 
balances. 
 
If we had had effective external and internal auditors, we would not have 
had to spend such a huge amount of money setting up new accounting 
opening balances. Such a lack of information could have been avoided  
(Interviewee 11) 
 
 
Saudi Telecom has three different bodies for auditing. The first is the independent 
internal auditing department, second are two external auditing firms and third is the 
Audit Committee (see below).  
The main job of the independent internal auditing department is to provide continuous 
reports to the Audit Committee to which it is connected directly (and is above the 
Finance Department). The Audit Committee are members of the Board of Directors; its 
remit is to be responsible for reviewing financial reports.  
The major work of the Committee is financially supervising the work of top 
management and the Finance Department before they seek the final agreement from the 
external auditors.  
STC has selected competent audit firms to provide an independent opinion on its 
accounts27. The external auditors are accountable before all external users for the 
                                                 
26
 Saudi Commercial Law forces companies to use two external auditing firms for auditing and approving 
their financial statements.  
27
  STC has two auditing firms. The first one is an international firm, Price, Waterhouse & Coopers. The 
second firm was Deloitte & Touche until 2007, and then it has used Alomari & Co., a Saudi based firm. 
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company’s financial statements. Their responsibility is to make sure that the company’s 
financial statements present the financial situation of the company fairly28. 
 
Some managers showed their frustration at the weak role of the Board of Directors in 
general and in the Audit Committee in particular. A senior manager blamed the Board 
of Directors for some of the mistakes and contradictions in managing the company: 
 
I think that, in a company like Saudi Telecom, which was having a boom 
time in terms of services and revenues, a highly competent Board of 
Directors was needed to guarantee an adequate level of corporate 
governance. We received an adequate level of autonomy without a 
sufficient level of accountability. To be honest, the Board of Directors 
was supposed to play a more effective role than they did. Unfortunately, 
some of them were not able to perform their role effectively and did not 
want to leave it to the people who had that ability. (Interviewee 12). 
 
Further, most interviewees showed a notable level of concern about the importance of 
ensuring the quality and reliability of their services. A senior manager in STC described 
internal control practices as follows: 
 
Our internal audit department receives high support and is directly 
linked to top management, especially the deputy president because of his 
accounting background. We deal with and derive benefit from the 
external auditor. We visit branches, prepare annual reports about all 
activities and give our recommendations. (Interviewee 8). 
 
 
The above indicates that the high level of concern was due to top management’s 
awareness of the importance of the role of internal audit. The internal auditors are 
responsible for reviewing all the financial transactions and reviewing the work of the 
Financial Department in detail and reporting it to the Audit Committee in order to 
obtain final approval from the external auditors.  
 
5.1.5.3 Capital Management and Investment Appraisal: 
Before privatisation, if the company wanted to undertake major new projects, it first had 
to seek approval from the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. If the Ministry 
                                                 
28
 Saudi legal requirement for financial statements are requires fair presentation. 
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approved the projects, further approval then had to be sought from the MOF for 
funding.    
The problem here was that the process was very slow and in the end the MOF could 
turn round and say ‘No’.   In addition, since projects were not effectively prioritised 
there was a danger that it could approve one project and yet reject a more important one.  
 
Since STC was privatised and therefore became self-funding, a more focused approach 
has been followed in order to achieve specific goals and objectives. The new 
methodology has ensured that projects, after following the internal approval process, 
have a positive cash impact on the organisation. The new approach is based on 
commercial studies and the expected economic benefits and competitive advantages 
gained.  Interviewee 12 stated that: 
 
Nowadays our approach has changed radically. There is a greater drive 
to minimise project expenditure through re-negotiation for prices with 
vendors. There is improved support for justification of projects including 
cost benefit analysis. Budget discipline and the approval process have 
improved and only value adding projects are executed. 
 
 
Most projects involve a multi-disciplinary approach where each party contributes 
according to their area of expertise. Accountants and engineers work together to look 
for costs and benefits in the early stages of a project’s proposal; accountants then take 
full responsibility for financial evaluation and presentation to decision makers. Once the 
proposal is completed it is presented to the Management Committee29 in the form of a 
detailed written report and oral presentation. Once approval by the Management 
Committee has been given, the second stage is to present it to the Board of Directors for 
final approval. 
 
Projects track a multi-level process that includes preparation by the 
sector, evaluation by finance, initial approval by the Management 
Committee through to final approval from the Board of Directors. 
(Interviewee, 7) 
 
STC uses the Capital Asset Pricing Model to calculate the Weighted Average 
Cost of Capital (WACC). This rate provides STC with a minimum hurdle rate 
                                                 
29
 The Management Committee has members on the Board of Directors. Those members were selected 
based on their financial and engineering backgrounds. The main job of this Committee is to make sure of 
the financial suitability of a new project.  
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with which to evaluate projects. Only projects that exceed the Weighted Average 
Cost of Capital are accepted.  
It is worth mentioning here that STC has a target to achieve 10% of its annual 
profit from international investments by 201130. 
 
 
5.1.6 External environment: 
 
The MOF had the role of pre-auditing31 Government entities. SOEs were viewed as 
separate legal entities. However, due to the accumulated deficits in the country’s 
budgets as well as in most SOEs, it found no better option than centralising the accounts 
of budget-supported organisations, collecting their revenue in the Central Bank, and 
providing them with their required budgets.  
 
After privatisation, the situation in STC has changed as it has more autonomy in its 
accounts and revenue. However, as the Government is the biggest shareholder in STC, 
the MOF has to receive regular financial reports.  Nevertheless its role in dealing with 
revenues and budgets no longer exists.  
 
Before privatisation the only regulatory body that the company was dealing with was 
the Ministry of Telecommunications. The Ministry was in fact running the company; 
therefore it is difficult to say that it was regarded by the company as a regulatory body.  
However, after privatisation and especially after other companies entered the Saudi 
market, STC now deals with two regulatory bodies. The first is the Telecommunications 
Agency, which is mainly concerned with providing fair competition in the market. The 
Agency usually requires frequent reports about each service provided by STC, but does 
not require any detailed financial reports. The second regulatory body is the Saudi Stock 
Agency. This agency aims to make sure that each Saudi company is following the 
financial standards required by law and that financial statements are presented to all 
users in the correct way. 
 
                                                 
30
 The President of STC is quoted in a recent newspaper interview of saying that in 2009 STC achieved 
21% of its annual profit from international investment. (Aleqtesadyah newspaper, 2009, www.aleqt.com)  
31
 Pre-audit means an examination of vouchers, contracts, etc., in order to validate a transaction or a series 
of transactions before they are paid for and recorded. 
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Results of the interview survey for STC revealed that most respondents were satisfied 
with their organisation’s level of compliance with statutory obligations and internal 
rules and regulation. In addition they believed that the statutory regulations were fair to 
them and it did not prevent them from doing their job properly.  
However, some felt that there were times where these obligations, especially to the 
Telecommunications Agency, prevented the company from providing certain profitable 
services at the right time. The Agency is more concerned about fair markets and 
occasionally will stop or delay STC from providing certain services in order to allow 
another company to gain entry to the market. This issue was the main concern for most 
interviewees.  
One of the interviewee expressed his concern as: 
 
Yes, some times the Telecommunication Agency annoys us by delaying 
our services but if we look at the bigger picture, it is for our benefit. This 
action would provide competitors access to the market, which will give 
us the motivation to improve our own company’s performance.  
If the Agency allowed us to do what we want no other company would be 
able enter to the Saudi market. We would monopolise the market…. In 
the end it is good for us. (Interviewee 6) 
 
 
5.1.7 Organisational Structure: 
 
The Saudi Telecom sector was part of the Ministry of Telecommunications until the 
Government decided to privatise the sector. As a result of privatisation, the company 
had to come up with a suitable structure to help it to achieve its goals and objectives. 
Since the sector was privatised in 1998, STC has been through three organisational 
structure changes.  
 
The first was immediately after the privatisation in 1998 until 2002 (Figure 5.3) but was 
only viewed as temporary since the company was in transition. This initial restructure 
was not based on the goals and objectives of the company since it had not had enough 
time to determine what they would be (Interviewee 11).  
 However some interviewees did not consider it to be any kind of structural change, 
arguing that the difference amounted merely to changes in the names of some 
positions32.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Phase One of the STC Structures.
Source/ STC classified documentations, 2008.
 
The structural second change took place between 2002 and 2007 (Figure 5.4). This was 
based on the changes in the philosophy and vision of the company, which was now 
focussed on its product range (Data, Landlines and Mobiles). At this stage the company 
was more concerned about maximising its service provision. Its key objective was to 
demonstrate to the Saudi customer base that it was capable of providing the most up
date service possible. (Interviewee 13). 
 
Figure 5.4 Phase Two of STC Structures.
 
Source: STC Classified Documents
 
 
Interviewee (11) was astute in his comments on problems facing the company after 
Phase Two changes: 
                                        
32
 For example, before privatisation the Deputy Minister occupied the position of President. 
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We had a tough time in adapting to the new 2002 structure, as there were 
several obstacles. We suffered from the lack of a clear picture of the top 
management, we faced a lack of support from middle management as 
they didn’t understand the purpose of the change and didn’t provide us 
with the information we needed.   We faced lot of people who didn’t 
believe in the change and we suffered from people who just talked 
without action. 
 
From the above statement it is evident that the core problem with the structural change 
lay mainly with people who were against it. The company managed to solve this 
problem by either changing the attitude of the people concerned or changing personnel.  
This will be discussed in next section.  
 
The noticeable issue during that period of time was the absence of competitors. The 
absence of competition is an indication of the reason for changes leading to a phase 
three restructure in 2007 (Figure 5.5).  
When competitors entered the Saudi market STC was forced to act in order to continue 
to attract more customers. It was forced to change its goals and objectives and in 
consequence had to restructure to achieve the new objectives. These were based on 
“customer centricity”.  
In the previous structure, the main three departments on the company were related to 
products but in the new structure the main three departments were related to customers 
(Personal, Home, and Enterprises).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5.5 Phase Three of STC Structures.
Source: STC Classified Documentation, 2007
 
From the above, it is clear that STC has changed its structure based on the changes in its 
goals and objectives.  
Thus to summarise, the first change was as the company moved from being a 
Government controlled organisation lacking credibility in the marke
autonomy.  Its aim was to attract and gain the trust of the Saudi market and convince 
customers that it was able to provide all the services it needed. 
 
Changes in phases two and three were the result of competition entering the 
marketplace.  The company had to maintain its competitive edge and continue to attract 
new customers.  However, the focus shifted from a product
two to a market, i.e. customer base, in phases three.
 
5.1.8 Changes in Culture:
 
Before privatisation, STC suffer
Government-based bureaucratic mentality; the second (internal) issue was a 
predominantly engineering mentality.
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As explained in point 5.1.4, STC faced employee problems when implementing the 
BSC.  During that time the company managed to convince the workforce that its 
introduction as a measure was for positive evaluation of performance and not one 
designed to allocate blame.  However this was only part of the solution:  it still needed 
to change the mindset of its employees to ensure acceptance of any changes resulting 
from its introduction.       
 
A general manager described the situation regarding the organisation’s cultural situation 
as follows: 
 
We had two main kinds of attitude problems: the first one was a non-
business Governmental bureaucratic mentality The attitude of those 
people was that they believed that they were going to get paid, and 
promoted anyway so why should they bother themselves.  
The second was with us, the engineering people who wouldn’t listen to 
anyone else in the company and thought they understood better than 
others and were always right. (Interviewee 1). 
 
From the above it is evident that the company had to change the culture of two kinds of 
employees.   
The first were front line employees who dealt directly with customers and at the same 
time suffered from the ‘governmental bureaucratic mentality’.  
The second concerned employees whose attitude affected the internal organisation and 
were suffering from both a ‘government bureaucratic’ and an ‘engineering’ mentality.   
 
To solve these problems the company made a contract with an American company33 
with offices in Turkey, the reasoning being that whilst indigenous Turks would have a 
good understanding of the Arabic and Islamic mentality, they would also bring a 
Western business approach to the situation.  
The project was in two phases: the first was to conduct a series of lectures, seminars and 
workshops with front line employees into how best to deal with customers.    
The second was a long-term plan with both front line and inside employees. This long-
term plan entailed lectures, seminars, workshops, and long training courses outside 
                                                 
33
 This company was called Peppers & Rogers Group. Peppers & Rogers Group is a management-
consulting firm, recognized as the world's leading authority and acknowledged thought leader on 
customer-based strategies and underlying business initiatives. Founded in 1993 by Don Peppers and 
Martha Rogers, Ph.D., Peppers & Rogers Group invented the term 1to1® marketing to illustrate the 
importance of treating different customers differently, and transformed the concepts into practical 
methodologies driving financial results for companies. http://www.peppersandrogersgroup.com  
153 
 
Saudi Arabia. The long-term plan was aimed at employees who wanted change and were 
selected by the consultants.   If it was thought that employees did not want to co-operate 
with the new direction of the company they were offered a ‘Golden Cheque’, described 
below. 
 
The need for the change in the accounting system forced cultural change within the 
company.  One general manager described how crucial this need had been in changing 
the organisation’s environment from one of being highly bureaucratic to becoming more 
autonomous. 
He commented: 
 
The establishment of new accounting systems was critical in shifting the 
culture from an engineering one with an emphasis on physical 
production, to a commercial one in which the emphasis was on markets 
and finance and in which accountants, public relations personnel, and 
marketing managers significantly increased their power relative to 
engineer.  Also, a clear mission statement and objectives helped in 
driving new definitions of roles and responsibilities so that meaningful 
corporate plans, budgets, cost and performance reports could be 
established. (Interviewee 14). 
 
 
The move that STC took to change its organisational culture was costly and time 
consuming. But the benefits that the company was seeking were ambitious and worth it. 
A manager stated that: 
 
We spent hundreds of millions on the culture project. It was so costly and 
it took lot of time to be done. But we were happy for that as we managed 
to change our employees’ attitude towards customers, competitors, and 
the need to accept changes in a positive way. The other cost we spent was 
on getting rid of people who don’t want to change. That was another 
issue. (Interviewee, 6) 
 
 
5.1.9 Human Resources Development and Reward Systems: 
 
Before privatisation, STC’s employees lacked any motivation to be creative 
(Interviewee 17).   Since the company was part of the Government, employees were 
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merely concerned with ‘getting the job done’ rather than thinking about ways to 
improve or add any new creative aspects to it: 
 
 As a government employee, your job was to follow orders and rules that 
came from the Ministry and to get the job done. The Ministry people 
thought they were able to make plans and tell you what to do, you didn’t 
tell them what to do. (Interviewee, 6). 
 
 
A further issue was that employees would receive their salaries (and could even be 
promoted) regardless of whether they achieved set targets.  The result led to no clear 
differentiation between those who were and were not doing a good job.  Reward and 
advancement was based on two things:  personal connections with high level company 
or Ministry employees, and successful completion of service at a designated level which 
would lead to automatic promotion to the next grade.  (Interviewee 1). 
 
When STC was privatised, it was faced with two common issues that impaired its 
employee’s effectiveness and performance: overstaffing and lack of qualifications. 
However with autonomy came the ability to introduce programmes to reduce the 
number of employees.   As a result, STC, due to the boom in its services and revenues, 
has been able to encourage employees to take early retirement and attract new 
competent employees by establishing what it called the “Golden Cheque System”.  
Whilst this system has cost the company millions of Dollars just to get rid of unwanted 
employees34 it has resulted in the company being able to reduce its number of its 
employees from 22,000 in 2001 to 17,000 in 2007.  The target is to reach 12,000- 
13,000 employees by 2011 (Interviewee 17). 
On the issue of lack of qualifications, especially financial and commercial, a general 
manager explained how the company overcame that problem with the following 
comment: 
 
The lack of management in-depth knowledge and experience with 
financial and commercial aspects resulted in the adding of financial and 
commercial expertise to top management and to the seeking of direct 
help from external experts. Without the help of consultancy companies it 
would have been difficult to achieve the changes in the company. They 
made an essential contribution in smoothing the change processes and in 
helping to adopt new accounting practices. Also, attracting competent 
                                                 
34
 Unwanted employees is a term used by an interviewee number 17 to describe the kind of unqualified, 
resisting changes, and governmental mentality employees.  
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people from the private sector was very important, especially in finance, 
accounting and commerce, because consultants needed competent people 
to be able to understand and implement the new systems. (Interviewee 
11)35 
 
 
Some managers expressed the view that the radical change processes were more difficult 
and took more time because the appointment of top management had been based on 
engineering rather than financial and commercial knowledge and experience. The 
majority of managers indicated a significant increase in the power and influence of 
accountants36 during the process of privatisation. A general manager gave the reason for 
the high demand for competent accountants and the new role played by accounting. He 
stated that: 
 
After privatisation, without sufficient quality information and adequate 
accounting systems, it would have been difficult to have a common 
language of communication. The roles of accounting and accountants 
were changed tremendously in order to facilitate the political and 
organisational change.  This was not only through the technical 
provision of information necessary for the parties involved to complete 
transactions but by changing perceptions and setting the power of 
accountability. The number of qualified accountants employed increased 
substantially and most of them came from the commercial private sector. 
(Interviewee 11). 
 
Dramatic changes have also been made to the Board of Directors. Before privatisation 
almost 90% was comprised of engineers (Interviewee 17), now most members have 
financial and commercial backgrounds (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1  Qualification of Board of Directors Members on STC.  
Qualification for the member of Board of Directors on STC 
Number Qualifications 
1 B.A in Economics in 1979, MSC in Economics in 1981, PhD in Economics 1986. 
The Director of the Saudi Monetary Agency. 
2 M.A in Public Administration. Governor of Public Pension Agency 
                                                 
35
 It was obvious from looking at the CVs of most people who work now in the company that they were 
attracted to join the company in recent years. The company made radical changes in the people working 
in the finance department and top management between 1999-2003. 
36
 From 1970s to 1990s, Saudi culture valued engineering and gave it high social respect and high 
income. Based on the nature of the then Government’s goals to establish new infrastructures the focus 
was on engineering.  
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3 B.A in Finance. MSc in Accountancy. The Deputy of Finance Ministry for Budget 
and Planning.  
4 M.A in Finance, MBA,  
5 Deputy Director General of Technical Affairs & Information in Saudi Customs, 
Ministry of Finance. BA, MSc, PhD in Information Technology.  
6 Business Man, B.A, and M.A in Engineering and Business Management. 
7 Business Man, B.A; MSc; and PhD in Accountancy. 
8 M.A, and MSc in Telecommunication Engineering.  
9 B.A and MSc in financial Accounting.  
Source: STC documentations 2008. 
 
 
One of the main issues in STC is the evaluation of its employees’ performance. It 
distinguishes between two levels of employees, viz., those on grade 12 and above 
(middle and top management) and those under grade 12 (lower management). Each 
level has two main performance evaluation indicators (PEIs) based on the nature of the 
work.   
 
The first PEI is entitled “Achievement of Objectives” and is applied in a similar way to 
both levels of employees. This contains financial, customer, and learning and growth 
objectives according to the managerial level and nature of work. 
 
The second is based on “Competencies”. Managers on grade 12 and above have 10 
indicators as follows:  leadership, functional knowledge, team working, communication, 
planning, commercial awareness, problem solving, corporate relationship, time 
management and customer focus. 
Competencies for those under grade 12 are divided into two sets, the first being “Core 
Competencies”: functional knowledge, team working, customer focus, commitment, 
quality and accuracy, time keeping and attendance, and asset management and care.  
Inability to achieve acceptable grades in these areas could lead to loss of job.  
The second set are “Optional Competencies”, containing the 10 indicators of the top and 
middle managers competencies to which is added  ‘Safety’. If lower grade management 
employees manage to achieve three or more of the optional competencies they will be 
entitled to attend company  “Leadership Training Programmes”. 
It is noticeable from the above that STC used BSC to evaluate its employees. 
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Another interesting issue on STC is the loyalty of its employees. A general manager 
stated that: 
 
We make a contract with a neutral party to study the loyalty of our 
employees every year. The aim is to find out what should we provide as 
bonuses for our employees. We are in a competitive market; if we don’t 
keep our good employees we might lose them. Apart from bonuses we 
sometimes provide them with financial facilities like zero rate loans and 
scholarships for them or their kids to study abroad. (Interviewee, 17). 
 
 
It was obvious that the majority of managers interviewed believed that privatisation 
would encourage employees to perform well and give them rewards based on their 
individual performance.  
 
 
5.2 Changes in SEC’s Management Accounting Control Systems 
 
The previous section discussed the changes that happened in Management Accounting 
Control Systems in the first company in the study (STC). The following sections will 
explore the changes in these same systems within the second company in the study – 
Saudi Electric Company (SEC).   
5.2.1 Changes in Planning: 
Although SEC has moved towards privatisation, which creates pressure to meet targets 
for financial performance and reliability of services and to ensure resources are used as 
efficiently as possible, it is still considered a public service provider committed to 
continuing to provide its services at a consistent and affordable price (Al-Dehailan, 
2004).  The majority of managers interviewed suggested that privatisation could help 
eliminate non-commercial objectives and make management more aggressive and 
focused on developing new business initiatives. However, most maintained that the 
company could not operate effectively without having a reasonable level of autonomy 
in its budget setting and decision making processes, having clear plans and objectives, 
developing a cost accounting system, enhancing the role of internal auditing, and 
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motivating the role of the Board of Directors to achieve financial and non-financial 
performance accountability (Interviewees B, C, D and E).  
 
They stressed the need for an integrated information system to achieve a timely, reliable 
and relevant information system. All interviewees confirmed that SEC still doesn’t have 
enough autonomy in setting its goals and objectives. It still operates under Government 
objectives and plans, the majority of which are based on social rather than commercial 
factors.  Interviewees B and C also commented that whilst SEC might sometimes 
propose changes or suggest new objectives they were still subject to Government 
(Ministry of Electricity) approval. 
 
5.2.2 The budgetary process: 
 
Although the budgetary process at SEC is similar to the process at STC two main 
differences occur in the preparation and approval stages.  
First, the goals and objectives come mainly from Ministry of Electricity, especially for 
new projects.  On the basis of objectives SEC then has to prepare its own detailed 
objectives and from there prepare its budget guidelines. The budget for SEC has to have 
a full recommendation from the Budget Committee within SEC. The President and 
Chief Accountant meet with the Board of Directors to present the budget, which is then 
discussed by the Board and approved.  
  
After gaining approval from the Board of Directors, the President and Chief Accountant 
then seek approval from the Ministry of Electricity and the Ministry of Finance.   This 
involves meeting the Deputy Minister and his team and presenting and defending the 
budget, and this is the second difference from the process at STC. The approval of the 
two ministries legitimates the budget and creates a legal implication that binds the 
organisation.  
 
The big involvement of Government at SEC’s budget approval stage shows the 
limitations of SEC’s autonomy in relation to its budget since one of the Ministries may 
disagree with any part of the budget and change it.  In addition the Government will 
fund some of projects even if they are not commercially profitable. 
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5.2.3 Costing Systems: 
The aim of the current traditional cost system being employed in SEC was not to 
achieve financial accountability but to monitor operations and production. A manager 
described the current costing system in the following way: 
 
The current cost system could be described as aggregated information 
since we have three major activities: generating, transmission and 
distribution, each one being considered as a cost centre that has sub-cost 
centres. It is difficult to compare costs and effectiveness or benefits 
because it is an aggregated system. The details might exist in the 
technical departments. You can tell from the high maintenance expenses 
that there is a low awareness of cost benefit or cost effectiveness, 
because technical people are more concerned with meeting the level of 
production with a specific quality of services and continuity. (Interviewee 
C). 
 
 
SEC has not adopted the Activity-Based-Cost system and is still using the traditional 
cost system. SEC faced difficulty directing and allocating its expenditures between 
activities to rationalise its expenditure and decisions as indicated by the same manager: 
 
It is difficult to rationalise expenditure without having a good cost system 
and knowing how high some costs are and what costs less. The current 
system does not distinguish, so any reduction will not be logical. Frankly 
speaking, the current accounting system is just about revenues and 
expenditures and the expenditures are not entirely correct. The 
information system is ambiguous and the current databases are not 
accurate. For example, it is difficult to obtain an accurate cost for any 
product or service. In the absence of accurate data, therefore, it is 
difficult to reach an adequate decision. (Interviewee C). 
 
From the above statement it can be said that the current costing system is geared to 
aggregate measurement, doesn’t disaggregate and therefore fails to provide useful 
internal information. 
  
A manager gave an illustration of the lack of allocation costs, not only in overheads but 
also in material and labour costs: 
 
The cost system should help to provide aggregated information. 
However, it cannot provide accurate information for achieving adequate 
costing and pricing. It is a traditional system and there is no incentive to 
develop it because I don’t think it will be used as an accountability tool. 
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The variation in the allocation of material costs sometimes comes from 
an inaccurate direction in the transaction when we record the accounts. 
It is the same for labour costs, if the cost centre has, for example 15 
employees when we examine the centre we may find more or less. So the 
cost system is an aggregated system not a detailed system. (Interviewee 
C). 
 
The inaccurate allocation of cost was a big issue in SEC. Most senior managers in the 
company expressed the need to develop their old cost system by adopting an Activity 
Based Costing system (ABC) to provide adequate costs, especially with the new trend 
towards commercialisation and competition.  
The feeling was that the organisation had to become more concerned about determining 
adequate costs and prices in order to ascertain how much it has to spend to provide 
services in a commercially oriented environment and still achieve an adequate profit 
margin.  
The pricing policy in SEC is one of the main reasons that the company does not pay 
much attention to cost systems37.  One manager commented that: 
 
 The company receives a list of the prices for the services that it provides 
from the Government; the prices do not always cover the cost and 
sometimes they are not even close - so what difference is a new costing 
system going to make? Whatever we say to Government the cost is, they 
believe us, and they cover it for us, so why should we change? 
(Interviewee A). 
 
The above statement confirms that since SEC has no control over pricing its services, it 
has become irrelevant for it to know the accurate cost of its services. This is because it 
knows the Government will cover the difference. Therefore, it is obvious that there is a 
lack of motivation on SEC to change its costing system. 
 
However, one manager at SEC revealed the increasing amount of attention the 
organisation’s President is paying to the need to determine the cost of providing 
services: 
 
Our President is highly concerned about the cost of providing services. 
We have established a new department to monitor service and costs for 
                                                 
37
 The Saudi government has full control over pricing of the electricity service in the country for political 
and social reasons.  
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every project; in the near future the private sector will be encouraged to 
come and build, operate and own the new projects and we will buy and 
distribute their electricity production; therefore, it is necessary to know 
how much it costs us to provide these services in order to pay a 
reasonable price to private providers. (Interviewee A). 
 
The above statement shows how competition is likely to motivate the company to 
change. 
 
 The above practices reveal the very small impact accounting information has on 
internal decision-making in SEC because it cannot provide a useful database for pricing 
and other managerial decisions. The current cost system could be classified as 
underdeveloped or inefficient. The lack of available information and low contribution of 
management accounting to quality information provision, scientific management and 
cost techniques, could be a result of the low importance attached to accounting 
information, because line managers are more concerned about meeting the 
specifications for their products, mainly in terms of completion dates and improving 
production efficiency.  
Financial implications tend to be ignored because of the lack of cost information on a 
systematic basis. The suggested logical reasons for that are: the domination of the 
company by engineers, lack of competition which reduces the need to change, and the 
involvement of Government and its readiness to provide whatever cash is needed. 
 
5.2.4 Implementation of the Balanced Scorecard: 
 
At the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), the BSC does not exist. Interestingly, out of 8 
people from different management levels, mostly in the financial department, only one 
person could answer the question about BSC without asking to have BSC explained to 
him. That person was the only interviewee who had worked in a totally private company 
before working at SEC.   He was fairly new to SEC and it was obvious from his point of 
view, that the others still had a public sector mentality, leading to a rejection of the need 
for innovation and vision, the need to compete with others, the ability to make quick 
changes and adjustments, and a desire merely to follow orders. The interviewee who 
could identify the meaning of BSC said that the reason for not applying BSC, which he 
thinks would be very useful for the company, was: 
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... Yes SEC is a public listed company and considered as a private 
company, but in reality and based on the way management in the company 
operates, we are still a sort of public owned enterprise.... We cannot apply 
BSC because first, the top management won’t understand it, second it will 
conflict with the Government way of running the company...   BSC is a 
system for the whole company and if you want it to work properly you 
should apply it in every department starting from top management; it 
requires lots of strong leadership and huge participation by top 
management and the problem is that these people still have a public sector 
mentality. (Interviewee G) 
 
From the above, it can be argued that SEC has to make radical changes in the 
nature of top managers and the culture of its employees.  In addition, Government 
has to give the company more autonomy in its policies and open the electricity 
market up to competition.   
 
However, interviewee G mentioned that although a proposal had been made by 
one consultant to apply BSC to the company he still maintained it would not work 
because of the aforementioned reasons38.   
5.2.5  Changes in accounting policies and accountability:  
 
According to the IFAC (1989), state-owned enterprises should operate reporting 
systems consistent with accrual based and other generally accepted accounting 
principles. However, although SOEs are supposed to implement accrual based 
accounting, they are not homogenous, since some use cash based accounting and others 
follow accrual based accounting, depending on the legal requirements and enforcement 
of implementation (Ruffing, 1993).  
 
Before privatisation, SEC, as with STC, was required to fulfil and submit its reports 
based on cash based accounting systems by the MOF in order to supply its services 
within budgeted appropriations. 
                                                 
38
 In early 2010 the company announced a plan for applying BSC. They stated that they would start in the 
Human Resources Department as a Phase 1. Phase two would be in the Generating, Transformation, 
Distribution, and Customer departments. Phase Three would be Regulatory, Internal Audit, and Finance 
departments. Phase four would be Top Management. The plan would be completed by 2014;  the 
programme contained workshops and training days. 
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 Nevertheless, as a result of privatisation, SEC changed from cash based to accrual 
based accounting in 2002.  The change from cash to an accrual basis in SEC has had a 
radical impact because the lack of asset values made establishing the opening balance 
sheet difficult. 
 
Some managers revealed that the East regional company led the process of 
consolidation because it maintained its accounting records with more reliable and 
informative accounting systems than the other companies. The more informative 
systems in the East regional company were possibly due to the nature of its ownership, 
since the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) owned a high percentage (41.12%) of 
the company. 
 
Nevertheless, the Saudi Electricity Company faced fewer valuation problems than the 
Telecoms Company because the six small and the four main regional companies (East, 
West, Central, and South) had maintained their accounting records using accrual based 
accounting in accordance with National Accounting Standards39. However, the small 
projects that were under the governance of the Electricity Enterprise had used cash 
based accounting which presented difficulties due to lack of accounting records for their 
assets. During the consolidation period, the net assets of these small projects were 
valued by a national accounting firm at almost SR 1.2 billion, which represented only a 
small portion of the company’s total assets (SR 90 billion). 
 
Although these ten regional companies prepared their accounting using the commercial 
accounting system, and their accounts were subjected to independent audit, Government 
ownership influenced their accounting practices since they were required to follow 
accounting policies advocated by the parent Ministry (the Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity, now Ministry of Water and Electricity).  Comment from Interviewee D, a 
general manager: 
 
Although we used to follow Saudi Accounting Standards and choose our 
accounting policies from these standards, sometimes when we sent our 
accounts to the Ministry it would force us to change some accounts, 
especially if we had high operating expenses. It would ask us to 
capitalise them to reduce losses but now, after the cessation of 
Government subsidies, I think intervention from the Ministry will also 
                                                 
39
 Saudi Commercial Law requires the use for National Accounting Standards. 
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stop and new harmonisation of accounting policies will help us to present 
our accounts more fairly. (Interviewee D) 
 
The above statement clarifies the role that Government was playing in SEC by the 
politicisation of accounts. The involvement of politicians in the accounts of SEC could 
be viewed as one of the reasons the Saudi government made the move towards 
privatisation. 
 
Moreover, the ten companies’ accounts were consolidated without asset valuations, 
causing possible major problems in the future because of unfair asset values. One 
manager pointed this out: 
 
Merging all the accounts of these companies into one set of financial 
statements without valuation of their assets is a major issue that has to be 
solved because of the inaccurate historical costs of the previous 
accounts. Moreover, this company has its stocks on the stock market and 
accounts are supposed to be presented in a reliable and credible way to 
investors in this company. (Interviewee A) 
  
 
As it was the case in STC before privatisation (see 5.2.4), SEC has huge accounts 
receivables. There are two possible reasons for that: (i) the lack of collection, (ii) the 
nature of their main customers, since it has to provide its services to other 
Governmental ministries and their departments, or “special people” regardless of their 
ability or intention to pay.   
 
From a purely commercial point of view, this could seriously impair its ability to 
finance or update some of its assets and systems, and achieve its planned or desired 
objectives. However SEC overcomes this problem by financing its projects from 
Government funds. 
In the case of bill collection SEC has no autonomy as it has to follow the Government 
system and orders. The problem is that whilst SEC is considered a private company, 
when it comes to cash the MOF considers it to be a Government asset. 
 
Besides the huge accounts receivable, SEC also has huge accounts payable because it 
receives fuel and oil from the Government owned company, Aramco. It is obvious that 
SEC has a huge debt. The fuel bill and certain other contractors cause this debt. The 
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only logical reason for that is that SEC uses the privilege of being the only company 
that supplies a very important service (electricity).  
Also the main debtor is a Government owned company (Aramco) and, as explained by 
senior managers, this is a serious issue that should be solved before any further action 
towards reform40.  
SEC not only has more than SR 14 billion accounts payable, including SR 6.7 billion 
and SR 5 billion for Aramco and contractors respectively, it still uses the old tariff for 
fuel which is cheaper than the new tariff.   According to the new tariff, an additional SR 
4.7 billion would be added to the accounts payable if used (Electricity Annual Report, 
2006).  
 
Furthermore, SEC has a shortage of quality accounting information that is attributed by 
one senior manager (Interviewee C) to the inability to update their current accounting 
system and lack of an integrated IT system that would help to provide reliable internal 
reports. Another senior manager (Interviewee E) confirmed differences in information 
provided by many related departments’ internal reports, and also the weakness of other 
systems, such as costing and warehousing.  
SEC needs to improve the quality of its information provision; maintenance and 
warehouse systems need greater control in terms of cost benefit and effectiveness, 
especially with the trend towards increasing commercialisation and the ready 
availability of qualified engineers.   
Although SEC has no difficulty in acquiring and attracting qualified people, it still has 
inefficient management and cost accounting systems which are very important for 
determining accurate costs of providing services, rationalising costs, providing clear 
justification for the provision of services below costs, and facing potential competition 
(Interviewee C). 
 
An accountant at SEC expressed his concern about the warehouse system, stating: 
 
In a sector like the electricity business, warehouse items worth millions 
should be accurately monitored. Unfortunately, we still use the old 
system and whereas most or maybe all the other electricity companies 
have been updated with new systems because they care about costs, we 
are providing the service, which is the main concern, whatever it costs. 
(Interviewee F).  
                                                 
40
 There is a proposal about dividing the company into three different companies: production, 
transmission, and distribution and also allowing competition.  
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Another problem, which should be noted at SEC, is that it is not always possible to 
obtain sufficient information because of (i) the lack of communication between 
departments and (ii) the fact that more use is made of engineering reports than those of 
the accounting department (which would more accurately reflect transactions and 
events).  
One manager commented on the lack of communication between departments as 
follows: 
 
The engineering staffs are the people who provide the information upon 
which top management decisions are made and the finance department 
just records what has been done. (Interviewee E). 
 
 
Some managers expressed their frustration at the new reform because they considered it 
a temporary solution to the poor performance of the weak companies. They revealed 
that the Government had asked the stronger companies to take over the weaker ones, 
which could subsequently lead to the stronger turning into weaker. 
One manager expressed his concerns with the current proposed mergers as follows: 
 
Now the government has not only stopped subsidies but has also merged 
its General Electricity Company (GEC) projects with the six small 
companies and the four regional companies. While the regional 
companies complained of a lack of autonomy, finance, incentives and 
poor performance and effectiveness, which impaired the motivation of 
management to act commercially, small companies were worse and the 
GEC needed radical accounting and managerial changes. Their 
employees also complained about low salaries and benefits. Therefore, 
the recent reform is not an easy task. It needs clear vision to achieve 
successful reform because, without adequate autonomy, sufficient power 
of collection, clear planning, and reliable information, the new 
consolidated company would possibly collapse. It is difficult to serve for 
so many years and then see your salaries and benefits decrease. With the 
current situation, restructuring the companies may frustrate some 
employees in terms of their salaries and benefits or their positions 
(Interviewee B). 
 
Another further manager explained the previous accounting practices of the GEC 
projects as follows: 
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The former GEC projects did not maintain their accounting records 
based on an accrual accounting basis nor did they have a cost 
accounting system. We faced difficulties in implementing our accounting 
systems there because of the lack of its financial employees’ 
qualifications so we convinced some of our staff to work there and train 
their employees. A national accounting firm valued their assets. The 
result of the valuation was less than SR 1.2 billions, which represents a 
small proportion of the total assets of the consolidated companies (SR 90 
billions). Also, the net assets of the former six small companies, based on 
their audited financial statements, represented only a tiny proportion of 
the company’s capital, no more than 0.16%. However, if some or 
perhaps all regional companies needed serious development in cost and 
managerial accounting, the others definitely needed radical accounting 
change. (Interviewee D). 
 
Some managers did not consider the merger with six small companies and the GEC a 
major concern because of the minor impact of the assets of these companies on the total 
assets of the Saudi Electricity Company. However they did express their concern about 
the reliability of the previous regional companies’ financial statements because they 
were consolidated without asset valuation. A general manager explained his concern in 
the comment below: 
 
The process of reform jumped to harmonising the companies’ accounting 
policies and procedures without stopping at the companies’ assets, which 
seriously needed to be devalued. The adoption of new accounting policies 
that were not followed by the former 10 companies resulted in making 
non-recurring adjustments of more than SR 2 billion. Technical asset 
valuation should have taken place so that the results in the financial 
statement were fairly presented. Before consolidation, and due to the 
yearly deficits, sometimes we were forced to capitalise some operating 
expenses in order to reduce yearly deficits. Therefore, figures were 
unreliable and could have led to inappropriate decisions, whether for the 
short or long term. Also, whilst the amounts of shares in the Centre 
Region Companies were double the East Region Company, they had a 
lower level of reliable accounting information than in the East Region 
Company, which raised further concerns”. (Interviewee C). 
 
The above comment provides evidence that electricity companies had been forced to 
adopt income increasing accounting procedures to reduce the level of deficits by 
deferring current expenditures to the future. This possibly resulted from either the high 
degree of freedom allowed by existing accounting standards to choose the accounting 
policies that promoted the company’s best interests, or from weak pressure to 
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implement the accounting standards since the Government did not want to show that its 
enterprise was making big losses. 
 
SEC is now required to have its financial statements certified by an independent 
professional auditor. The Finance Department is responsible for preparing these annual 
statements as indicated by an accountant at SEC: 
 
We, in the finance department, prepare the financial statements and send 
them to the President and his deputies. They go over them so they are 
ready for the Board of Directors. (Interviewee F). 
 
 
The interviews showed that one of the big issues in SEC is the weak role and 
ineffectiveness of its Board of Directors to enhance organisational performance, 
planning and control. This weakness is the result of many factors, including  
(i) A lack of relevant qualifications, which results in members’ inability to 
make clear, rational decisions (members are chosen based on trust or 
specialist knowledge and experience as old government employees); 
inadequate autonomy; and 
(ii) Lack of accurate information and insufficient attention paid to costs, since 
cost awareness does not seem to go beyond the short-term because of 
inadequate accounting systems which provide unreliable information and 
impede effective control, pricing and planning.  
 
Some interviewees suggested that lack of sufficient internal and external control also 
contributed to the Board of Directors’ ineffectiveness41. 
 
Interviews also showed a lack of autonomy in terms of pricing. SEC does not have any 
level of independence on the issue of pricing as the Council of Ministers decides the 
price of services. If the price does not cover the cost, the Government makes it up and 
pays the difference.  
 
                                                 
41
 The Board of Directors had major changes to its member profile in late 2009 when most of old 
members left the Board and were replaced by other qualified, experienced members.  However  most of 
the new Directors are still engineers. 
169 
 
The interviews showed that SEC had a quite good level of freedom in terms of 
generating adequate financial resources for both operations and capital expenditure, due 
to being able to borrow and retain income.  
However, although SEC dominates the market by providing a monopoly service, it also 
has to provide its services to local government, which leads to difficulty in collecting 
accounts receivable, so it lacks cash.  
Furthermore, although it retains its huge income and uses it to recover its expenses, this 
requires a sufficient degree of cash management in terms of short and long run 
investment and a good sense of cost allocations.  
 
A group of senior managers in SEC (Interviewees B, C & D) expressed their concern 
about virement. They attributed the high transfer between expenditure headings as 
planned in the budget to the organisation’s lack of planning, clear vision and objectives. 
Most managers expressed their concern about high asset maintenance expenses, which 
they mainly attributed to MOF not requiring an effective budgeting system.  
 
In SEC, in order to convince current and potential investors about the company’s new 
plan, some managers expressed the need for sufficient autonomy over collection and 
pricing, as well as adequate accounting systems that accurately reflected the cost of 
providing the services. They revealed some frustrations about the company’s future 
because the current situation is unclear. Some of them stressed that reforming the 
electricity companies needed more effort than telecoms because electricity would not 
experience the same boom in services and revenues unless the government was 
courageous and made huge investments, not only to enhance the current infrastructure 
but also to ensure more advanced quality information to achieve sufficient planning, 
control, and performance accountability. 
 
The SEC prepares its financial statements according to Saudi Professional Accounting 
Standards’ requirements; therefore the contents of its financial statements are uniform. 
It is easy to obtain the annual reports of the company.  
A general manager in SEC stated: 
 
For internal purposes, we also have internal reports that include more 
detailed information about the production and costs of every plant. In 
fact, most of the day-to-day problems are technical; however, they are 
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not presented in the financial report because of the lack of 
communication and the wide gap between the finance department and the 
technical or engineering departments. Although I’m quite confident that 
technical people care about the quality of production, and could provide 
sufficient information for efficient and effective decision-making, in the 
financial department we don’t see the information in detail to assess its 
rationale, we just record aggregated information. The technical 
department determines the needs and after the contracts have taken place 
we just record. Why that expenditure took place or that asset has been 
disposed of, we are the last people to know the reasons. (Interviewee D).  
 
 
From the above, it seems that engineers or technical managers are the main sources and 
users of the information and reports are presented in aggregated form without any basic 
disclosure of the techniques used to provide this information, especially to determine 
and allocate costs.  
Nevertheless, its ability to attract highly competent engineers, who supposedly have 
adequate qualifications and knowledge of highly technical methods, should help to 
reduce the risk of providing unreliable and irrelevant information.  
This issue was noted in STC before privatisation and still exists in the SEC, where 
engineers are usually the ones who lead. In addition, the above statement casts light on 
the weak relationship between the finance department on one side and top managers and 
the technical department on the other.  It also reveals that the Finance Department has 
no real and obvious management accounting role. 
 
A general manager in SEC expressed a very interesting view of the Financial 
Department as follows: 
 
The most important issue in our organisation is to achieve the production 
target and to make sure there are no obstructions to meeting this. 
Financial issues should remain the concern of the finance department. Its 
role is to keep records of our transactions at the end of the year. They do 
not understand the core business, the production issues, so why do they 
want to participate in something they don’t know anything about?  
As for the control issues, these should be our area of concern because we 
know our work better than others. (Interviewee I)  
 
These remarks highlight the fact that some line managers view accounting merely as the 
documentation of historical data. Managers with a similar view to that expressed above 
may in fact be concerned about loss of power by allowing low level personnel or other 
171 
 
departments to monitor the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of their units’ day to 
day operations, production or maintenance.  
Surprisingly, some also do not recognise the value added of independent control, and 
using cost awareness in addition to production targets. They are the ones who determine 
spare part specifications and methods of maintenance, i.e. the budget needed. But who 
oversees the accuracy of their demands, their qualifications, etc.?  
A completely integrated information system is required to achieve sufficient control and 
performance accountability.  
 
The ten electricity companies had a good record of presenting reliable annual reports 
using the commercial accounting system, since they adopted Saudi accounting 
standards, which made issuance of the annual report after consolidation of the electricity 
enterprises’ projects much easier.  
SEC’s financial statements may now show more quality information because at present 
it is partly privatised, i.e. it has investors as well as creditors that need to be satisfied 
with the information they obtain to evaluate the company’ performance and for 
comparative purposes.  
The issue of concern in SEC is the accuracy of the financial position as well as financial 
performance because of weak cost determination and allocation, which may result in 
inaccurate valuation of assets.  
 
It was noticeable in SEC that there was undue delay in the reporting of its financial 
statements42 which might have impaired their relevance. This may be because it is a 
partly state-owned enterprise and operates without any competition and as a result 
external pressure is insufficient to motivate the provision of timely financial statements.  
Moreover, its information is insufficiently accurate, because the cost accounting system 
is inadequate. It is supposed to provide raw information for the accounts, but fails to do 
so because departments’ internal reports are difficult to integrate financially as they are 
mainly technical. This reduces confidence in departmental results, leading to possible 
bias in financial statements.  
Additionally, as a result of inaccurate information and delays in passing on information 
between the various departments of the organisation, it is not untypical for senior 
                                                 
42
 For example, financial statements for 2005 were approved and released  mid May 2006, those for 2006 
were approved and published early June 2007,  2007 statements were approved and published  mid May 
2008. 
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financial managers to use their intuition and judgements when information is requested 
by external parties as an accountant disclosed: 
 
To be honest, in some situations, we have no adequate way except using 
guesswork, shortcuts, making approximations and rule-of-thumb 
assessment to meet information demands. (Interviewee G).  
 
A manager in SEC pointed to the inconsistency between annual reports as follows: 
 
As regards timing, we prepare the annual report based on the rules and 
regulations of the MOF or the governmental accounting system, and 
within the three months after the year-end.  The commercial accounts 
need another three months to adjust the fixed assets. The results will, of 
course, be late which may raise doubts about their usefulness for 
decision-makers and their purpose for the Board of Directors. It is 
difficult to compare annual reports; especially cash based ones, because 
there is no consistency between current and past years. (Interviewee E). 
 
5.2.5.1 Performance Evaluation: 
Interviewee (B) stated that SEC had an acceptable performance indicators system, 
which had been adopted in the East regional company. However, this system needed to 
be integrated and improved by using more reliable information derived from a more 
adequate cost accounting system.  
The difficulty of setting and developing financial performance indicators appeared more 
clearly in SEC for a number of reasons, such as non-commercial objectives, lack of 
incentives, and lack of control.  
A senior manager (Interviewee E) at the SEC confirmed this when he complained about 
the company’s failure to set performance indicators in a clear format, which impeded 
effective examination of its performance. The company in most cases used estimates or 
budget reports, such as expenditure reports, sales reports, estimated revenues, and 
inventory reports, as performance indicators. Many senior managers confirmed this.  
 
One manager described his organisation’s performance indicators as follows: 
 
The way we look at performance indicators is by the level of use of some 
or the entire budget- the percentage for every account. If our spending is 
just below the budget this is considered a good sign. But on the other 
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hand, the new level of spending will be our actual spending level. 
(Interviewee B). 
 
The frustration expressed in the above points to the lack of an adequate budgeting 
system to help achieve the organisational objectives of rationalising expenditure and 
obtaining sufficient control and accountability. The current budgeting system may thus 
de-motivate top managers and hold back their effort to look for new ideas that could 
increase their revenues. It is clear from the above statement that the main KPI is 
comparison of actual against budgets which means lot of financial indicators are used.  
 
The overwhelming majority of managers reported non-financial indicators, e.g. the 
number of new subscribers, were very important to achieving their objectives. However, 
this high concern was not combined with cost benefit or even cost effectiveness, since 
most admitted these targets needed to be improved and compared with suitable 
benchmarks, which took into account the environmental circumstances and the culture 
of customers.  
The majority of managers (Interviewees B, C, D, E) commented on the difficulty of 
using an international benchmark because of the special environment and climatic 
conditions of Saudi Arabia and also the lack of autonomy that held back any 
development. 
The above suggests that the SEC had an awareness of performance indicators, 
especially non-financial indicators, in terms of the quantity and timing of production 
and also more financial indicators in terms of meeting the budget.  
 
Although they provided justification for their current practices, interviewees from SEC 
did not confirm current-reporting practices satisfied their own needs and provided 
trustworthy information, whether for future requirements and trends or the present 
situation.  
Thus reporting systems within SEC suffer from two shortfalls. First, the kind of 
information that is used, which is mainly engineering-based, containing much technical 
detail without providing enough financial information.  This could be due to the lack of 
accounting techniques, and the nature of costing systems in use.  
Secondly, the natures of internal users who are top managers are mainly in SEC 
engineers who primarily ask for technical engineering information. At the same time 
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Government related personnel tend only to focus on providing services within technical 
specifications and within predetermined financial allowances.  
 
5.2.5.2 External and Internal Auditor: 
Saudi Commercial Law requires that companies use two external auditing firms for 
auditing and approving company financial statements. SEC has two private Saudi 
auditing firms and an Auditing Committee43 responsible for reviewing and approving 
the financial statements before they are taken to the external auditors.  
 
In addition, since SEC has considerable government shareholdings, the GAB (General 
Audit Bureau) has a role and control over the company. The majority of managers in 
SEC expressed dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the GAB’s role and control 
over the companies: GAB auditors failed to see major problems because they lacked an 
overall picture of an organisation’s practices and their role and its employees’ 
qualifications are limited (Interviewees A, B, D, E).  
The GAB’s audit is considered a documentary or legal audit since it only looks at 
statutory issues. As a governmental unit, GAB officials suffer from a number of 
shortcomings, including lack of incentives, ineffective independence, weak training, and 
the civil service salary system, which possibly weakens the Bureau’s ability to attract 
the best, most competent new staff (Interviewee A; Aba Alkhail, 2001). 
 
 
5.2.5.3 Capital Expenditure Management and Investment Appraisal: 
SEC was a state-owned enterprise following the rules and orders of the Saudi 
Government. Before privatisation SEC had no autonomy to manage its capital or its 
investment, but once it was privatised it became a partly self-funding company. SEC 
can now look for new projects but whilst it has enough autonomy to decide suitable 
projects, it still has to gain ultimate approval from Government. Usually the 
Government will not reject any project proposal unless the project is going to be based 
outside of the country. This is deemed to be for ‘political reasons’.  (Interviewee A).  
 
                                                 
43
 The Committee members are part of the Board of Directors. 
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One manager (Interviewee B) stated that the majority of SEC projects proposed directly 
and sometimes indirectly by the government were for social reasons. He mentioned that 
the government sometimes asked the company to provide services to certain areas that 
led the company to raise the need for new projects to extend its ability to meet the 
required services.  
It can be argued that some projects that SEC accomplished have had no positive cash 
impact on the organisation since they were proposed by the Government to serve some 
social, non-profitable areas.  
An interviewee summed up the difficulty that SEC face with any new project: 
 
The problem with the electricity sector is that it is very related to politics 
so once you want to make any move you have to prepare yourself to face 
not only other companies but also maybe other Governments. We have a 
proposal for a project in another Arab country, very profitable, and it 
will help the company but now the negotiation is in the hands of the 
Saudi Government with that country. All what we can do is wait, maybe 
we will do it and may we won’t. (Interviewee, B). 
 
 
All new proposed projects involve the much-needed expertise of both engineers and 
accountants in SEC.   Together engineers and accountants look for costs and benefits in 
the early stages of a project’s proposal. Then the engineers take full responsibility to 
convince the Board of Directors through the Head of the related department 
(Generation, Transmission, and Distribution). Once the Board of Directors approve the 
new project, the head of the Board and the President of the company and the Executive 
Vice President for the related department have to take the new project to the Ministry of 
Electricity to gain their approval and sometimes ask them to facilitate it financially 
(Interviewee, D). 
 
5.2.6 External Environment: 
 
As we argued before SEC was part of the government, which was controlled financially 
by the Ministry of Finance. However, not all the electricity companies were under the 
direct control of the Ministry of Finance.  
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After privatisation, the situation in SEC did not change a great deal in relation to 
Governmental agencies such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Electricity.  
It is noticeable that the two Ministries still have huge involvement in different aspects 
of company policy.  
Pricing policy is the first aspect since SEC has no autonomy on its services prices. The 
Government (MOF) will compile a list of services prices and it is usually the case that 
this leads to loss – in which case the Ministry will make it up to the company by paying 
the difference.  Additionally, the Ministry of Electricity must approve any new projects 
and formulate key objectives and goals for the company. The company has to follow 
these mandates in order to make its own, more detailed objectives.   
 
In 2004 the Saudi Government announced the establishment of the Electricity & Co-
Generation Regulatory Authority (ECRA). The objectives of this Authority were to 
ensure that supplies of electricity were provided to consumers in the Kingdom were 
adequate, reliable, of a high quality and were priced fairly.   
The ECRA established what it called The Electricity Law in 2006.  The Law is 
 
  Central in the regulation and development of the electricity sector in the 
Kingdom. The general features of the Law cover provision of reliable 
services, protecting consumer’s rights including reasonable prices, while 
protecting the rights of investors in the sector to receive a fair return 
(www.ecra.gov.sa).  
 
 
It is obvious from the above that the establishment of ECRA was an action by the 
Government to move responsibility from the Government to a Regulatory authority to 
enable it to deal with the electricity sector.  Although it would appear that ECRA is now 
doing the same job as the Ministry of Electricity it is nevertheless a positive step toward 
opening up the market and allowing competition.  
 
For SEC the situation is much the same since the Regulating authority is still doing the 
same job as the Ministry with regard to pricing and new projects.  
As one manager in SEC states: 
 
 We were dealing with only the Ministry of Electricity with regard to 
everything, but now since they established the Electricity Authority we 
have now to deal with both of them, the Ministry and the Authority. We 
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know it is a temporary situation until they open up the market. 
(Interviewee D) 
 
 
A second manager at SEC showed his dissatisfaction with the ECRA as he stated: 
 
 
We now have ambitious plans for our company but these plans are 
always faced with the bureaucratic systems of the ECRA and the 
Electricity Ministry. For example, we have a plan to restructure our 
company based on separating the three main organizational Units 
(Generation, Transmission and Distribution) to be companies under the 
Saudi Electricity Company. We also want to have a competitive market 
so we can have different companies, especially in the Generation and 
Distribution sectors. All these plans need hard work and healthy 
environment to attract other private companies. ECRA and the Ministry 
need to have radical changes on: 1) The pricing policies as they need to 
let the market decided the prices so companies can make profit by its 
production not by the support of the government; 2) The Government 
needs to provide opportunities for the Generation sector since it 
monopolizes this sector claiming it is for political and security reasons; 
3) Give us the freedom to run the company in a commercial way. 
(Interviewee A)  
  
The above statement shows how the some of the top managers in the company are not 
satisfied with their relationship with Governmental bodies and are requesting more 
freedom and autonomy. This demonstrates that the SEC is still restricted by rules and 
the Government’s continued significant involvement.  However some of the managers 
are optimistic and think only a few more steps are needed to get the reforms the 
company wants.  (Interviewee H).  
The only positive change in relations with the external environment is with that of the   
Banks.   SEC after privatisation, and particularly in the last three years since 2006, now 
has the ability to negotiate with private banks for loans based on commercial activity.   
However SEC is still only allowed to take this action after gaining the approval from the 
Ministry of Electricity for the project and for the loan. For banks it represents a good 
business opportunity since the Government will implicitly guarantee the company.  
An interviewee from the Saudi Investment Authority stated that: 
 
For anyone who doesn’t know the real situation for the company, SEC 
looks like a very normal private company. In reality, its situation is so 
complicated. You can say it is private and you can say it is governmental. 
For us we recommend any foreign investor who wants to buy shares in 
Saudi stock to buy SEC.   We also recommend them to invest in any 
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project related to electricity such as when, from time to time SEC 
proposes building generation units44 around the country.  
But most of them are always concerned about the influence of the 
Government on the company as well as the lack of competition and free 
market. 
 
The type of project mentioned in the statement above is extremely typical. The 
company is trying to encourage as many private investors as possible to become 
involved in its development plans and help make payback for these projects easier. 
 
5.2.7 Organisational Structure: 
As discussed earlier, until privatization 10 separate companies provided electricity 
services and undertook Government projects. After privatization one of the biggest 
problems facing SEC (which was now only one large company), was that of how to 
restructure the company. Each company from the ten had its own structure and whilst 
on the surface they appeared very similar with regard to job titles and descriptions, they 
were in fact totally different in terms of salaries and qualifications needed for the 
positions.  For example, the East Region Company had the highest salary and it required 
very high qualifications. For this reason, it took SEC three years to come up with a 
proposed final structure for the company (after a several proposed structures and lots of 
rejections from the Ministry and Board of Directors) (Figure 5.6).  
 
At the beginning of 2003, the Board of Directors approved a new organizational 
structure, which was to be phased in gradually.  The design of the structure was based 
on specialized activities such as organizational units, i.e. electricity activities, related 
activities and the supporting services needed to reinforce the overall company 
performance.   
 
During 2003, phases 1 and 2 of this new organizational structure were put into effect; 
sectors and departments were specified and relevant job descriptions were outlined.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 These projects are based on private companies building generation units around the country, SEC 
subsequently agree to buy the power they produce for a certain length time. After the agreed time the 
company then takes over the unit.  
 Figure 5.6 SEC Structure
Sources: SEC Documentations, 2007.
 
 
It can be seen from the figure that SEC had designed its structure based on the services 
they provided, which were Generation, Transmission, and Distribution. However there 
were reservations about the restructure of supporting depar
enormous task of dealing with all three main units.  The proposal now being discussed 
is that the three units should become separate companies, each with its own supporting 
service department.  
 
5.2.8 Cultural Changes:
 
One of the main problems for the public sector enterprises in Saudi Arabia is the 
mindset of its employees. Employees in the public sector suffer from a bureaucratic 
mentality, which resists change and is very slow in accomplishing tasks (Interviewee 
H).  
In addition, due to the reverence paid to engineers by the majority of Saudi society in 
the past (see section 3.5) the electricity sector was dominated for many years by 
engineers in all decision
 
After privatisation, SEC still suffers from the above pr
Government still has very significant control over the company:  key positions in the 
company, namely the top managers (the President and the members of the Board of 
Directors) are still appointed by the Government and most of them 
Government employees. As a result SEC is unable to change the mindset of its 
employees. Since top management shares the same ‘mentality’ as other employees there 
is no initiative for change.
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It was noticeable for the researcher, when visiting the headquarters of SEC that it was a 
Government facility – not in terms of the new offices and other buildings, more in terms 
of the way people dealing with him and how they worked. For instance, emails were 
hardly in evidence in any formal communications, the preference was for paperwork 
which consumed a great deal more time, effort, and money.  
 
Furthermore, SEC still suffers from the domination of engineers over most of key 
positions except the Finance Department.  
This was a worrying aspect for an accountant in SEC who complained about how 
difficult it was to deal with non-financial people: 
 
 
In a lot of times we suffer from misunderstanding between top managers 
and us. They find it so difficult to understand our financial data that we 
provide them with. Most of the time they prefer technical terminology. 
We can’t complain because they are the ones who make the changes as 
and when they want to. (Interviewee G). 
 
 
This is logical since most of the key people in the organisation are engineers. However, 
the situation does seem to be changing on this issue: significant change in Board of 
Director qualifications has now led to approx. 50% of members having finance and 
economics qualifications (Table 5.2). This radical change in structure may encourage 
further change for future employees and the need for more finance and accounting 
oriented qualifications.  
 
Table 5.2 Qualifications of Board of Directors Members on SEC 
Saudi Electricity Company 
No Qualification 
1 B.A in Electrical Engineering in 1982, MSc in Electrical Engineering in 1985, PhD in Electrical 
Engineering 1989 
2 Former president of SEC. 
3 B.A in Electrical Engineering, MSc in Electrical Engineering  
4 B.A in Computer Science in 1990, MSc in Computer Science in 1994, PhD in Computer Science 
1998 
5 B.A in Economics, MSc in Economics in 1980, PhD in Economics 1985 
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6 B.A in Industrial Management in 1982, MSc in Economics in 1993.  
7 B.A in Accountancy in 1981, MSc in Accountancy in 1983. 
8 B.A in Accountancy in 1973, MSc in Public Administration. PhD in Public Administration in 
1981. 
Source: SEC Documentations, 2008.  
 
In addition, one of the main problems with SEC’s is that its employees are less open 
and have the government mentality, which consider all information as a top secret 
information and cannot provide anyone with it. This problem was the main problem that 
faced the research when meeting people in SEC as they gave him access to fewer 
members of staff even the research had a personal and friendship relationships.  
 
5.2.9 Human Resources Development and Reward Systems: 
 
Before privatisation the electricity industry suffered from different problems compared 
to those of telecommunications.  These were overstaffing, qualifications of employees, 
salary, and employees’ performance evaluation (Interviewees B, C, D, & I).  
 
On the issue of overstaffing, SEC since privatisation has had enough autonomy to 
reduce its employees in two ways.  First the company has started to reduce the non-
Saudi employees and replace some of them with Saudi employees. The second is to plan 
to reduce the total number of employees. 
One manager describes the situation of overstaffing as follows: 
 
When the SEC was established, we had duplication of staff and lots of 
people doing the same job. This was understood, as there was more than 
one company. But now we are only one company. (Interviewee C). 
 
 
 The company plans to shed employees by offering them generous compensation 
packages. So far the company has managed to reduce the total number of employees 
from 31000 in 2000 to 27,601 in 2009 (SEC documentation, 2009). 
 
On the issue of employee qualifications, the company has managed to attract some 
qualified employees from different companies, although still mostly engineers. 
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However, the company has been able to attract experienced and qualified employees to 
its headquarters in Riyadh.  
  
One manager described how the lack of suitably qualified finance employees affected 
his region: 
 
When I go to headquarters in Riyadh and see employees there I feel that 
the company has changed. They understand your requests and they can 
translate it financially.  Nevertheless when I come back to my place I see 
the same company that I have known for 20 years. People here are same. 
(Interviewee I) 
 
 
To try and improve the situation SEC has plans to improve the level of its financial 
employees around the country. It has started with staffing at its headquarters and is now 
moving out to its regions (Interviewee A). As highlighted in Table 5.2 earlier, change in 
educational profiles has reached Board of Director level with now almost 50% of 
members possessing Business related qualifications.  
 
When privatisation took a place SEC also had a very major problem regarding 
employees’ salaries.  Some regional companies had considerably higher salaries for 
people in similar positions compared to others e.g. employees in the Eastern company 
earned more than double compared to their counterparts who were doing the same job 
in the Southern company.  This issue took over two years to resolve and for the 
company to come up with a new salary system that satisfied all its employees 
(Interviewee I). 
 
One manager commented that: 
 
Before privatisation, as an employee at SEC, all that was needed was to 
come to work, do what you were asked to do, and it didn’t make any 
difference if you did it sooner or later.  All that mattered was to be nice 
to your superiors, stay in your job and hope that you would get 
promoted. (Interviewee I)  
 
The above statement describes the situation in SEC before the privatisation. 
Unfortunately this situation still predominates.  Interviewees I, G, D & B complained 
that it was all about relationships with superiors. 
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From the above, it is clear that there are no clear performance evaluation indicators for 
SEC’s employees.  Reasons for this are (i) there are no clear and specific goals and 
objectives for each employee and (ii) the old Government mentality remains in the 
regional branches of SEC.  
 
 
5.3 Summary: 
 
This chapter aimed to explore the changes in aspects of the MACS in both privatised 
Saudi companies, STC and SEC. This chapter used the aspects of MACS presented by 
Uddin (1997) and Ferreira (2002) and the three elements of organisational context t 
provided by Flamholz, Das and Tsui (1985). These aspects and elements were used as 
the basis of all interviews with all managers and accountants. 
 
This chapter found that both companies responded to privatisation and MACS in both 
companies have changed. It was clear that MACS in STC had positive changes and had 
improved dramatically. On the other hand, MACS’s response in SEC to privatisation 
was weak, and changes in its MACS were very limited. 
 
The next chapter will discuss the reasons other than privatisation that affected MACS in 
the two Saudi privatised companies. The discussion in the next chapter will compare e 
aspects of MACS in both companies in order to identify the differences between them. 
Then the factors that have had an impact on MACS will be presented. 
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Chapter Six: Discussion 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a discussion of the key findings from chapter 5 and a critical 
analysis of the secondary documents provided by the STC and SEC with regard to their 
management accounting control systems. The discussion is guided by the research 
objectives that were set out in chapter four. Based on the findings of this study, the 
chapter also presents a model of the factors that affect the MACS and presents 
suggested changes that privatized companies should take to improve the efficiency of 
their MACS. 
 
 
6.1 Changes in Both Companies Due to Privatization: 
 
As we discussed in earlier chapters, Uddin (1997) provided a model of five aspects that 
were intrinsic to any management accounting control system. Specifically these were: 
(1) organizational objectives; (2) budgetary processes; (3) incentive systems; (4) 
accounting systems; (5) effectiveness. Ferreria (2002) added a further two aspects that 
were intrinsic to the MACS, viz. (1) the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) and (2) costing 
systems. 
These above direct aspects were investigated alongside the three elements of 
organizational context identified by Flamholz, Daz and Tsui (1985) (organizational 
structure, organizational culture, and external environment) in this research. 
 
All three sets of researchers claimed that there would be changes to these aspects as 
organizations moved from public to private status. Although this research originally 
used the 10 aspects as a framework, as a result of the research, the findings showed that 
other factors also contributed to the changes identified. 
In particular, the influence of competition (growing competition in the marketplace), the 
changing relationship between accountants and engineers, and the extent to which 
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government restrictions were eased had considerable influence on the extent of change 
within the two respective organizations’ MACS. 
 
The discussion now will turn to comparing the findings from both organizations 
regarding each of the 10 aspects mentioned. The format throughout is to examine the 
effects of change of ownership (privatization) in management accounting control 
systems in both privatized Saudi companies STC and SEC and subsequently identify the 
reasons for the differences between the two companies in terms of their development (if 
any differences exist). 
 
6.1.1 Organizational Objectives: 
 
Before privatization both STC and SEC had key objectives that were formulated and set 
by the government, based predominantly on social and political factors and with very 
little consideration to commercial factors. 
 
After privatization STC had autonomy in setting its own objectives and these were 
based on clear and achievable commercial outcomes. Significantly, management at all 
levels was involved in this objective setting process. According to the employees that 
were interviewed, the reasons for this autonomy and inclusion in the decision making 
process was the existence of competition, as competition forced the company to work in 
a commercial way. According to interviewee (I)  
 
For the company to survive in a competitive market it should function on 
commercial bases which means starting first with setting up achievable 
commercial objectives. 
 
  
In addition, another reason was the reduction of government involvement in the 
company’s policies and systems. One of the interviewees (D) explained that 
governmental employees in Saudi Arabia couldn’t think commercially. He stated  
 
 When we were government, all people were concerned was with 
pleasing the government by achieving its political and social objectives. 
Also people were bureaucratic and slow in the decision-making process. 
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At the same time, however, in SEC the main key objectives were still set by the 
government. The major difference was that in SEC the government still had huge 
involvement in the company, specifically due to the social and political importance of 
providing electricity to the nation: whereas people could hypothetically do without 
telephones and computers in Saudi Arabia, a continued supply of electricity was 
considered essential. In addition the ‘nature of the sector’ encouraged the government to 
free the telecommunication sector and monopolize the electricity sector. It can be 
argued that the technologies of telecommunication make the sector competitive in its 
nature and cannot be monopolized. 
 
However, in terms of future developments and based on a press statement from the 
Minister of the Electricity, the government now has plans to open the market for other 
companies to invest in the electricity sector (Alriyadh Newspaper, 2010). This will 
force the government to ease its influence in SEC by allowing it autonomy in setting its 
own objectives to maintain a competitive position. 
 
6.1.2 Budgetary Processes: 
 
Before privatization the government prepared budgets for both organizations; however, 
these budgets did not reflect the real financial situation of the companies and were not 
used for internal control purposes.  For example, budgets could not be offered as 
supporting documents to banks to get loans since they did not present a true financial 
picture.  
 
After privatization, STC, as a result of setting its goals and objectives, had full 
autonomy to set its own budgets. Budgetary processes are now seen as a useful tool for 
management control within the company. In addition budgets in STC are used to help 
the company identify responsibility and accountability in each department since the 
directors of departments are directly involved in setting them.  
 
SEC on the other hand, still has to gain final approval from the government since in 
most projects the government still provides the funding and maintains responsibility for 
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initiating any new projects.  This is an indication of the continuing huge involvement of 
government in SEC and its policies. 
 
6.1.3 Incentive Systems: 
 
Before privatization both STC and SEC had incentive systems based on wage structures 
that were imposed by the government. Employee performance evaluation was 
bureaucratically based and depended more on personal relationships and time spent in 
the workplace than on effectiveness. These problems created a lack of creativity and 
incentives for improvement in both organizations. 
 
After privatization, and as a direct result of the autonomy given to the company from 
the government to set its own systems and policies, STC changed its salary and 
promotional structure to one based on employee performance and educational 
background.  Employees were therefore motivated to become more creative and 
concerned about achieving the goals of their departments and the company in general.  
In turn, the company was now keen to attract well-qualified people into the company. 
Whilst the autonomy that was given was a direct result of a more competitive 
marketplace, the response from employees meant that the company was able to maintain 
and improve its competitive position. 
 
On the other hand, SEC still remains in a governmental wage structure, with promotion 
very much based on personal relationships as a direct result of the government’s 
continuing involvement in company policy. Thus SEC continues to be run by 
government employees with a public sector mindset, caring only about:  
 
 
Coming to work, doing what you were asked to do regardless of the 
efficiency, time, and cost of it, and making your superiors happy 
(interviewee, I).  
 
 
This attitude can be linked directly to an absence of clear objectives for employees and 
unclear personal targets. 
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6.1.4 Accounting System: 
 
Before privatization both STC and SEC had accounting systems based on government 
regulations with the sole purpose of ensuring that the money had been spent as agreed 
by the government. 
 
After privatization STC changed its accounting system to a more commercial basis in 
order to provide other functions such as control and decision-making. The company 
changed from cash to an accruals base, as Saudi Commercial Law requires it.  
 
In addition, accounting information in STC changed to contain both financial and non-
financial information and was used for multiple purposes such as performance 
evaluation and control purposes. Information subsequently included in internal reports 
had more of financial basis than before privatization, such as ‘the cost or the benefit of a 
new station’ used to be, whereas it used to be more engineering based information, such 
as ‘the capacity of a new station’. This was due to changes in the personnel preparing 
reports and those who subsequently used them, i.e., the decision makers, as the 
company experienced the growing involvement of accountants and finance employees 
in the preparation of reports compared to that of engineers.   
Furthermore, because of the autonomy that STC had, it became a self-funding company, 
able to initiate new projects and use up-to-date techniques for investment appraisal. 
 
Post-privatization SEC, on the other hand, changed its accounting system to an accrual 
basis since it was required by Saudi Company Law in its capacity as a joint stock 
company to prepare its accounts in this way. However the company still suffers from 
huge accounts receivable, and weak performance evaluation indicators with little use of 
non-financial indicators.  In addition it still has to gain approval from government for 
any major projects since, in most instances, they still initiate and fund these projects.    
 
All of the above problems indicate the continuing involvement of the government in 
SEC policy making.  However, if the market was opened up, these could be solved, as 
with STC and competition as a driving force for change.  Nevertheless, in SEC 
engineers still prepare most of the internal reports since the key decision makers using 
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this information are still engineers. This gives an indication of the continuing 
relationship between accountants and engineers where engineers are still the more 
powerful.  
 
6.1.5 Effectiveness: 
 
Before privatization both STC and SEC measurements of effectiveness were based on 
their achievement of governmental goals and objectives and not profitability; use of 
sophisticated performance evaluation indicators was limited. 
 
After privatization STC based its effectiveness on measuring profitability and used 
more sophisticated performance evaluation indicators containing financial and non-
financial indicators (for example, NPV and customer satisfaction surveys). Once again, 
autonomy and a competitive marketplace were the driving factors for this change.  
 
SEC remains in same position as before privatization with little improvement in its 
financial performance evaluation indicators. The company is still measured partly by 
achieving government objectives and partly by achieving its own company objectives, 
due to the mix of its objectives as discussed earlier in (6.1.1). For example, SEC was 
asked sometimes by the government to provide services to non-profitable areas and the 
company would be measured on its achievement of this target, even if it was not 
profitable.  
 
6.1.6 Balanced Scorecard: 
 
Before privatization both STC and SEC were following government policies and 
directions, which did not include use of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). 
 
Since privatization, which to re-iterate led to increased autonomy and motivation, STC 
has now adopted sophisticated and up-to-date systems such as BSC.  These have now 
provided the company with more effective techniques for performance evaluation of 
employees and their activities; in addition, the company now has a specific BSC 
department. STC considered BSC as a clear and sophisticated system that would help 
the company to measure employees’ performance as well as company performance. The 
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BSC uses clear financial and non-financial techniques for that purposes and “it is great 
system that you can cascade within the company department easily and clearly. It is a 
very good American system” (Interviewee, 1).  
 
On the other hand, and at the time of the case study interviews, which took place in 
early 2008, only one person within the financial department in SEC knew what BSC 
meant. This gave the researcher insight into the type of person still working at SEC at 
that time: someone with a bureaucratic, government-based frame of mind, lacking in 
motivation for self-development and still following government directives. 
 
However, of interest is an announcement by the Minister of Electricity in early 2010 
that his ministry is now planning to open the sector for competition and allow foreign 
investors to enter the market by 2015 (Alriyadh Newspaper, 2010).  
In turn this announcement was quickly followed by the President of SEC stating that his 
company was planning to adopt BSC as a comprehensive system for the company 
starting from late 2010, with a date for completion of 2014, thus providing a sound 
indication that pressures of competition are forcing the company to seek the most 
appropriate systems to improve performance and control processes.  
 
 
6.1.7 Costing System: 
 
As a result of privatization, and therefore the ability to set its own service pricing levels, 
STC has had the motivation to improve its costing system and use more sophisticated 
methods.  In consequence the company has changed its system from using a traditional 
approach to adopting ABC, enabling the company to provide more accurate cost 
information for decision-making and controlling company activities. 
 
SEC, on the other hand, lacks the motivation to improve its costing system as the 
government still sets prices for the company’s services and will cover the difference if 
costs exceed selling price.  
 
This continued involvement of government in company policy is still causing lack of 
motivation for improving SEC’s costing system, using the system as a tool for 
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managing employee performance and company activity in the marketplace, and still 
results in a decision making process based on inaccurate information. 
 
6.1.8 Organizational Structure: 
 
Before privatization, structures in both STC and SEC reflected the government’s 
philosophy of providing services regardless of cost and levels of profitability. For 
example interviewee (I) stated that: 
 
When we were government, we were forced to provide services to small 
villages without any profitability just on the premise that it was 
government policy to do so. 
 
Moreover, it was noticeable that neither organization had a strategic planning or costing 
department, since plans came from the government and costing calculations were the 
job of a ministry official and not a company employee. 
 
Since privatization, STC has changed its structure three times as a result of changes in 
the company’s main objectives. It can be seen that the first structure was based on the 
geographical areas that the companies serve and it was a temporary structure, as the 
government did not have by that time clear objectives. The second structure was based 
on the changes in the objectives and vision of the company, which was focused on its 
product range. The last structure was based on the new philosophy and objectives of the 
company, which were based on attracting customers. 
 
These changes have had a direct effect on the reporting process and on the 
responsibility and accountability of departments. This is a reflection of the company’s 
ability to change its philosophy and objectives as a result of volatility in the 
marketplace. 
 
After privatization, although SEC modified its structure based on the services it 
provided (Generation, Transmission, Distribution), it did not undergo major structural 
change because the company lacked the motivation to improve its structure as the 
government still set the company’s main objectives.  Interestingly one interviewee (B) 
claimed that the changes in structure at SEC were merely a “renaming” of positions.  As 
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an example he cited the position of the company President, which used to be occupied 
by the Deputy of the Minister and named as the Deputy Electricity Minister; the name 
was subsequently changed to be just that of ‘President’ with the same job description 
and duties.   
 
It is worth noting from this case study that changes in structure are a result of changes in 
the organization’s objectives because of privatization. The relationship in this issue can 
be described as in Figure 6.1 The Relationship between Privatisation, Organisation, and 
Structure. This can clarify that changes in organizational structure are a response to 
privatization in general and changes in organizational objectives specifically. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The Relationship between Privatisation, Organisation, and Structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.9 Organizational Culture: 
 
Before privatization a government culture prevailed which meant that employees 
regarded customers as secondary to their own interests and working environment. In 
addition, working relationships were based on families, tribes and personal friendship 
and the effectiveness of these relationships resulted in promotion or non-promotion. In 
addition, a public sector mentality prevailed which meant that employees’ main concern 
was pleasing their superiors regardless of the cost and timing of their achievements. 
Furthermore this public sector mentality considered all information as highly classified 
governmental information and they worked in a very bureaucratic environment.   
 
After privatization STC made a conscious effort to change the organization’s culture by 
providing training courses and seminars to educate employees into the ‘new way’ (of 
non-governmental reliance). If employees resisted change, a ‘Golden Cheque’ was 
given to the person in question and usually he would be replaced with someone willing 
to adapt to the new culture. It is noticeable that the company was forced to change the 
Privatisation Organisation Structure 
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attitude of its employees in response to a very competitive market by employing more 
people from accounting and business backgrounds.  
 
On the other hand, SEC still suffered from a governmental mindset; government still 
had control over the company and therefore the attitude was that there was no need for 
change. This was the main problem that the researcher faced in collecting data on SEC, 
because of the remaining public sector mindset of SEC employees. Employees of SEC 
work in a very bureaucratic environment and they consider all information as secret 
government data. However, it should be noted that there was noticeable increase of the 
number of people who have an accounting and business background but top managers 
and decision makers are still engineers. 
 
It is worth noting from this case study that changes in organizational culture can be a 
result of an organization’s effort to change its employees’ culture and a result of 
changes in objectives, employees’ educational background, changes in the incentives 
system, and changes in the external environment. Therefore the relationship between 
organization and its culture can be described as a dual relationship, as both would be 
affected by privatization and would have an effect on each other (Figure 6.2). 
 
 
Figure 6.2 the Relationship between Privatisation, Organisation, and Culture 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Privatisation 
Organisational 
Culture 
Organisation 
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6.1.10 External Environment: 
 
Before privatization both STC and SEC were part of the government and both were 
only following government regulations especially those of the related ministry and the 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
After privatization the Saudi government had to eliminate the Ministry of 
Telecommunication. After that and at same time as allowing competition in the sector, 
the government created a regulatory body with specific and clear requirements for STC 
and other telecoms companies. This regulatory body was called the Telecommunication 
Agency and had the main objective of providing fair competition in the market. The 
amount of information that the agency requires is less than before with the Ministry and 
it is more specific and more related to the purpose of the agency, which is to provide a 
fair market.  Moreover STC now has to deal with different stakeholders such as 
shareholders and investors. Each one of those stakeholders requires different 
information, which has an impact on the reporting systems, costing systems, and 
accounting systems. For example, reports required by banks should provide different 
information than reports provided for shareholders. In addition, STC after privatisation 
has to follow the requirements of Saudi Commercial Law as the company now is a joint 
stock company. 
 
After privatisation the situation in SEC did not change in relation to governmental 
agencies. It is noticeable that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Electricity still 
have huge involvement in the SEC. For example, they set the prices of services and they 
have full access to all financial documents in SEC at any time. However the government 
has established a new agency to organise the electricity sector and reduce the 
involvement of the Ministry of Electricity, but this resulted in increasing the job that 
SEC has to do to satisfy both the Ministry and the Agency which consumes more time 
and cost. Both the Ministry and the Agency are considered as government, but they 
have different objectives as the government’s concern is to provide the service equally 
to all Saudi people and the agency’s concern is to organise the sector and make sure that 
it can be profitable, so as to be ready for competition. This resulted in conflicts about 
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what SEC has to achieve, either provide the service equally to all people or try to be 
profitable.  
SEC for shareholders and investors is like “investing your money with the government. 
It is guarantee that you won’t lose it” (Interviewee, I). This has a positive impact on the 
relationship with banks, as it makes it easier for SEC to obtain loan finance for new 
projects, as banks would consider it as lending to the government. The involvement and 
protection of the government prevents the company from having enough motivation to 
improve its systems and techniques. However, it is expected that this situation would 
change as the government is planning to open the sector to competition.  
SEC after privatisation is considered as a joint stock company that must follow the 
Saudi Commercial Law. This can indicate that SEC’s external environment has changed 
but it has not changed as much as STC’s. 
 
It is worth noting from this case study that the entry of privatization into the sector 
would cause changes to the external environment. These changes to the external 
environment would have an effect on the privatized organization. In other words, 
changes in organization would be a result of changes in the external environment 
because of privatization (Figure 6.3). 
 
 
Figure 6.3 the Relationship between Privatisation, Organisation, and External 
Environment 
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6.2 Other Factors that have an effect on MACS: 
 
 
From the above, it can be seen that STC has experienced a dramatic change in the 
aspects of its MACS, whilst the changes in SEC were very limited. Both companies are 
located and working in the same country and both of them has been through the same 
changes in ownership status, namely privatization, but they experienced very different 
levels of change. Indeed it should be noted that the government remains the majority 
shareholder in both companies, showing that the level of state ownership is not the most 
important variable.  
 
The results of the case study showed that privatization has a positive impact on MACS, 
but that it cannot inevitably work effectively and efficiently on its own. The study 
showed that organizations need, beside privatization, an interaction of other factors that 
can change MACS and lead to more efficiency and effectiveness. This study found out 
that there were three main factors that affected the level of changes in the MACS of the 
two Saudi companies after privatization. These three factors are: competition, the 
degree of involvement of the government, and the relationship between engineers and 
accountants (Figure 6.6).  
 
It is notable that there is a key element that is common to all the factors that have 
impact on changes in MACS which is the people who are behind those changes. The 
main step for successful privatisation was the choice of qualified and suitable members 
of Board of Directors who are prepared to allow change and understand the needs for 
changes and how to make it happen. The kind of directors, consultants, and experts who 
are going to recommend and execute the changes and can run the company after 
privatisation in a very competitive environment is very important. The changes in 
organisational culture and structure are around employees and their ability to accept the 
changes and be accountable for the work. One of the three factors that affect MACS is 
the balance of power between accountants and engineers and how those people are 
qualified, responsible, and authorised to initiate and allow the changes in MACS.  
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This can be seen clearly at SEC as the people who are on the Board of Directors and 
serve as high-level managers still have a public sector mentality. Those people resist 
changes and run the company as a public sector enterprise, which prevents positive 
changes to MACS. 
 
As we discussed earlier, SEC has experienced very limited changes in its MACS, as 
there were few factors that motivated the company to respond to changes in its 
ownership status. In the situation of the Electricity Sector there was a total absence of 
competition as the only company that worked in the sector was SEC. In addition, the 
Saudi government exercised major influence on the company’s policies and objectives. 
Moreover, engineers were the most powerful managers in the company and most of the 
decision makers were engineers (Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4 Factors that affect MACS at SEC 
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On the other hand, one of the first steps in the privatisation of STC was changing people 
in high positions. This helped the company to initiate changes in its MACS and improve 
them.   
It can be said that STC has noticeable positive changes in its MACS, as there was 
dramatic application of the factors that motivated the company to respond to changes in 
ownership status. In the situation of Telecommunications Sector there are now three 
other companies that function in the sector, which makes the environment very 
competitive. In addition, there is very limited involvement of the Saudi government on 
STC policies and objectives and the role of the government has changed from a decision 
maker to become more of a regulator. Moreover, accountants are more powerful than 
managers in the company and most of the decision makers are accountants and finance 
employees (Figure 6.5). 
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Figure 6.5 Factors that affect MACS at STC 
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Combining the results from the two companies SEC and STC Figure 6.6 presents the 
model that this study concludes with. The model shows that the three elements of 
organization context can affect and be affected by the seven aspects of MACS as was 
argued by Flamholz, Daz, and Tsui (1985), Uddin (1997), and Ferreria (2002). In 
addition all aspects would be affected by privatization alone (Uddin, 1997; and Ferreria, 
2002). But this study adds another three additional factors that would affect MACS, 
which are: competition, government involvement, and the relationships and balance of 
power between accountants and engineers.  
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Figure 6.6 Factors that affect MACS 
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6.2.1 Competition: 
 
It was clear from the previous discussion that competition had a positive impact on 
STC. Opening the market was the motive for STC to change its objectives to be more 
commercial, change its budgetary process and use it as a control tool, attract more 
qualified employees and measure their performance based on achievement of their 
objectives. Competition was the motivation for STC to change its accounting system 
and overcome all its accounting problems. This can be noticed from when the company 
had problems with the government in accounts receivable and accounts payable before 
privatization. These problems remained the same after privatization but when the 
competition entered the sector the government was forced to find a solution for this 
problem by dealing with STC as an independent private company. Moreover, STC 
established a small division within the financial department called the forecasting 
division, which is concerned with market forecasts. This division was created after 
competition entered the sector and it is, as one interviewee stated (Interviewee, 8), that 
without competition STC would not make any market forecasts. Competition led STC 
to apply up-to-date and sophisticated systems that can improve the performance of the 
company and keep it competitive such as ABC and BSC. This supports what Kaplan 
and Norton (1996b) argued about companies’ need to use measurement and 
management systems derived from their strategies and capabilities, if they want to 
survive in a competitive market. Competition forced STC to attract more qualified 
accounting and business professionals to enable the company to compete in the market. 
Competition forced STC attempt to change the beliefs and attitudes of its employees to 
be more market focused.  
 
On the other hand, SEC still runs in a monopoly sector, which removes from the 
company the strong motivation which competition brings. During the data collection for 
this study the researcher noticed the importance of competition as a motivation for 
improving systems and processes. This derived from the frequently given answer that 
the researcher received when he asked about the reason for not changing; the answer 
was “Why should we change? We are happy as we are”. This indicates the lack of 
motivation for change. In addition, it is noticeable that when the government announced 
that it would open the sector to other companies, SEC announced that the company 
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would apply BSC as a comprehensive system for measuring the performance of the 
company and its employees. 
 
The relationship between competition and the two Saudi companies STC and SEC 
matches the claims of Aharoni (1991), who argued that the improvement of efficiency 
in an organization is more likely to be the result of a strengthening of the influence of 
market forces than of changes in ownership. He claimed that privatization alone, 
without the introduction of competition, may simply transform a public monopoly into 
a private monopoly and this is exactly the situation with SEC.  Moreover, Conrad 
(1999) argued that once privatization is introduced in a country, competition should be 
introduced as well. This contrasts with the results of this study, as the 
telecommunication sector kept its monopoly status for almost 5 years after 
privatization and the electricity sector is still a monopoly, which means that it is not 
inevitable that the existence of privatization brings competition to the market. Bringing 
competition to the market can be the result of the reduction of the degree of the 
government involvement in the market, which will be discussed under the following 
subheading. 
 
6.2.2 Government Involvement: 
 
When the Saudi government privatized STC, but before allowing competition into the 
sector, it reduced its regulatory requirements and allowed more autonomy to the 
company. This reduction in regulation was greater after competition was allowed. This 
resulted in having clear and commercially based objectives for the company, autonomy 
in preparing budgets and using them for control purposes, creating a new incentive 
system based on employees’ performance, allowing changes in the accounting systems 
and making it possible for the company to deal with the government as a normal 
customer and shareholder, autonomy in setting the prices for its services, which led to 
the introduction of sophisticated costing systems, using comprehensive and 
sophisticated performance measurements techniques and systems such as BSC. The 
reduction in government involvement allowed the company to respond to the changes in 
the market and provide the company with the motivation to change its structure to be 
more market responsive three times, and gave the company the flexibility to adopt new 
systems and provide new services and initiate new projects.  
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On the other hand, SEC still suffers from the huge involvement of the government in 
the way the company is run. This prevents the company from having the motivation to 
improve itself. This was noticeable when the researcher did his data collection on SEC, 
when he found most of the employees seeking to keep the government happy by just 
following orders without thinking creatively or trying to improve themselves. The 
remaining involvement of the government in the SEC contrasts with the argument that 
was initiated by Uddin (1997), when he claimed that privatization would reduce 
government involvement in company policies, whereas it supports the claims of Jones 
and Pendlebury (1988) that the involvement of government in setting organizational 
objectives leads to conflicts between the organization’s and the government’s objectives 
which consequently reduce the speed of improving the aspects of MACS. The 
involvement of the government restrains the organization from improving its financial 
systems and attracting more accountants and financial employees, which leads to an 
uneven power relationship between accountants and engineers, which will be discussed 
under the following subheading.  
 
It can be argued that the reduction of government involvement can be considered as a 
result of competition. The situation of STC can be considered as evidence of that, as 
once the company faced real competition, it had to have more autonomy and, for 
example, had to sort out its huge receivable accounts relating to the government and 
“special people”, as the company could not otherwise be competitive.  
In most Less Developed Countries competition entered the sector as a result of the 
pressure of other countries and the World Bank to allow privatization and improve the 
economy (Uddin, 1997). Therefore, the reduction of the government involvement would 
be a result of competition. Nevertheless in the case of Saudi Arabia, which had no 
outside pressure for privatization, the government was willing to reduce its involvement 
and allow competition into the country. 
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6.2.3 Accountants vs. Engineers: 
 
The change in the kind of information that was provided in control reports in STC was a 
result of changes in the people who prepare them and the people who use them 
(decision makers). Before privatization most of the reports that were prepared by 
engineers used very technical engineering language and terminology without paying 
attention to financial concepts such as the cost and the revenues of the services or the 
station, for example. This information should be now after privatization in a financial 
format even if it is engineering information (Interviewee, 11). Most engineering 
managers had had courses on financial reports and have at least one financial employee 
in their department.  
In STC after privatization, there is more reliance on accounting and financial 
information rather than an engineers and technical information. For example, the 
concern about the technical engineering terms of services and the description of the new 
station that will be established were changed to be more concerned about the cost and 
revenue of the new services and the cost of the new station and its revenues. This 
reflects the power that accountants and finance people now have within the company. 
This resulted from the changes in the structure and manpower in the organization. For 
example, the Board of Directors changed from 100% engineers and governmental 
employees to a majority of accountants and businessmen. 
 
On the other hand, in the SEC the majority of the members of the Board of Directors are 
still engineers or governmental employees. This affects the ability of the company’s 
decision makers to understand any proposed changes in the MACS, especially any new 
system or techniques. 
 
Another interesting issue is that as one of the interviewees (Interviewee, B) claimed: 
 
Sometime I wish I were an engineer in this company. People here do not 
know what sort of job we do, and how important it is. But if you are a 
new engineer they will respect you and you have great personal 
relationship within the company. 
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The above statement reflects the respect for engineers over accountants that lead to the 
company following engineers’ requests rather than accountants’. This can be a reason 
for sometimes rejecting changes proposed by accountants. An example for that was the 
reaction of all managers that were interviewed in this study about BSC as no one except 
one accountant new about it. 
 
 
6.3 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented a discussion of the major findings of this study derived from 
the qualitative findings and from internal reports and other secondary documents 
provided by the two Saudi privatised companies, STC and SEC, with regard to their 
management accounting control systems. The discussion is guided by the research 
objectives that were set out in chapter four. Based on the findings of this study, the 
chapter presents a model of the factors that affect MACS and suggests changes that 
privatized companies should take to improve the efficiency of their MACS. 
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Chapter Seven: Summary and Conclusion 
Introduction 
The research presented in the preceding chapters comprises an analytical study of 
changes in Management Accounting Control Systems (MACS). The intention of this 
study was to conduct a thorough examination of the changes on MACS in two 
privatised organisations in Saudi Arabia.  
 
In recent years the MACS has attracted considerable interest, in practice as well as in 
theory. A great deal of literature on the MACS concept and its relationship to changes 
in ownership status (such as privatisation) has been published. Several surveys and 
studies indicate that the MACS have changed because of privatisation, but as 
privatisation is a new concept in developing countries such as Saudi Arabia, this 
research was designed to investigate the impact of privatisation on MACS in Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
To address these issues, the following research objectives were developed: 
 
6 To investigate the nature of change in management control systems in the 
two post-privatisation Saudi companies; 
7 To determine the factors other than privatisation that led changes in the 
management accounting control systems in the selected companies; 
8 To examine whether privatisation improved management accounting control 
systems or not; 
9 To examine the impact of cultural, political and structural factors on the 
changes in the management control systems of Saudi privatised companies; 
10 To propose recommendations drawn from the findings relating to Saudi 
privatised companies that might assist the government of Saudi Arabia when 
it privatises another organisation. 
 
209 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a review and conclusion of the entire thesis. The 
chapter summarises the main findings from the research and sets out conclusions, which 
can be drawn in each of the main areas. It also provides recommendations that might be 
of interest and assistance not only to the organisations studied but also to other 
organisations and governments, in bringing about improvements in management 
accounting control systems and sets out the contribution to the advancement of 
knowledge together with opportunities for further research. It also acknowledges the 
limitations of this study. 
 
7.1 Summary of Thesis Content 
This section summarises in turn the contents of each of the chapters of the thesis.  
 
Chapter One presented an overview of the area of the study, research objectives and 
questions, methodological framework, importance and organisation of the thesis. The 
chapter presented several reasons for conducting this study. The most important reason 
was the lack of empirical literature and clear understanding of management accounting 
control systems in privatised Saudi Arabian companies. Hence, the thesis bridges the 
gap between theory and practice since this is the first major study ever to focus on 
MACS and changes that have taken place in them as a result of privatisation in the 
context of Saudi Arabia. It also investigates what other factors might have also 
influenced those changes.  
 
Chapter Two provided an overview of the setting of the study, i.e. Saudi Arabia, and 
discussed the geography, demography and governance of Saudi Arabia and reviewed its 
business environment by looking at the major economic developments affecting it. The 
chapter examined the reasons behind the recent privatisation programme and its 
implementation. The chapter examined other experiences in some developed and less 
developed countries to investigate similarities or differences as bases for comparison. 
The chapter concluded that because of the special situation of Saudi Arabia as a less 
developed but rich country with a reasonably developed economy, this thesis would not 
expect the Saudi Arabian experience to mirror that of any other country. 
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Chapter Three gave a detailed explanation of management accounting control systems, 
and the impact of privatisation on MACS. It started by giving a general introduction to 
the concept of MACS followed by an explanation of the framework for MACS. The 
chapter explored the relationship between privatisation and MACS, it defined the 
aspects of MACS and explained the impact of privatisation on these aspects, and then it 
set out the changes that would be expected to occur in MACS in privatised 
organisations in Saudi Arabia. The literature revealed that privatisation would change 
MACS in any organisation; however some believed that privatisation alone would not 
change the MACS without the interaction of the three elements of organisational 
context which are the external environment, organisational culture, and organisational 
structure. The chapter examined in detail the changes that might be expected to occur in 
each aspect of the ten management accounting control systems’ aspects.  
 
Chapter Four reviewed and discussed some of the research design and methodology 
issues that researchers need to deal with. Additionally, it attempted to explain briefly the 
features of qualitative research and to justify the adoption of the triangulation strategy, 
combining the qualitative and documentation examination approaches to the collection 
and analysis of the data. It explained the advantages and disadvantages of the case study 
approach. In the case study of STC and SEC, in-depth interviews were conducted with 
top-level and other mid-level managers in different departments, providing data on their 
experiences and ideas concerning these particular issues. The validity and reliability of 
this study were discussed in some depth in this chapter. Internal validity and reliability 
were strengthened by using triangulation to minimise the weaknesses of the data 
collection methods.  
 
Chapter Five provided a detailed description of the qualitative data collected. Changes 
that have occurred in the ten aspects of MACS in the two Saudi Arabian privatised 
companies were reviewed in each company separately.  
 
Chapter Six provided a critical discussion and analysis of the qualitative data that were 
described in chapter five. The chapter compared the changes in MACS in the two 
companies to identify the differences and explore the factors that influence the degree of 
change. Factors that affect MACS other than privatisation were examined. A model 
(Figure 6.4) of the factors that affect the MACS in privatised companies has been 
developed. 
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7.2 Main Findings 
Objective 1 set out to investigate the nature of changes in management accounting 
control systems in the two privatised Saudi companies (STC and SEC).  
The analysis of qualitative interviews with the top, middle, and low levels of managers 
and the examination of the company’s documentation showed that although the same 
government owned both companies, both of the companies were partly privatised to 
almost the same percentage, and both of them work in same political and social 
environment, there was a big difference in the level of changes in MACS in the two 
companies after privatisation.  
Changes in STC were positively dramatic, and obvious in all aspects of MACS. On the 
other hand, the changes at SEC were very limited. For example there had been little 
change in some aspects of MACS such as setting the organisation’s objectives and the 
budgetary process, and there were not any changes in some aspects of MACS such as 
the costing system and use of the BSC.  
 
 
Objective 2 set out to clarify the factors other than privatisation that led to 
changes in the MACS in the selected privatised Saudi companies.  
The analysis of interviews and documentation from both companies reveals that 
privatisation cannot be on its own the only factor that motivates changes in MACS. The 
study found that there are another three factors working together to improve MACS in 
any privatised company. These factors are: competition, government involvement, and 
the relationship between accounting and managers.  
The key observation on these factors is that the first two have to be brought about by the 
government, as organisations cannot do so. It can be argued that once the government 
allows competition, it has to ease its restrictions on the privatised company, as 
governmental bodies cannot by their nature compete with private sector companies, 
especially when big international firms enter the market, as these private companies 
have the ability to respond quickly to market changes, whereas governments usually 
operate in a bureaucratic way. In addition government has to provide privatised 
companies with autonomy, as these companies have to have effective and sophisticated 
212 
 
accounting systems to clarify their costs, prices, and revenues in order to be competitive 
in the market.  
The third factor is the result of allowing competition into the market and consequently 
the easing of the government restrictions. Privatised companies would be more 
commercial and more focused on profitability and as a result of that, the companies 
would pay a great attention to the kind of staff that they employ to include more people 
from a business and accounting background. This was the case of STC once the 
competition entered the Saudi Telecoms sector. Nevertheless it has to be mentioned that 
the Saudi government is the main shareholder and when it allowed competition to enter 
the market, it also appointed new members on the Board of Directors and increased the 
number of accountants and businessmen. Engineers are still the majority on the Board 
of Directors of SEC, in addition to the absence of competition and the huge involvement 
of the government in company policies. 
 
 
The issues raised by Objective 3 examine whether privatisation improves 
management accounting control systems or not.  
From the findings of this case study on Saudi Arabia, it can be said that privatisation for 
STC was a crucial step in improving MACS. It helped to establish a new regime of 
financial and accounting discipline using private sector accounting techniques that 
emphasised annual reports and their accompanying audit report, accrual accounting, 
implementation of corporate strategy, better use of budgets, and the introduction of 
financial management and information systems such as ABC and the BSC. Privatisation 
facilitated organisational environment and cultural change, from a highly bureaucratic 
structure to a more autonomous one, and from an engineering culture with an emphasis 
on physical production to a commercial culture.  
On the other hand, the privatisation of SEC did not achieve the same level of change, as 
SEC lacked the motivation that arises from the existence of competition and suffered 
from the continuing huge involvement of the government in the company’s policies, and 
the dominant role of engineers over accountants. From that, it can be said that 
privatisation on its own cannot change MACS positively. It can be argued that 
privatisation can be a motivation to encourage government to help companies to 
improve their MACS. The government can provide encouragement by allowing 
competition into the sector that has been privatised, and by easing the restrictions on 
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privatised companies; these would lead the privatised companies to provide accountants 
and business background people with power in their relationships with engineers.  
This can be said to be the situation of less developed country such as Saudi Arabia as 
the government always control most economic aspects within the country and provides 
all services and production to people, which makes them depend on the government for 
everything. 
 
 
Objective 4 raised elements of organisational contexts and their effects on the 
changes in the MACS of Saudi privatised companies.  
It can be said from the analysis of the data that were collected during this study, that the 
cultural, political, regulatory and structural factors have had a great impact on the 
changes in MACS. This study found that organisations are effected by changes in the 
political and regulatory environment and have to respond to these, possibly by changing 
their structure, so as to be able to deal with the changed environment more effectively. 
So it can be said that changes in organisational structure can be a result of the response 
of the organisation to changes in political and regulatory environment. 
In addition, changes in organisational cultural factors can be a result of the changes in 
national culture or changes in political, regulatory, social, and structural factors or the 
result of a conscious effort of the organisation to effect changes in its culture like the 
situation of STC. STC had a policy of trying to manage change in its culture. However, 
STC in some cases faced resistance from its employees to changing their culture and 
beliefs, so the organisation had to have a second plan, which was the ‘Golden Cheque’ 
and replacing such employees. 
 
Objective 5 set out to propose recommendations to Saudi privatised companies 
and the Saudi government that might help companies to improve their current 
management accounting control systems and assist the Saudi Arabian government 
when it privatises other organisations.  
These recommendations will be presented in detail in the following section. 
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7.3 Implications and Recommendations 
From the analysis, the implications of the findings reported in this thesis can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Although a privatised organisation has to have autonomy in setting its objectives 
(Uddin, 1997, 2003), objectives cannot be set without taking into consideration 
other social, economic, and political factors. For example, one of the objectives 
of STC and SEC is to increase the number of Saudi employees in the companies.  
2. A clear understanding of what the privatised enterprise is expected to achieve is 
crucial to improving its performance. Thus, objectives should be measureable 
and quantifiable since “what can be measured can be improved”. This can be 
seen at STC as most of its departments’ objectives were specified by numbers or 
percentages so they can measure them  
3. A privatised organisation’s objectives should be kept a few as possible and 
priorities should be established; the cost of non-commercial objectives should be 
made explicit; financial and non-financial indicators should be introduced; and 
accountability should be based on results which require the condition of 
complete and appropriate information.  
4. Effective change in accounting systems and budgetary process will most 
probably occur if it is preceded first by a change in the privatised organisation’s 
strategy and objectives and then a reorganisation of its administration and 
structure.  
5. Government can ensure that SOEs are better prepared for privatisation by 
ensuring that they have suitable skilled directors, who are allowed sufficient 
autonomy and given strong enough incentives to strengthen control systems and 
improve the company’s values (Al-Dehailan, 2004; Bozec et al., 2004). One of 
the first steps that the Saudi government took when it prepared STC for 
privatisation was appointing suitable skilled directors and members of the Board 
of Directors.  
6. Privatised organisations cannot control the changes in the external environment, 
which arise from privatisation but can only respond to them, but they can change 
their organisational culture by making efforts to change employees’ beliefs and 
the organisation’s values. In addition, organisational structure can be changed by 
efforts from the organisation to change it as a response to privatisation. 
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There are various recommendations that the Saudi Arabian government should 
consider when they are privatising other sectors and for privatised organisations to 
improve their management accounting control systems. 
 
1. The accounting and control systems used in SOEs should be modernised. 
The lengthy instructions and procedures guiding accounting practices should 
be updated and simplified. Specialised units and departments should be 
established and highly skilled and professional staff should be recruited. 
This can be noticed clearly at STC when the company simplified its 
budgeting procedures and recruited highly experienced accountants and 
established special departments for budgeting, strategic planning and 
costing.  
2. Different levels of managers should be given a greater opportunity to 
participate in setting objectives and in budget preparation. Possible benefits 
include (a) better understanding of assumptions underlying the objectives 
and the budget and direction of the organisation, (b) greater acceptance of 
the objectives and budgets as an attainable targets, and (c) clearer 
accountability centres. It was clearly noticeable at STC when the company 
allowed more participation from different levels of managers in setting their 
department’s objectives, which made it easy for the company to measure 
departmental performance. In contrast SEC still has its objectives set by the 
government; this affects the way that its managers are accountable, as they 
just have to follow government orders. 
3. The introduction of a reliable accounting system that collects financial and 
managerial information and prepares timely financial statements using 
generally accepted accounting principles should be a priority, if one does not 
already exist. The reasons for that are to provide SOE Boards of Directors 
and managers with sufficient information not only to monitor the 
performance of SOEs and allocate economic resources effectively, but also 
to generate confidence among potential investors and encourage their 
interest (Kennedy and Jones, 2003). STC applied a reliable accounting 
system and implemented a sophisticated standards that helped the company 
prepares its financial statements in an acceptable time. While SEC still 
suffers from delays in preparing its financial statements because of 
bureaucratic accounting procedures.  
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4. Therefore, to achieve successful reform, Saudi Arabian SOEs need to 
develop their accounting systems and maintain their accounts in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting standards in order to determine the 
current status and performance of the enterprise, and ensure that all 
necessary controls are in place to guarantee the efficient use of the 
enterprise’s resources. For example, STC first used an US GAAP then 
switched to purely commercial Saudi Accounting Standards, whereas SEC 
used governmental procedures guides, now combining them with Saudi 
Accounting Standards. 
5. An independent and effective state audit institution is needed to ensure 
adequate public accountability, check upon the economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness, and assess the legitimacy and procedures of the transactions 
carried out to support the move towards privatisation. Furthermore, 
education and training are needed to provide employees with the specific 
technical and methodological concepts and procedures necessary to carry out 
an effective privatisation process. This can be seen clearly at STC when the 
company worked with two auditing firms in addition to the BT team before 
the privatisation. This helped the STC to overcome all the problems that 
faced the company on its way to privatisation. In addition STC recruited 
more educated employees and trained some of its employees to gain more 
education in accounting and finance.  
6. This thesis found that the role and control of the General Audit Bureau 
(GAB) was ineffective. There is an urgent need to develop the GAB and 
enhance its role to secure effective monitoring of SOEs in order to facilitate 
the new government trend towards privatisation. It needs a sufficient level of 
incentives, independence, training, and competent staff. Its role should be 
proactive and not tied to the rules and regulations of the MOF. It was one of 
the main problems that faced STC at privatisation, as most of the data that 
were provided by the GAB were insufficient and people working there still 
had a governmental mentality and some of them were not qualified. 
7. Although the Saudi government enjoys economic and political stability and 
does not plan at the moment to transfer the whole ownership of its vital 
infrastructure to the private sector, the current economic situation, the 
dramatically growing population, and the poor quality of some existing 
infrastructure requires further private sector participation, which in turn 
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requires a satisfactory investment climate, a strong market, reliable external 
controls and a strong independent regulator. To achieve privatisation 
successfully, it is essential to improve the accounting environment by 
increasing the role of the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA), developing stock markets, and enhancing the level 
of public awareness regarding the importance of accounting information 
through the media, accounting professional and education. It is noticeable 
that most of the accountants at STC after privatisation are members of 
SOCPA whereas this is not the situation at SEC.  
8. The Saudi government should learn from the experience of the last three 
decades. In the 1970s and 1980s the emphasis was mainly on construction 
and accounting systems received little attention due to the budget surplus, 
which limited pressure for quality information for control (Al-Dehailan, 
2004). However, the economic situation changed in the 1990s, since the 
increased budget deficit together with high population growth forced the 
government to rationalise its expenditure and use resources effectively. 
Although the government has ambitious plans, its objectives are difficult to 
achieve in a weak information environment due to inadequate current 
accounting systems, which may lead to waste instead of rationalisation and 
impair effective control, planning and decision-making. Therefore, there is a 
strong need to develop the accounting environment (governmental and 
commercial) in Saudi Arabia to effectively govern the new economic trends 
and support government plans for privatisation. The government role will 
change from a service provider to a service regulator, which requires the 
regulatory authorities to be more effective and informative. This was seen in 
allowing a bigger role for SOCPA in setting Saudi Accounting Standards 
and forcing Saudi organisations to follow them. Also the government paid 
more attention to the stock market and created a regulatory body for that 
market with strong and specific roles, which called Capital Market 
Authority.  
9. The government should open the sector for competition once it has 
privatised an SOE in order to motivate the company to respond positively to 
market changes. Most of the changes at STC were motivated by competition, 
as the company has to respond to market changes and gain more from the 
market. Furthermore, SEC launched some plans to improve its efficiency, for 
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example applying BSC, after the announcement about allowing competition 
in the sector. This research shows clearly that competition is a much more 
powerful driver of change than privatisation per se.    
10. Once government has privatised an SOE, it should give the company full 
autonomy to set its objectives and budget, apply adequate accounting 
systems and costing systems, attracting qualified staff. This autonomy 
helped STC to motivate its managers to set achievable goals and to clarify 
their responsibilities. Moreover, it encouraged STC to apply more 
sophisticated costing systems and attract more qualified people. In contrast 
SEC still suffers from a lack of motivation on the part of its managers and 
employees and from unclear responsibilities.  
11. Saudi universities and institutes through their academics can contribute to 
achieving successful reform since this is the time for them to play a key role 
in order to serve their country. The privatisation process would provide a 
good opportunity for them to benefit organisations since organisations lack 
qualified staff. Moreover, they lack understanding of the organisations’ 
actual practices, which impacts negatively on their knowledge. Saudi 
universities and institutes can provide SOEs and privatised companies with 
special courses in accounting and finance and gain benefit from these 
universities’ academic expertise and do research on these companies’ 
problems and provide them with recommendations. 
 
7.4 Thesis Contributions to Knowledge: 
This research has made a contribution to the understanding of MACS and their 
relationship to privatisation. To date, little research has focused on the issues of 
management accounting control systems in developing countries. By investigating 
MACS and their relationship to privatisation in a Saudi context, this study has added to 
our understanding of how privatisation would change MACS bearing in mind the social, 
cultural, economic, and political contexts of a developing economy.  
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to investigate empirically 
the effects of privatisation on MACS in Saudi Arabia and the factors other than 
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privatisation that would affect MACS. In addition, this study identifies the gap between 
privatisation theory and MACS in Saudi organisations and thereby will hopefully 
contribute to improve the level of efficiency that privatisation would bring to an 
organisation. 
 
This study also fills the gap in the international literature on management accounting 
reform issues since it has focused on management accounting control systems and 
changes in its aspects as a result of privatisation and examines the effect of the three 
elements of organisational context on MACS. The study identifies the factors that 
would have an effect on MACS other than privatisation.  
 
This study provided empirical evidence from Saudi Arabia that supports other case 
study researchers in management accounting (Flamholz, Das and Tsui, 1985; Jones, 
1985; Espeland and Hirsch, 1990; Adam et al., 1992; Ogden, 1993; Wright et al., 1993; 
Karatas, 1995; Potts, 1995; Boycko et al., 1996; Wickramasinghe, 1996; Uddin, 1997; 
Ferreira, 2002), namely that privatisation would change the aspects of MACS by 
interaction with the elements of organisational contexts and social, political, and 
economical factors. Thus this study replicated earlier research on management 
accounting control systems and the impact on these of privatisation, and extended the 
research by providing additional material, such as the identification of factors other than 
privatisation that affect MACS in privatised companies.  
 
7.5 Research Limitations 
Any research effort has its own limitations which have to be frankly admitted and 
discussed in detail as a means of furthering the understanding of what the research has 
accomplished. This thesis has several limitations.  
 
First, because this study was conducted as an exploratory case study in two 
organisations, the results are constrained by the unique nature of these organisations and 
their activities. Hence, findings obtained highlight only the changes in aspects of MACS 
as a result of privatisation in the two organisations being studied and, therefore, lack 
generalisation.  
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The second main limitation was the methods of data collection. The primary data 
collection in this research was semi-structured interviews. The various shortcomings of 
interviews have been admitted, discussed and dealt with in detailed in Chapter Four. 
  
The third main limitation was the timeframe. Given the limited time available, a 
complete investigation of the phenomenon under consideration could not be undertaken, 
especially by using a case study approach. Although all possible efforts were made to 
interview as many people as possible in both STC and SEC, the companies allowed 
only a limited number of participants.   
 
Fourth, there were limitations in access to information especially at SEC, where 
officials were particularly hesitant to release information due the nature of the 
information requested. Access to such information was sometimes impossible because 
of confidentiality. However, access in this study was gained through advanced 
permissions and arrangements, a friendly relationship and a formal contact as a 
representative of Umm Alqura University, where the researcher is a teaching assistant.  
 
Fifth, the strength of the analyses presented depends on the ability of the researcher to 
identify, choose and analyse the empirical data considered being the most important and 
appropriate. Since this involved judgements, the analyses faced the risk of being biased 
towards values that the researcher adopted and the extent of his knowledge to make 
such choices. The researcher overcomes this limitation through classifying the areas of 
the study and choosing and grouping participants accordingly. Therefore, although the 
researcher was selective in terms of issues and participants due to time constraints, this 
selectivity, did not affect the analysis. 
 
Despite the above limitations, the researcher believes that the study has been 
successfully executed and provides new understanding in the research area studied, 
shedding light on the under-researched area of MACS issues in Saudi Arabia. 
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7.6 Areas for Future Research 
One of the main aims of this chapter is to highlight some areas where further research 
might be pursued in order to contribute to the understanding of management accounting 
control systems and organisational change in privatised companies.  
First, data was collected for this study in early 2008, two years ago; during this time 
organisation might have undergone some changes, thus an updating study would be 
recommended to investigate the changes over the time.   
Second, the Saudi government announced that it would privatise more of the public 
sector and in the case of electricity sector; the Saudi government announced that it 
would open the sector to competition and reduce its involvement in the SEC. These 
would suggest a study of the effect of the introduction of these factors on MACS in 
SEC and compare it with other new privatised sectors. This could be compared to the 
findings of this study. 
Third, due to the lack of studies about privatisation in Saudi Arabia, a further study 
could be conducted to examine the impact of privatisation on the Saudi economy in 
general, company financial performance in particular and on public satisfaction with the 
new policy.  
Fourth, a study could be conducted on other countries that share the same economic, 
cultural, and political systems as Saudi Arabia, especially countries from the Gulf 
Corporation Council (GCC) or Middle East Countries. The study might try to provide a 
framework for other countries to follow when they want to implement a privatisation 
policy. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
This study has provided several important insights into issues relating to Management 
Accounting Control Systems. It is one of the first to investigate how privatisation 
affected the management accounting control systems in Saudi Arabia by investigating 
the changes in aspects of MACS before and after privatisation in two Saudi privatised 
companies. This research discovered other factors that might affect MACS other than 
privatisation 
 
This research has also contributed to the management accounting literature by providing 
advice for governments of less developed countries, which intend to pursue 
privatisation policies. It has identified the key factors, which should improve 
management accounting control systems, in particular the importance of introducing 
competition and avoiding governmental interference in the affairs of privatised 
companies. 
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Appendix A: Interviewee Questions 
 
A. Introductory 
 
1. How long have you worked for this organisation? 
 
2. What positions have you held during that time? Qualifications and experience 
gained? 
 
3. What do you do now? 
 
 
 
B. External Environment 
 
 
4. What did you understand to be the main objectives of privatisation at the time it 
was introduced? Has your understanding changed over the years? 
 
5. What do you consider have been the main consequences of privatisation for your 
organisation? Any unintended consequences? 
 
6. What did you consider was the role of the regulator at the time of privatisation? 
Has your understanding changed over years? 
 
7. What do you consider have been the main consequences of regulation for the 
industry? Any unintended consequences? 
 
8. Are you personally accountable to (a) the regulator or (b) any other external 
bodies as a result of regulatory requirements?  
 
9. Do you feel that your accountability relationships are clear and well defined? Do 
you find any conflicts between accountabilities to different bodies? 
 
10. In terms of your organisation’s stakeholders, who do you think have been the 
winners and losers over the years since privatisation? (by stakeholders, I mean 
employees, directors, shareholders, customers, suppliers, government) 
 
11. Is the current level of regulation too intrusive, about right or not strong enough? 
 
12. What, if any, are the main changes you would like to see in the regulatory 
process? 
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C. Organisational structure 
 
 
13. Could you provide me with an organisation chart? Can we discuss it? 
 
14. Who do you report to? Who do you work with? Do you find any conflicts in 
being accountable to different people, e.g. because they have conflicting 
objectives? 
 
15. Are unit managers responsible for revenue, profit, cost control, ROCE? Has this 
changed since privatisation?  
 
16. Your organisation has undergone numerous reorganisations since privatisation. 
What are the main reasons? Do you believe the reorganisations have been 
effective in helping your organisation to meet new challenges? 
 
17. To what extent have you experienced new reporting structures and 
accountabilities which are due to the company reorganising: (a) to meet 
regulatory requirements, or (b) reshaping the business in order to move into new 
areas? 
 
18. In what ways reorganisations have directly affected the work that you do? Have 
they helped you to contribute more in your work towards the achievement of 
organisational objectives? 
 
19. What have the main effects of changes in organisational structure on your career 
with your organisation? 
 
20. Are you aware of any power shifts (i.e. greater influence exerted by some 
departments or divisions than other) as a result of reorganisations? 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Organisational culture 
 
 
21. Do you believe your organisation had distinctive organisational values prior to 
privatisation? Can you describe it? What changed?   
 
 
22. Do you think the changes in the organisational values have developed in 
response to new challenges, or has there been a planned effort by top 
management to change the culture? 
 
23. Have you experienced any ideas, which you believe were planned attempts to 
change the culture, e.g. attendance at courses on management techniques, 
financial awareness, etc.? 
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24. Are certain specialist skills accorded greater prestige, status and rewards than 
others within your organisation? Are certain skills more in demand now than 
they were before privatisation? Is great importance attached to professional 
qualifications? 
 
25. Would you tell me about the difference between the public sector and 
commercial philosophy on the way they think the organisation should be 
operated? 
 
26. Do you think your organisation has changed its image in the minds of the 
public? In what ways? 
 
27. Do you think that any of the changes you have experienced in relation to 
provision of financial information have resulted in a change in organisational 
culture? 
 
28. What have been the main effects on your work and career of any cultural 
changes? 
 
29. Does the number of the employees changed? How? Did u change the required 
qualifications? Why?  
 
 
 
E. Accounting information  
 
 
30. Do you think financial information has been taken on greater significance in 
relation to your work since privatisation? In what ways?  
 
31. What sort of accounting techniques do you use in your unit? And why?  
 
32. What sort of changes have you experienced in dealing with financial information 
(e.g. more use of budgeting, new or increasing accountability, ABC)? 
 
33. Do you accept that the financial control you experienced are relevant and 
important in your work? 
 
34. Do you think that any of the financial controls influence your behaviour in a 
way that they were not intended to do? 
 
 
35. What financial information do you have to produce? Do you report the 
information directly to an external body or to someone else within your 
organisation? 
 
36. Which financial performance indicators are of most importance to the regulator, 
shareholders, investors, and decision-makers? 
 
37. What is the role of the managers in achieving co-ordination between 
departments? 
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38. Do you receive accounting reports on time? Are you satisfied with the 
information provided in these reports? 
 
39. Do you use non-accounting information, such as production reports, narrative 
reports? And to what extent do you think they are useful? 
 
40. Can you explain to me the importance of accounting to your company in terms 
of its usefulness in control? 
 
41. What is the role of the managers in the process of budget setting? (e.g. record 
keeper, consultant, coordinator) 
 
42. Do you use accounting data for the purposes of problem solving and 
performance evaluation? Would you provide me with examples please? 
 
43. In which area does your company make formalised plans or budgets? 
 
44. How often each budget is revised? (e.g. annually, quarterly, monthly) 
 
45. How often variance reports are prepared (actual vs. budget)? (e.g. weekly, 
monthly, quarterly) 
 
46. Do you have an internal audit department? If yes, what are the objectives of this 
department?  
 
47. Do you have an external audit department? Does it required by the regulators? 
And how does it function with the internal audit department? 
 
48. Have the financial accounting requirements changed since the privatisation? If 
so, who ask for these changes? Why? What are the impacts of the changes on 
the control system?     
 
49. Could you explain the purposes of the use of the management accounting data?( 
e.g. measure performance, determine the cost, evaluate the efficiency) 
 
50. How are specific budgets or goals established? (e.g. goals and objectives are 
established exclusively by members of higher management without consultation 
with lower levels of management or it developed by higher levels of 
management and are presented to lower levels of management for their 
consideration and comment prior to final adoption) 
 
51. Does your organisation usually establish specific non-financial budgetary targets 
for its managers? (e.g. Productivity, human resources development) 
 
52. How many budgets do you use based on its purpose? (e.g. planning and co-
ordination, evaluation purposes) 
 
53. How frequently do you review your annual budget for possible revision of 
goals? (e.g. monthly, quarterly, semi-annually) 
 
250 
 
54. How frequently do corporate managers formally meet with lower level managers 
to discuss budget related matters? (e.g. weekly, monthly, quarterly) 
 
55. How do you handle the reports, which show a significant variance? (e.g. written 
or oral explanation, indicate what corrective action is to be taken) 
 
56. Does your organisation have the freedom to set their prices? How? What are the 
regulators’ requirements for that?  
 
57. Would you tell me about the capital investment in your organisation? And what 
are the techniques they use for that?  
 
58. How does your organisation manage their cash flow/liquidity? In other words, 
can you tell me about your cash budgeting?  
 
59. Would you tell me about the rewards system in your organisation? Does it 
conflict with accounting department?  
 
60. What are the methods used for personal evaluation? (e.g. residual income, 
variance analysis, sales target to productivity). And if there is a variance, how do 
you handle it?  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
